able should be sent in to the nearest posts, and CHAP. VIL returns made of officer for officer of equal rank, 1778. and soldier for soldier, as far as numbers would admit; and that if a surplus of officers should remain, they should be exchanged for an equivalent in privates.

On the representations of general Washington, congress acceded substantially to this proposition, so far as related to the exchange of officer for officer, and soldier for soldier, but rejected the part which admitted an equivalent in privates, for a surplus of officers, because the officers captured with Burgoyne were exchangeable within the powers of general Howe. Under this agreement, an exchange took place to a considerable extent: but as the Americans had lost many more prisoners than they had taken, unless the army of Burgoyne should be brought into computation, numbers unexchanged were still detained in captivity.

1778.

CHAPTER VIII.

General Lacy surprised....General Howe resigns his command, and returns to England; is succeeded by sir H. Clinton....The British army evacuate Philadelphia, and march through the Jerseys....Council of war called by general Washington, decide against attacking the enemy on their march.... The opinion of the general against this decision....He attacks the enemy at Monmouth court-house....The action severe, but not decisive.... General Lee arrested for his behaviour in this action, and afterwards to the commander in chief....Court martial appointed to try him....Sentenced to be suspended from his command for one year....The thanks of congress presented to general Washington and his army, for their conduct in the battle at Monmouth.

THE position at Valley forge had been taken by the American army, for the purposes of covering the country of Pennsylvania, protecting the magazines laid up in it, and cutting off those supplies to the British in Philadelphia, which would be of great utility to them, and with which very many of the people were well disposed to furnish them. It was impossible without a vast increase of force, to station troops in sufficient numbers on both sides of the Delaware, and the Schuylkill, to repel large parties which it was easy for the enemy to detach; and of course, this formed no part of the system of operations laid down for the winter. The plan extended no further, than to guard, with the militia of Pennsylvania, the

north of the Schuylkill, and with the militia of CHAP. VIII. New Jersey, the east of the Delaware, so as to 1778. restrain the people of the country from carrying in their provisions to a market, to which they were irresistibly allured by receiving payment in specie.

These light irregular parties, it was hoped, would not only restrain and check an intercourse, which, though beneficial to individuals, was deemed highly pernicious in a national point of view, but would be sufficient to repel small foraging parties; and, consequently, would render it necessary for the enemy to come out in force, or to want those important supplies, which they depended on collecting in the adjacent country.

On such occasions, the operation could not be suddenly completed, and, it was expected, might often be defeated by small detachments of Continental troops from the army, to be re-enforced by militia, who, it was supposed, would turn out with alacrity, and in greater numbers, to save themselves from being plundered. This hope was the rather indulged, because in the intervals between these incursions, only small portions of the militia were required to keep the field. On a great and pressing emergency, therefore, a greater exertion was expected.

In the species of war which this state of things introduced, the advantage was manifestly

CHAP. VIIL with the enemy; who, being unassailable in 1778. their quarters, and possessing the command of the Delaware, could, at any time, with great facility, ravage the coast of Jersey to a considerable extent, before any assistance could be received from Continental troops to be detached from the army. But of this advantage it was impossible to deprive them, unless two camps could have been formed, either of which would have been sufficiently strong to repel them; or, unless the militia would have assembled universally, at the first alarm, with arms in their hands, to drive back the invaders of their country.

This was not counted on. A much smaller degree of service was expected, and even this was not always performed. The lines were often so il guarded that the communication with Philadelphia experienced but little interruption.

Yet the wants of such a number of persons and horses required a greater supply of fresh provisions and forage, than could be brought in by these means, and as the spring opened, several expeditions were undertaken, both to relieve the British army, and to distress that of the United States.

About the middle of March, an expedition into Jersey, under colonel Mawhood and major Simcoe, with about twelve hundred men, was projected, and carried into execution. Having

embarked at Philadelphia, and sailed down the CHAP. VIII. river, they landed at Salem, nearly opposite 1778. Reedy island, and dispersed the small bodies. of militia stationed in that part of the country, under colonels Hand and Holme. The militia were posted at some bridges on Olway's creek, over which it was supposed the British would endeavour to force a passage.. Their numbers being unequal to an effectual resistance, it was only intended by their commanding officers to keep the enemy in some check, until they should be re-enforced. A very judicious plan to surprise them, was skilfully executed by major Simcoe, one of the best partisans in the British service, and their guard was cut to pieces. The loss of the militia in these skirmishes, in killed and taken, was between fifty and sixty men.

General Washington had received early intelligence of this expedition, and had communicated it to governor Livingston, with a request, that he would immediately order out the militia in force, to join colonel Shreve, who was ordered to pass over into Jersey with his regiment; and, with the assistance he would there receive, to take such a position, as was best calculated to cover the country against which the expedition might be directed. It was uncertain whether the party intended to forage in the counties bordering on the Delaware, or to destroy the salt works on the seacoast. The 3 L

VOL. III.