pair the power of this united kingdom, will terminate in the disgrace and ruin of those by whom it may be made, and that my people will find an ample reward for all their sacrifices, in an undisturbed enjoyment of that freedom and security, which by their patriotism and valour they will have preserved and ensured to themselves and their posterity."

Further Observations on the Importance of Malta. By GEORGE ORR, Esq. Taken from a Pamphlet recently published. "Or all the foreign possessions which the English retain, not one is more valuable, nor can be retained at a less expense. Its contiguity to Sicily and Italy will always secure to it plenty of provisions. It is a fit situation for a naval arsenal, and a British garrison; and, setting aside its importance as a military station and naval depot in time of war, its advantage, in a commercial point of view, for the British trade in the Levant and the Mediterranean, is such, that it makes amends, in a great measure, for the privation of every port in Italy, and from which the French could easily exclude us, as has already appeared. Considered in a military point of view -first, no expedition to Egypt, from the south of France, or Italy, could ever pass it; and it would give fuch an effectual interruption to any supplies, supposing an expedition had passed, that it must eventually fail. Its harbours are so very commodious, that the whole British navy might ride in safety in them. The knights of Malta, and the Maltese, are so very indifferent about being restored to the former order of things, that they have never hinted it; and to reinstate such a handful of scattered superannuated knights, without revenues and without power, while kings and dukes are dethroned and disinherited sans ceremonie, would not only be absurd but insulting. The English, in possession of this important post, may command the coasts of Africa, Egypt, Syria, Sicily, and Italy, the southern coasts of France and Spain; and, if they regard their own interests, they will not surrender it.

Since the treaty of Amiens, have not whole countries been seized by France? And while the French government cuts and carves for itself at pleasure, could it possibly be wondered at, or could it possibly be objected to, that England should keep the solitary possession of Malta? The importance of this island is such, and the difficulty of repossessing it, if once

MEMORIAL OF TALLEYRAND.

37

surrendered, so great, that Britain ought never to surrender her present hold."

These suggestions, added to those which appeared in our former Number, will satisfy any reasonable person that we have not a small thing at stake in the island of Malta; res specting which, Buonaparte told our ambassador that he had rather see us in possession of the suburbs of PARIS!

Extracts from a Memorial of M. TALLETRAND, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, developing the ambitious and unjust Views of France, during the late Peace.

T

TALLEYRAND, as every body knows, is one of the principal advisers and confidential friends of Buonaparte; therefore, the opinions which are here given, respecting" the conquest of the British islands," must be regarded as highly influential and important.

Talleyrand begins by telling the First Consul that the present memorial is merely a copy of one presented to the mi nisters of Louis XV. after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to "dissuade them from that fatal and dishonourable war to France which ended in 1762. He says "by the ignorance of the ministers, the bribes of Austria, the intrigues of Bernis, the Influence of Pompadour, and the weakness of Louis XV. those strong reasons for peace were not listened to; the consequence is known, but it is not known that this impolitic war alone prevented the total ruin of England during the following or American war, and preserved that country from 'being what, if we are prudent, it sooner or later must be, an invaluable naval and military station of France, and which shall secure us the empire of the world."

Talleyrand then enters into the particulars of the many and irresistible means, France, during the peace, possesses, to foment troubles, to spread discontent, to tarnish the honour, to undermine the resources, to weaken the strength, to lull asleep the public spirit, and to cool the patriotism of the inhabitants of the British empire; and, by a gradual train of intrigues, insults, demands, insurrections, vexations, murmurs, alarms, and bankruptcy, prepare even the warmest English patriot to see with indifference, if not with approbation, an union with France, which will put an end to all difficulties, and procure Englishmen the same tranquillity, honour, and happiness Frenchmen enjoy, under the mild but firm government of the Chief Consul."

TOV.

"But," says he, "powerful as France is upon the continent, by its conquests, by its influence, by the vigour of its government, and by the victories of its armies; in regard to England, it is not in a better position of strength, than in 1755 because, with the knowledge of our means, and with the great abilities of our ruler, we are unable directly to injure England, our navy being more reduced, and our naval officers more ignorant, than in 1755: but, indirectly, and in a time of peace, to lay the infallible foundation for the future subjection of England, France at no former period had so many certain and undoubted underhand methods. A war at present may lessen, if not destroy them; but every year's continuance of peace shall preserve, augment, and

fix them.

"Ought we not to wait, at least ten years, before we renew the war with England? till we are in a condition effectually to support our claims, our views, and our plans? The English will do our business, if we permit them. Their religion is pleasure, and their pleasure debauchery. They have plunged themselves into an excess of luxury and intemperance. They have begun to neglect their navy, and to disband their artificers, who go to France, Spain, and Holland, for maintenance.

"While their individuals squander their riches, the state grows parsimonious, and begins to save in those articles on which it cannot be too profuse.

