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Electoral Rules and Party Strategy
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Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives
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Page 234 - Riley, 1989. Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1, 17-39.
Page vii - Co., and president of Yankee Atomic Electric Co. The following were elected to URA's board to represent member institutions, which are divided into 15 geographical groups : Group one : Robert F. Bacher, acting president, California Institute of Technology ; for the University of California (Los Angeles), the University of California (San Diego), and the California Institute of Technology. Group two: Edward M. McMillan, director, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. University of California (Berkeley) ;...