CHAPTER FIRST.

VERACITY AS IT RESPECTS THE PAST AND PRESENT.

VERACITY, in this sense, always has respect to a fact; that is, to something done, or to something which we believe to be doing.

Moral truth consists in our intention to convey to another, to the best of our ability, the conception of a fact, exactly as it exists in our own minds.

Physical truth consists in conveying to another the conception of a fact, precisely as it actually exists, or existed.

These two, it is evident, do not always coincide.

I may innocently have obtained an incorrect conception of a fact myself, and yet may intend to convey it to another precisely as it exists in my own mind. Here, then, is a moral truth, but a physical untruth.

Or, again, I may have a correct conception of a fact, supposing it to be an incorrect one, and may convey it to another with the intention to deceive. Here, then, is a moral falsehood, and a physical truth. Pure truth is communicated, only, when I have a correct conception of a fact, and communicate it, intentionally, to another, precisely as it exists in my own mind.

The law on this subject is, that when we profess to convey a fact to another, we, to the best of our ability, convey to him the impression which exists in our own minds. This implies, first, that we convey the impression which exists, and not another; and, secondly, that impression, without diminution or exaggeration. In other words, we are obliged, in the language of jurisprudence, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

This law, therefore, forbids,

1. The utterance, as truth, of what we know to be false. I say the utterance as truth, for we sometimes imagine cases for the sake of illustration, as parables, or fictitious writing, where it is known beforehand, that we merely address the imagination. Since we utter it as fiction, and wish it not to be believed, there is no falsehood if it be not true.

2. Uttering as truth what we do not know to be true. Many things which men assert, they cannot know to be true; such, for instance, are, in many cases, the motives of others. There are many other things which may be probable, and we may be convinced that they are so, but of which we cannot arrive at the certainty. There are other things which are merely matters of opinion, concerning which every several man may hold a different opinion. Now, in any such case, to utter as truth what we cannot know, or have not known, to be truth, is falsehood. If a man utter any thing as truth, he assumes the responsibility of ascertaining it to be so. If he, who makes the assertion, be not responsible, where shall the responsibility rest? And, if any man may utter what he chooses, under no responsibility, there is the end of all credibility.

But, it will be said, are we never to utter any thing which we do not know to be true? I answer: we are never to utter as truth what we do not know to be true. Whatever is a

matter of probability, we may utter as a matter of probability; whatever is a matter of opinion we may state as a matter of opinion. If we convey to another a conception as true, of which we have only the impression of probability, we convey a different conception from that which exists in our own minds, and of course we do, in fact, speak falsely.

3. Uttering what may be true in fact, but uttering it in such a manner, as to convey a false impression to the hearers.

As 1. By exaggerating some or all of the circumstances attendant upon the facts.

2. By extenuating some or all of the circumstances attendant upon the facts.

3. By exaggerating some, and extenuating others.

4. By stating the facts just as they existed, but so arranging them as to leave a false impression upon the hearer. As, for instance, I might say, A entered B's room, and left it at ten o'clock. Within five minutes after he left it, B discovered that his watch had been stolen. Now, although I do not say, that A stole B's watch, yet if I intentionally so arrange and connect these facts as to leave a false impression upon the mind of the hearer, I am guilty of falsehood. This is a crime to which pleaders and partial historians, and all party narrators, are specially liable.

4. As the crime, here considered, consists in making a false impression, with intention to deceive, the same effect may be produced by the tones of the voice, a look of the eye, a motion of the head, or any thing by which the mind of another may be influenced. The same rule, therefore, applies to impressions made in this manner, as to those made by words.

5. As this rule applies to our intercourse with men as intelligent agents, it applies to our intercourse with men under all the possible relations of life. Thus, it forbids parents to lie to children, and children to lie to parents; instructers to pupils, and pupils to instructers; the old to the young, and the young to the old; attorneys to jurors, and jurors to attorneys; buyers to sellers, and sellers to buyers. That is, the obligation is universal, and cannot be set aside, by any of the complicated relations in which men stand to each other.

Nor can it be varied, by the considerations, often introduced, that the person with whom we are conversing has no right to know the truth. This is a sufficient reason why we should not tell the truth, but it is no reason why we should tell a falsehood. Under such circumstances we are at liberty to refuse to reveal any thing, but we are not at liberty to utter what is false.

The reason for this is the following: The obligation to veracity does not depend upon the right of the inquirer to know the truth. Did our obligation depend upon this, it would vary with every person with whom we conversed; and, in every case before speaking, we should be at liberty to measure the extent of our neighbor's right, and to tell him truth or falsehood accordingly. And, inasmuch as the person whom we address, would never know at what rate we estimated his right, no one would know how much to believe, any more than we should know how much truth or falsehood we were at liberty to tell. This would at once destroy every obligation to veracity. On the contrary, inasmuch as we are under obligation to utter nothing but truth in consequence of our relations to God; this obligation is never affected by any of the circumstances under which we are called upon to testify. Let no one, therefore, excuse himself, on the ground that he tells only innocent lies. It cannot be innocent to do that which God has forbidden.