ciple of self-love, and despaired of finding any objective criterion of right and wrong other than that afforded by the law of the civil magistrate. Butler's opposition to his teaching comes out most clearly in reference to his doctrine of the objects of desire, and the definitions of benevolence and compassion which he was led from the necessities of his system to adopt. As to the first of these points of divergence, Butler has indicated his own opinion in § 35 of the Preface, and he explains it more fully in Serm. xi. 4 ff.1 Hobbes' views of benevolence and compassion seem to be based on dicta of Aristotle, whose philosophy he had been obliged to study when a boy at Oxford. Aristotle's picture of the μeyaλóyvxos, the "high-souled man" of Greek ethics, in which we have a faithful representation of what is now called a "prig," contains the following description : καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν· εὐεργετούμενος δ ̓ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δὲ ὑπερεχομένου, viz., “ And he is the sort of man to do kindnesses, but he is stricken with shame when he has received a benefit; for in the one case he is in the position of a superior, in the other of an inferior" (Nic. Eth. IV. iii. 24). Hobbes adopts this in the form: "There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is the conception wherein consisteth charity" (Human Nature, ix. 17). It must be admitted that Butler, in his polemical note (Serm. i. 6), puts the worst possible construction on these words. He does more justice to Hobbes in a memorandum first recovered and pub-` lished by Bp. Steere,2 which may fitly be cited here: "Hobbes' definition of benevolence that 'tis the love of power is base and false. But there is more of truth in it than appears at first sight; the real benevolence of men being, I think for the most part, not indeed the single love of power, but the love of power to be exercised in the way of doing good, which is a different thing from love to the good or happiness of others by whomsoever effected, which last I would call single or simple benevolence. How little there is of this in the world may appear by observing how many persons can bear with great tranquillity that a friend or child should live in misery, who yet cannot bear the thought of their death.” Again, Aristotle's definition of pity seems to be behind that of Hobbes. He says (Rhet. ii. 8): ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος, λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ καὶ λυπηρῷ, τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὅ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἄν παθεῖν, ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα ; καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται. We know that as early as 1631 Hobbes made a Latin version of this treatise of Aristotle's, which was afterwards published in English under the title of "The Whole Art of Rhetoric"; and there is no doubt that the words quoted above suggested the line 2 See p. 306 below. 1 See Note C appended to Serm. xi. of thought in the following passage, which is of sufficient importance to be given in full. "Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man's calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us; for the evil that happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also, that men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out of love to their aspect. The contrary of pity is hardness of heart, proceeding either from slowness of imagination, or some extreme great opinion of their own exemption from the like calamity, or from hatred of all or most men (Human Nature, ix. 10). It is worth observing that Descartes takes exactly the same view of compassion (Les passions de l'âme, iii. 186). Butler's objections to this theory are fully given in a scornful note on Serm. v. I; in the main there can be no doubt that he is right, though some of his verbal criticisms may not seem quite fair to his opponent. That to which our whole nature leads us is divinely ordered. In thus taking nature as a guide, three cautions necessary: a SERMON II. UPON HUMAN NATURE. For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves (Romans ii. 14). [1.] As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so likewise moral obligations may be shewn by different methods. If the real nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than to any other; this is a reason to believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the And the more complex eye was intended for us to see with. any constitution is, and the greater variety of parts there are which thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the proof that such end was designed. However, when the inward frame of man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost caution must be used that none make peculiarities in their bown temper, or anything which is the effect of particular customs, though observable in several, the standard of what is common to the species; and above all, that the highest principle be not forgot or excluded, that to which belongs the adjustment and correction of all other inward movements and The standard affections: which principle will of course have some influence, but which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shewn, ought to preside over and govern all the rest. The difficulty of rightly observing the two former cautions; the appearance there is of some small diversity amongst mankind with respect of human nature not quite fixed for: C i. ii. to this faculty, with respect to their natural sense of moral good and evil; and the attention necessary to survey with any iii. exactness what passes within, have occasioned that it is not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal nature of man, as of his external form. Neither is this last exactly settled. Yet we understand one another when we speak of Yet it is approximately the shape of a human body: so likewise we do when we speak fixed. of the heart and inward principles, how far soever the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is therefore ground for an attempt of shewing men to themselves, of shewing them what course of life and behaviour their real nature points out and would lead them to. Now obligations of virtue shewn, and motives to the practice of it enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and natural conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for the proof As the eye is of things cognizable by them. (Since then our inward feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our external senses, are equally real; to argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to exception, as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his eyes were given him to see with, as he can doubt of the truth of the science of optics, deduced from ocular experiments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame; a man can as little doubt whether it was given him to prevent his doing shameful actions, as he can doubt whether his eyes were given him to guide his steps) And as to these inward feelings themselves; that they are real, that man has in his nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned, than that he has external senses. Neither can the former be wholly mistaken; though to a certain degree liable to greater mistakes than the latter. [2.] There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several principles in the heart of man, carry him to society, and to contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense and a manner in which no inward principle leads him to evil. These principles, propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good, are approved of by a certain faculty within, quite distinct from these propensions themselves. All this hath been fully made out in the foregoing discourse. [Cp. Serm. i. 12 above.] given us to see with, so is the feeling of shame intended doing of shame. to prevent the ful things. We have seen in Serm. i. seek the wel are approved by conscience. [3] But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the purpose of virtue and religion? these require, not only that we do good to others, when we are led this way, by benevolence or reflection, happening to be stronger than other principles, passions, or appetites; but likewise that the whole character be formed upon thought and reflection; that every action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule than the strength and prevalency of any principle or passion. What sign is there in our nature (for the inquiry is only about what is to be collected from thence) that this was intended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may indeed be absurd and unnatural for men to act without any reflection; nay, without regard to that particular kind of reflection which you call conscience; because this does belong to our nature. For as there never was a man but who approved one place, prospect, building, before another: so it does not appear that there ever was a man who would not have approved an action of humanity rather than of cruelty; interest and passion being quite out of the case. But interest and passion do come in, and are often too strong for and prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as brutes have various instincts, by which they are carried on to the end the Author of their nature intended them for: is not man in the same condition; with this difference only, that to his instincts (ie. appetites and passions) is added the principle of reflection or conscience? And as brutes act agreeably to their nature, in following that principle or particular instinct which for the present is strongest in them: does not man likewise act agreeably to his nature, or obey the law of his creation, by following that principle, be it passion or conscience, which for the present happens to be strongest in him? Thus different men are by their particular nature hurried on to pursue honour, or riches, or pleasure: there are also persons whose temper leads them in an uncommon degree to kindness, compassion, doing good to their fellow-creatures: as there are others who are given to suspend their judgment, to weigh and consider things, and to act upon thought and reflection. Let every one then quietly follow his nature; as passion, reflection, appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be strongest: but let not the man of virtue take upon him to blame the ambitious, the covetous, |