CHAP. VI. two troops of cavalry; and the state had been 1778. required to keep one thousand men constantly

in service for that purpose. For a time, this number was kept up, and the expected service performed under general Potter, a very active and vigilant militia officer; but the state began soon to relax in supplying the men required; and, instead of one thousand, their numbers were often less than one hundred, and of consequence, the roads were seldom sufficiently guarded.

To anticipate general Howe, who it was understood had contemplated a post at Wilmington, general Smallwood was detached to that place; and as fears were entertained that an attempt might be made to dislodge him, the militia of that state were directed to re-enforce him; but these directions seem to have been entirely disregarded.

In the mean-time the Continental army was not in a condition to supply these deficiencies. They were assiduously employed in erecting their huts, completing the bridge over the Schuylkill, and fortifying their camp; a work of great and pressing necessity, but which unavoidably experienced considerable delays in consequence of the great proportion of the soldiers rendered incapable of labour in the open air, by the want of clothing.

To recruit the army for the next campaign, was an object of which the commander in chief

Washing.

accom- General From ton's exer other increase his

tions to

force, and to place it on a

footing be

fore the ensu

ing campaign

felt the importance, and laboured to impress it CHAP. VL on the several states, as well as on congress. 1778. But it was an object, the difficulty of plishing which continually increased. the depreciation of paper money and from causes, no hope remained of obtaining any res- respectable pectable number of men by voluntary inlistments; and coercive means could only be employed by the respective states. To persuade them to apply with the requisite dispatch sufficient energies to this subject, required all the influence of general Washington; and his letters urged them by every motive which could operate on the human mind, to meet with sufficient means the crisis of the war, which he apprehended was now approaching.

He exhorted them to place no confidence in foreign aid, but to depend on their own internal strength and resources for the maintenance of their independence. He did not doubt but that Britain would, if not prevented by a war in Europe, make great exertions to re-enforce her armies in America, and effect the objects of the war. Only correspondent exertions to keep in the field a Continental army at least equal to that of the enemy could prevent their

success.

He enclosed to each state a return of its troops on the continental establishment; thereby exhibiting to each, its own deficiency, which each was strongly urged to supply.

CHAP. VI. To those who had not yet made use of coer1778. cive means, he stated, that the resort to them

had been made by others with good effect, and he represented to all, the necessity of using those means early enough to enable him to anticipate the enemy in taking the field.

In addition to the other ills which threatened the destruction of the army, one yet remains to be mentioned, not of less magnitude, though less calculated to arrest the attention, than those which have been already enumerated. The depreciation of the paper bills had now become so considerable, and the real difficulties under which commerce laboured had so enhanced the price of all imported articles, that the pay of an officer was not only no compen sation for devoting his whole time to the ser vice of the public, but could not even furnish him with those absolute necessaries, which might give him a decent appearance, or cover his person from the extremes of heat and cold to which he was exposed. Those who possessed small patrimonial estates, found them melting away; and others were absolutely unable to appear in the character of gentlemen. Such distressing circumstances could not fail to excite a general disgust with the service.

In an army raised as was that of the United States, great inequality of character among the officers was to be expected. The hard and active service in which it had been engaged,

1778.

was well calculated to ascertain the real merits CHAP. VL of each individual, and to exhibit those discriminations which, in the calm of domestic life, were not so easily discerned. It was necessary to purge the army of persons unfit to hold commissions; and the number and severity of the sentences of the courts martial manifested their determination to do so: yet the regiments were so miserably incomplete, that a surplus number of officers still remained, for whom it was difficult to obtain commands.

It might therefore be supposed, that the general disinclination for the service, excited by the condition to which the officers found themselves reduced, was not an evil much to be regarded, while a greater number remained than could be usefully employed. Than this, no opinion could be more incorrect. Among those who offered their commissions to the commander in chief, were found many, who, possessing most military pride, and therefore feeling most sensibly the degradation connected with poverty and rags, promised to be most the ornaments of the army, to exhibit courage in battle, and to assist most in maintaining those principles of discipline and regularity, so essential to every military establishment.

Nor could a hope be entertained that the mischief would stop with the mere loss of officers, whose continuance in service might promote the public interests.

CHAP. VI. A general indifference about holding a com 1778. mission; a general opinion that an obligation was conferred, and not received by continuing in the army, was extremely unfavourable, not only to that spirit of emulation which stimulates to bolder deeds than are required, but to a complete execution of orders, and a rigid observance of duty.

An officer whose pride was in any degree wounded, whose caprice was not indulged, who apprehended. censure for a fault, which probably his carelessness about remaining in the service had seduced him to commit, was ready to throw up a commission, which, instead of being valuable, was a burden almost too heavy to be borne.

The commander in chief watched with extreme anxiety the progress of a temper, which, though just commencing, he feared must increase with the cause that produced it, and which threatened the most fatal effects. He was therefore early and earnest in pressing on the attention of congress the consideration of this important subject.

The weak and broken condition of the Continental regiments, the various remonstrances of January 10. the general, the numerous complaints received from every quarter, determined congress to depute a committee of their body who should body to the reside in camp during the winter, and, in concert with general Washington, investigate per

Congress send a committee of

their own

army.