Japan's Political MarketplaceMark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent, Ramseyer |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Electoral Rules and Party Strategy | 16 |
Demographics and Policy | 38 |
Party Factions | 59 |
Party Organization | 80 |
Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives | 99 |
Bureaucratic Manipulation | 121 |
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agency slack agents banks branch office budget Bureau bureaucrats cabinet campaign career cartels Committee competition constituents constrain court judge delegate Diet majority economic election electoral rules electoral system faction leaders family court favors firms Hanrei jihō High Court implement incentive institutional Japan Japanese bureaucrats Japanese politics judicial independence judiciary Justice Kakuei Tanaka kōan LDP backbenchers LDP candidates LDP Dietmembers LDP leaders LDP legislators LDP members LDP politicians LDP's League members legislature Lower House McCubbins ministries MITI MOF bureaucrats monitor Muramatsu Nagara River Nihon keizai shimbun organization PARC parliamentary system party leaders party leadership party members party's percent personal-vote policymaking positions Prime Minister problems programs Ramseyer regulations Satō scholars Secretariat senkyo shō Socialist statutes Supreme Court Table Takeo Fukuda Tanaka tion Tokyo D.C. Tokyo District Court Tokyo High Court University of Tokyo Upper House voters Weingast ZSKS
Popular passages
Page 234 - Riley, 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1, 17-39.