CHAPTER III.

General Washington commences his march to the Delaware....He takes measures for checking Burgoyne.... Expedition of general Sullivan against Staten island.... British fleet come up the Chesapeak and land an army under sir William Howe at Elk river....General Washington advances to Brandywine....Lord Cornwallis attacks Maxwell's corps and compels them to retreat.... The American army defeated at Brandywine, and retreat to Chester....After a slight skirmish compelled again to retire, cross the Schuylkill and proceed to French creek....General Wayne surprised, and after a sharp action compelled to retreat....Washington marches to Pottsgrove....General Howe takes possession of Philadelphia....Congress remove to Lancaster.

ON receiving intelligence that the British 1777.

July.

Washington

commences

to the

fleet had sailed from New York, the American army immediately commenced its march in dif- General ferent divisions to the Delaware. About the his march time of its departure, a letter from sir William Delaware. Howe directed to general Burgoyne at Quebec, containing the information that "he was exhibiting the appearance of moving to the southward, while his real intent was against Boston, from whence he would co-operate with the army of Canada," was delivered to general Putnam by the person who had received it, as was said, for the purpose of carrying it to Quebec, and was immediately transmitted by general Putnam to the commander in chief. The stratagem entirely failed of producing the impression it

CHAP. III. was designed to make. General Washington 1777. had no hesitation in determining the letter to have been written, with a design that it should fall, into his hands, and mislead him with respect to the views of the enemy. It served to confirm the opinion, either that Philadelphia was the object, or that general Howe had put to sea with the fleet, merely to draw him from the North river, after which he would suddenly return, and by a rapid movement seize the passes in the highlands. The danger to which the fleet was exposed of being dispersed at sea, rendered it, however, improbable, that a feint, attended with so much hazard, would be made. That consideration decided him in the opinion, that the movement to the southward was real: yet all suspicions concerning the North river were not entirely removed.

He takes

measures for checking Burgoyne.

Whilst the utmost exercise of vigilance and judgment on the part of the American general were necessary to conduct the operations of the army under his immediate command, the events in the north were too deeply interesting not to engage a large share of his attention. He felt strongly the necessity of checking the progress of Burgoyne, and took with promptitude, those measures which might effect so important an object. Letters were addressed to the governments of the eastern states, urging them to reenforce with their militia the retreating army of that department, and to the generals of the

1777.

western parts of those states, requesting them CHAP. III. to get in readiness to move with the utmost expedition. Major generals Arnold and Lincoln, both relied on for their influence with the eastern militia, both esteemed excellent officers, the former of whom had from the commencement of the war, displayed in the field a spirit of intrepidity which could not be surpassed; were directed to join the northern army. Three brigades of New England continental troops, were detached from Peck's-Kill on the same service; and soon afterwards, colonel Morgan's regiment of riflemen, and two regiments of New York, were also ordered on it. Thus did general Washington, with that spirit of genuine patriotism he was in the course of exhibiting, weaken himself, in order to strengthen other generals, whose strength would be more useful. The fame of being himself the leader of the victorious army did not, with a false glare, dazzle his eyes, or conceal from his view the superior public advantage to be derived from defeating the plans of Burgoyne.

As some uncertainty still remained respecting the destination of the fleet, it was thought unadvisable to weaken too much the post at Peck's-Kill, and therefore, the New England troops, intended to act with the army immediately under the command of general Washington, were directed to cross the Hudson, and wait on its western banks for further

CHAP. III. orders; while other divisions were halted at 1777. different encampments, between that river and

the Delaware. On the 30th of July, all these doubts were supposed to be removed by the appearance of the whole fleet off the capes of Delaware. Orders were immediately given for assembling the detached parts of the army in the neigbourhood of Philadelphia, to which place the general immediately proceeded in person; and also for marching from the North river as many of the continental troops remaining at that station, as could be spared from its defence against the force still in New York.

Scarcely were these orders given, when the aspect of affairs was totally changed, and it was deemed proper to countermand them. An express was received from cape May with information that the fleet had sailed out of the bay of Delaware, and was proceeding eastward. The brigades which had marched from Peck'sKill were ordered immediately to return, and the other divisions of the army which were on the road, were directed to halt on their present ground for further orders. From this time no intelligence respecting the fleet was received until about the seventh of August, when it appeared, a few leagues to the south of the capes of Delaware, after which it disappeared, and was not again heard of until late in that month. In the mean-while, the most perplexing uncertainty concerning its destination was

universal. The fact was, that on entering the CHAP. III. capes of Delaware, the intelligence received by 1777. general Howe concerning the difficulties which would attend an attempt to carry his fleet up that bay and river, determined him to relinquish his original design, and to transport his army to the Chesapeak. Having gone out to sea again with this intention, he was so detained by contrary winds, as to be unable to reach the mouth of the Chesapeak until the 16th of August.

General Washington employed this interval in examining the country about Philadelphia, and the works below that place. Having paid great attention to them, he was entirely of opinion that the defence of the river should be confined to fort or Mud island and Redbank, a piece of high ground on the Jersey shore. opposite the island. This opinion was communicated to congress in a long letter stating at large the reasons on which it was founded, which letter also intimated his intention to march to Coryell's ferry, a position sufficiently near to Philadelphia, and from which he would be enabled sooner to gain the North river, should the next appearance of the fleet be to the eastward.

An attempt had been made to take and defend a position lower down the river, at Billingsport.