Japan's Political MarketplaceMark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth show how rational-choice theory can be applied to Japanese politics. Using the concept of principal and agent, Ramseyer |
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... judiciary is also an agent of the legislative majority . Ramseyer and Rosenbluth trace the importance of money in Japanese politics to the peculiar Japanese electoral system ( the combination of multi - member districts and ...
... judiciary is also an agent of the legislative majority . Ramseyer and Rosenbluth trace the importance of money in Japanese politics to the peculiar Japanese electoral system ( the combination of multi - member districts and ...
Page 12
... judiciary . First , because it controls the government , the LDP can divert enormous resources to its supporters . Were there no constraints , individual backbenchers would have an incentive to manipulate the government to maximize the ...
... judiciary . First , because it controls the government , the LDP can divert enormous resources to its supporters . Were there no constraints , individual backbenchers would have an incentive to manipulate the government to maximize the ...
Page 14
... judiciary through their influence on job assignments . Most Japanese judges approach the judiciary as a career . They take the job in their late twenties , and keep it for much of their working lives . During that time , whether they ...
... judiciary through their influence on job assignments . Most Japanese judges approach the judiciary as a career . They take the job in their late twenties , and keep it for much of their working lives . During that time , whether they ...
Page 144
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Contents
1 | |
Electoral Rules and Party Strategy | 16 |
Demographics and Policy | 38 |
Party Factions | 59 |
Party Organization | 80 |
Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives | 99 |
Bureaucratic Manipulation | 121 |
Political Structure and Judicial Incentives | 142 |
Judicial Manipulation | 161 |
Political Markets and Electoral Change | 182 |
Notes | 203 |
References | 228 |
Index | 255 |
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Common terms and phrases
agency slack agents banks branch office budget Bureau bureaucrats cabinet campaign career cartels Committee competition constituents constrain court judge delegate Diet majority economic election electoral rules electoral system faction leaders family court favors firms Hanrei jihō High Court implement incentive institutional Japan Japanese bureaucrats Japanese politics judicial independence judiciary Justice Kakuei Tanaka kōan LDP backbenchers LDP candidates LDP Dietmembers LDP leaders LDP legislators LDP members LDP politicians LDP's League members legislature Lower House McCubbins ministries MITI MOF bureaucrats monitor Muramatsu Nagara River Nihon keizai shimbun organization PARC parliamentary system party leaders party leadership party members party's percent personal-vote policymaking positions Prime Minister problems programs Ramseyer regulations Satō scholars Secretariat senkyo shō Socialist statutes Supreme Court Table Takeo Fukuda Tanaka tion Tokyo D.C. Tokyo District Court Tokyo High Court University of Tokyo Upper House voters Weingast ZSKS
Popular passages
Page 222 - Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.
Page 162 - the French admiral was just as far from the English admiral!" "That is indisputable," was the answer, "but in this country it is a good thing to kill an admiral from time to time to encourage the others.
Page 14 - The power to direct the economy was lodged in two ministries in particular: the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
Page 234 - Riley, 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1, 17-39.
Page 203 - ... political bodies (political parties, the Senate, a city council, a regulatory agency), economic bodies (firms, trade unions, family farms, cooperatives), social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic associations), and educational bodies (schools, universities, vocational training centers). They are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives.
Page 254 - Political Clienteles in Power: Party Factions and Cabinet Coalitions in Italy, Beverly Hills, Prentice-Hall, 1975 and F.
Page 100 - ... If bureaucrats are writing the statutes (a point confirmed by Table 7.3), Pempel reasoned, then politicians must not be making policy. Second, Pempel examined the use of ministerial regulations. He found that bureaucrats increasingly relied on regulatory measures to implement...
Page 84 - But a willingness to work with the top leadership is essential to promotion beyond a certain point. Party Management LDP leaders contribute to their members' electoral prospects in several ways. First of all, they protect the party's brand-name capital by formulating the party's stance on public goods and maintaining a ceiling on the private goods that backbenchers dispense; and they broker the interests of factions when they impinge on the party's overall electoral performance and policy choices.
Page 9 - The resulting system may strike observers as "corrupt," but it is an institutionally driven corruption: multi-member districts force the LDP to spread the vote around; the party can do that most competitively if its candidates cultivate personal support networks; and those candidates can cultivate those networks most effectively if they manipulate the party's control over the government.