mitted himself with respect to General Clavering, or Major Tonyn; the thing was absolutely impossible. He agreed with his right honourable friend, that a blindness and an indisposition to make themselves acquainted with unplea sant truths were the characteristics of many men in high office. Therefore he should not vote for the resolution. The right honourable gentleman now asserted, that there were no grounds for further proceedings if his resolution should be agreed to; but if there were no grounds for further proceeding, what was to become of the necessity the House was under, according to his argument, to come to a direct decision, aye or no, guilty or not guilty, unless that the House was only to be allowed to find for the acquittal? He was aware that the right honourable gentleman had frequently changed his votes, not that he would impute to him the design of catching thereby a few more votes, but that it had arisen from accidental changes in his opinions. It was impossible for him to vote for the resolution, and it would be improper for the House to vote any words of equivocal or ambiguous meaning. The public expected that they should do their duty fairly and openly, and the House, he was sure, would do itself credit by proving to the public that it performed its duty, plainly, honestly, and uprightly. He could not shut it out from the House, that to vote for the resolution would preclude them from any proceeding which would have the effect of securing the public from the future recurrence of such abuses. The right honourable gentleman, no doubt, might say, that there was another head, that of improper influence, under which a resolution of censure might afterwards be brought forward; but no such thing had been proposed by the right honourable gentleman. But if the right honourable gentleman did not think that his Royal Highness had been guilty of corruption or connivance, the proceeding he proposed was one of the most unjust description towards his Royal Highness. After the House of Commons declared that his Royal Highness was not guilty of corrup tion, of participation, of connivance, or improper influence, the proceeding of the right honourable gentleman was to go on to brand his Royal Highness for a crime, of which that House could have no cognizance, unless it was connected with some official delinquency. He had voted for the amendment of the honourable gentleman (Mr. Bankes), on a former night, because this circum

stance had been introduced into it in the only way in which it ought to be introduced. But he would never consent that it should be introduced in any other way. With regard to the vote he should give, he must say that on the score of corruption there was no ground of charge against his Royal Highness, but he could not express by his vote that there had been no connivance, because it had been clearly proved that an improper influence had been exercised. Neither should he vote for the amendment of the honourable baronet. It was but justice, however, to the illustrious person, who was the object of the vote he was to give that night, to state, that from all the information he had been able to collect, the regulations made by the Duke of York had been highly beneficial to the army. The noble lord concluded by declaring, that he should negative the resolution and the amendment.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer did not think the noble lord was well founded in the ironical reproach which he had thrown out against him, for shaping his resolution in such a manner as to catch the greatest number of votes. He had only adopted an alteration in the phrase for the purpose of more clearly expressing his idea. If the noble lord really felt himself in that painful situation that he had mentioned, he would be glad to find that the grounds of his argument had originated entirely from mistake. The noble lord said, that he could find no grounds from the evidence to say that the Duke of York was not guilty. The address, however, did not go the length of saying that his Royal Highness was not guilty, but merely that there was no ground for the House to charge him with guilt. The noble lord had said, that when the resolution stated that there was no ground, he could not avoid supplying a word, and putting the question, whether there was a "sufficient" ground? If the noble lord would then so far give him credit as to believe that this was really what he meant by the resolution, it would spare his lordship the pain of voting against it. He hoped that, if the word "sufficient" were supplied, the noble lord would vote in favour of the resolution. As to the word charge, however, he would remind the noble lord that when the word was first mentioned, the whole bench upon which he sat was in an uproar. They then said that nothing could come up to the meaning of the word charge, but such an accusation as might be the subject of an impeachment, or

of further proceedings of a criminal nature; he would say, for himself, or in explanation of his own meaning, that when he called upon the House by this resolution to say, not guilty of corruption or criminal connivance, he meant nothing more than to state that there was no ground upon which the House would be justified in convicting him as guilty. He did not meant to express that he was not guilty, but to say that the House could not find him guilty. In such cases he would refer to an old maxim of law," De non apparentibus et non existentibus, eadem est ratio." The noble lord had said, that the passing this resolution would lead to an address to his Majesty to continue the Duke of York in his situation of Commander-inchief. He would declare, that by this resolution he meant no such thing; and the House would be perfectly at liberty to take what other measure they might think proper. This resolution would not at all touch the question which had been started, of the Duke's permitting an undue influence to be used. The noble lord had asked, Can I say, after the cases of Dr. O'Meara and Major Tonyn, that there was no corruption or criminal connivance? To this it might easily be answered, that those cases neither proved corruption nor connivance, although in the opinion of some gentlemen they would be considered sullicient to establish the fact of his Royal Highness allowing Mrs. Clarke to use an improper influence. He might allow, that an improper interference had been permitted in the eases of Dr. O'Meara, General Clavering, and Major Tonyn, and yet this (although highly improper) would not go to convict the Duke of either corruption or con nivance. As to the distinction which had been attempted to be drawn between direct corruption and corrupt connivance, he could not admit it. The one was as base and as infamous as the other. If by connivance was meant the definition which was given in the dictionaries of that word, "a voluntary blindness," this came quite up to the idea of corruption. He, therefore, could not thank the House for an acquittal, on the ground of personal corruption, if they found the Duke guilty of this connivance. Indeed, if either of those crimes were supposed to be worse than the other, he should conceive connivance to be the worst, inasmuch as hypocrisy is one of the most odious vices. If the Duke, under the parade of regulations for the good of the army, was conniving at practices directly contrary