"They are even, near reducing their trivial army, and their patriots speak of intrusting, what they call their liberty and property, to the valour of a militia. What a field is this for our policy Is it our business to awaken or arouse them from their lethargy? If we do, the consequence is obvious; we teach them to believe a real truth-that they cannot strengthen themselves too much by sea or land. Then an army ceases to be the object of public complaint, of public dislike; and the people begin to think that, as they must have one, it is better to have an army of English than of Frenchmen. Then their young nobility will continue to apply themselves to the military profession, and think themselves honoured by that profession, in which alone consist the defence and security of their country.

This may be fatal to us; for the sooner we go to war, the sooner their effeminacy will wear off, and their ancient spirit and courage revive. They will not then become more wealthy, but they will get more wisdom, which is better. The military virtues, and the manly exercises, may become fashionable; and the nation, which now seems immersed in

MEMORIAL OF TALLEYRAND.

39

debauchery and corruption, may yet think seriously, and be once more, what it has often been-the terror of Europe. This is not an unnatural supposition-they easily glide from one extreme to another-it is their natural temper, and their whole history is one continued proof of it.

"The ashes of la Vendée still smoke-it requires only a spark to kindle a civil war in the bosom of our country. The returned emigrants are as yet quiet, but they have not forgotten their former principles, and the wrongs they have suffered from the revolution. Let not a new war give the Bourbons an opportunity to remind them of it. The most dangerous of the Bourbons reside in England; let not the renewal of a war permit England to use them, their name and influence, to trouble and invade France.

"We command, at present, all the continental powers; but we know they carry with disgust and complaint, the, fetters we have imposed.-Let not a war with England give, them occasion to shake them off, and to command us in their turn.

"The general weakness and supineness that for ever attend immoderate wealth and luxury, hide from the English the knowledge of their own strength, real power, and true interest. Suffer them not to relapse into virtue and understanding. Plunge them not too deep into difficulties, and they will never emerge from folly, into real wisdom.

"Leave them in peace, and they will soon return to their amusements of elections, races, party, and faction.-Leave them in peace, and their ministers must be directed by popu lar clamour, which we can always excite and encourage.Leave them in peace, and their navy will once more be laid up to rot, and their seamen and artificers once more turned over to us, to Spain, and to Holland!--Leave them in peace, and the greater part of their army will soon be reduced, and the small remains will soon become a mere militia in pay.-Leave them in peace, and we shall not fear the defection of Russia, or Prussia, or any of our present allies, which otherwise would much hurt, and perhaps ruin our present system.Leave them in peace, and they will never think of schemes for increasing their population, or for making every part of their dominions of real use to every other.-Leave them in peace, and most of their nobility and gentry will continue to squander away, amongst us, their great riches, and augment our resources, to enslave their country.-Leave them in peace, and, before the year 25, France will command the departments of the Thames, and of the Tweed; as it already does the departments of the Rhine, and of the Po.

Pursue, Citizen Consul, this plan steadily, for ten or fifteen years, constantly directing the riches of the country to the raising a navy, equal, or superior to England; and then, and not till then, shall we be able to strike the blow we have, for above one hundred and fifty years, been meditating,— the conquest of the British islands.

(Signed)

C. M. TALLEYRAND."

On the Invasion by the Romans.

(Copied from the British Press.).

THE late interruption of my correspondence with you, might need some apology, had I not good reason to believe,. that you are well aware how busily I must have been employed in the councils of France, and especially in assisting the French bishops in drawing up their Addresses to the clergy on the subject of the war!" However, being in that situation much engaged in the contemplation of invasion, I have been perusing in Aylett Sammes Britannia Antiqua Illustrata; or, the Antiquities of Ancient Britain, an account taken from Tacitus, in Vit. Agric. of the invasion of

country by the Romans; from which I shall here transcribe some applicable parts of the speech of Galcacus, previous to a desperate battle with the invaders.

In the 82d year of the Christian era, the first of Domi- ̈ tian's reign, and the fourth of Agricola's government in Bri-, tain, "Glota and Bodotria, now Dun Britton, and Edinburrough Fryths, together with all the creeks and haven's on this side, were held by the Roman garrisons." In 85*, Agricola marched with his army as far as the mountain Grumpius, upon which the enemy was embattled." "Nam," says the Latin historian, "Britanni nihil fracti pugnæ prioris eventu, et ultionem aut servitium exspectantes, tandemque docti commune periculum, concordia propulsandum, legationibus et fœderibus omnium civitatum vires excitaverant.' "The aged themselves would not be exempted from this daies service; but as they had been famous in their time, so every one carried before him some badge or trophy of his youthful achievements. Amongst the rest, Galcacus, chief in authority and birth, when the army cried out for the signal of battle to be given, is said to have spoken to this purpose:

* It was in the year 86, after Christ, that the Romans first discovered that Britain was an island.