Federalist Government in Principle and PracticeDonald P. Racheter, Richard E. Wagner Federalism has generally been characterized as a system of government that is friendly to liberty. It is not obvious, though, why this should be so. Federalism is a form of government where citizens simultaneously reside in at least two governments, each of which has independent authority to tax and to regulate. By contrast, in a unitary form of government citizens face only one government with independent authority to tax and regulate. At first glance, it would seem a bit strange to claim that liberty is more secure when citizens are members of two governments with independent authority than when they are members of only one such government. The relationship between federalism and liberty turns out to be a complex one, and one that is capable of working in either direction. Whether federalism supports or erodes liberty depends on importantly on the institutional framework within which federalist governance takes place. The essays in Federalist Government in Principle and Practice examine this institutionalist theme from both theoretical and practical perspectives. |
Contents
Liberty Markets and Federalism | 1 |
Competitive Federalism in Institutional Perspective | 19 |
Taxes Grants and Porkbarrel Politics The Case for Decentralizing the Power to Tax | 39 |
Fiscal Competition in a Federal System | 55 |
Immobile Taxation in a World of Mobility | 97 |
Fiscal Vacations and Federalism in Western Europe A Search for Sovereignty | 111 |
Federalism and Commercial Regulation | 133 |
Other editions - View all
Federalist Government in Principle and Practice Donald P. Racheter,Richard E. Wagner Limited preview - 2012 |
Federalist Government in Principle and Practice Donald P. Racheter,Richard E. Wagner No preview available - 2012 |
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action activities agencies Amendment American American Heritage Rivers areas authority Basque Autonomous Community Basque Country benefits Benson Bruce Yandle bureaucrats centralized charter schools citizens Commerce Clause competitive federalism Congress constitutional costs created decentralization decisions Economic Development economic growth effects efficient environmental European European Union example expenditures externalities federal government Federalist finance fiscal fiscal federalism funding grazing Heritage Foundation impact impose income increase individuals industries institutional interest groups interjurisdictional competition interstate commerce issues Journal jurisdictions land trusts legislation levels of government Leviathan limits mobile national government OECD percent political politicians problems production programs protection Public Choice Public Interest Institute redistribution reduce regulation regulatory relatively rent-seeking responsibility reverse revenue sharing Sagebrush Rebellion sector spending Supreme Court tax base tax competition tax rates taxation Test transfers United Washington wealth welfare recipients welfare reform wetlands Wicksellian Wisconsin Yandle