to the spirit and meaning of these regulations, he would have been guilty not only of corruption, but hypocrisy. He, therefore, should not be satisfied with any acquittal that did not clear him of both these crimes. After the House had cleared his Royal Highness of those charges, which he did hope they would, he begged it might be perfectly understood, that he considered that it was completely open to them to resolve as they thought proper upon the question of undue influence, or to bring up whatever address they thought proper to the foot of the throne. He should be very sorry indeed if by any imperfection in his mode of expressing his sentiments on the resolution, he should fail to have his lordship's vote in acquitting his Royal Highness of the base criminality which had been imputed to him. If there was any gentleman in the House who considered his Royal Highness guilty of personal corruption, or connivance at money being taken by Mrs. Clarke for his interest, he could not ask such gentleman for his vote, as it would disgrace him to give it. He would confess, however, that in his opinion, the happiest termination of the case would be, if it terminated in the continuance of the service of his Royal Highness. In the opi nion of all who acquitted his Royal Highness from the charge of personal corruption, the case which was before the House was a case supported by falsehood, (for personal corruption was what Mrs. Clarke meant to prove). It would then be much to be regretted, if a case supported by falsehood, and avowedly aimed at his destruction, should be crowned with complete success as to its object. He conceived that the resolution would be attended with some inconvenience and mischief, not merely from the private immorality which it would have to notice, but from the great inconvenience that the country must have suffered in consequence of all other business having been postponed for this long protracted discussion. All those public inconveniencies ought to be traced up to their proper source. The question at present before the House, and which was the only question, was, whether the Duke of York was guilty of personal corruption, or connivance to the corrupt practices of others? The resolution did not imply a denial of improper influence having been permitted. It did, however, deny the infamy that would be attached to personal corruption or connivance. This was all that it meant to deny, and he hoped it would have the

support of all those who really did not believe the Duke either personally corrupt, or conniving at corruption in others.

Mr. Whitbread differed from the right honourable gentleman (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) in supposing that direct corruption and connivance were crimes of equal magnitude, or, if any thing, that connivance was the worst, as including hypocrisy. Now it appeared to him, that direct or personal corruption was a crime so base and so mean, that it could never admit of any excuse or palliation; but he could conceive it very possible, that a man under the infatuation and madness that the Duke might be supposed to be from his love to Mrs. Clarke, might connive at very improper things, and yet not be capable of the baseness personally to commit them. In the one case a man's character was retrievable-in the other not. The right honourable gentleman had said that the House was at perfect liberty, whether they ne gatived this resolution or not, to go up to the throne with an address, grounded upon the idea of an improper influence having been exerted. The House, however, must be aware that the right honourable gentleman only intended these resolutions as a step to something further. The right honourable gentleman had informed the House that, in his opinion, the Duke of York was a fit person to command the army. This conclusion was in fact the point to which his resolution tended. He now had asked the House, would they lend themselves as instruments to Mrs. Clarke? Mrs. Clarke, however, was not the accuser, but the witness. The accuser was his honourable friend (Colonel Wardle). A right honourable gentleman had said the other day that his honourable friend was the reluctant instrument of an abandoned junto. As to the situation of a public accuser, he thought that, at the present time, it ought to be cherished as the only means of bringing to light the vices of the great. But as to the abandoned junto, he would ask, of what did it consist? It certainly consisted of those instruments of a system of corruption, which it required the firmness and ability of his honourable friend to extract the truth from, and to make them the instruments of good, instead of the instruments of evil. A right honourable friend of his (Mr. Windham), had spoken of the manner in which his honourable friend (Colonel Wardle), had obtained