and unskilled; and it is observed, by a contemporary, that with their soldiers there was little difference between being wounded and killed in action, except that of a lingering or a sudden death. Next At length on the 27th of June Count Mercy left Melazzo at the head of 21,000 men. They had a most toilsome march for three days over rugged and dreary mountains and under a burning sun, led by unwilling guides, and harassed by the armed peasants of the country. Arriving at length on the heights of Tre Fontane they discovered the Spaniards eucamped below in the plain of Franca Villa, and a shout of joy ran through the whole army at the prospect of a speedy and decisive action. The Spaniards, though in a plain, held a strong position; their front protected by the steep banks of the river Alcantara, their wings by intrenchments, their rear by rocky ground and by the little town of Franca Villa. In advance of them, and on the other side of the stream, was a convent of Capuchins, crowning a single hill, and this De Lede had occupied with his best troops, the Royal Guards, headed by the brave Villadarias. morning the battle was begun by the Germans in three different places, and soon became general. The brunt of it was at the Capuchin convent, which was attacked in succession by the flower of the German forces, but which Villadarias most gallantly defended. At length Count Mercy himself, hoping to animate his troops by his presence and example, put himself at the head of another charge, but with no better success; his soldiers were repulsed, his horse killed under him, and himself severely wounded. At the close of day the victory had every where declared in favour of De Lede, and the Germans, though still in good order, withdrew from their attacks. They had upwards of 3000 men killed and wounded, the Spaniards not half so many; and it must, I think, be owned that the steadiness of the latter under the forlorn and disheartening prospects of their * The river must have been nearly dry at that season. I crossed it much lower down in the month of November, and found very little water. arms in Sicily, was highly honourable to the national character, and another proof how little it can ever be daunted by reverses. But this victory produced only barren laurels. De Lede could not or would not pursue his advantages; and the enemy, recovering from their discomfiture, were soon enabled to undertake the siege of Messina. The citadel made a most resolute defence, but not being relieved by the Spaniards, was compelled to surrender on the 18th of October. A further body of 6000 Germans, intended for the conquest of Sardinia, were diverted from their destination until Sicily should be quite subdued, and they sailed from Genoa to join the forces of Mercy.* A part of the army was then transported by sea to the fortress of Trapani, from whence it spread itself abroad, and reduced the cities of Mazzara and Marsala; so that at the close of 1719, De Lede, who had fixed his head-quarters at Castel Vetrano, trembled for the capital itself. Cardinal Alberoni, on receiving intelligence of the victory of Franca Villa, availed himself of the transient gleam which it cast upon the Spanish arms to signify his consent to a peace. He was far, however, from yet yielding to the terms required by the Allies, and giving his unqualified adhesion to the Quadruple Treaty. His plan was, that the States-General should be mediators, and that Spain should not relinquish Sicily and Sardinia, unless the French were prepared to restore their conquests, and the English to yield Gibraltar and Port Mahon. With these proposals he sent his countryman, Marquis Scotti, the Envoy from Parma, directing him to travel to Paris, lay his mission before the Regent, and then proceed to the Hague. The Regent, however, on receiving the communication of Scotti, positively refused him passports to continue his journey, declaring that he must previously consult the Emperor and the King *It appears that the English Ministers during all the summer strongly remonstrated with the Austrian on their employing such insufficient forces. "Je n'ai cessé de le représenter à M. de Penterrieder," writes Stanhope to St. Saphorin, July 31. 1719. (Hardwicke Papers, vol. xxxix.) 1719. STANHOPE PROPOSES ALBERONI'S DISMISSAL. 361 of England. Dubois wrote accordingly to Stanhope at Hanover. But the British Minister, knowing the restless temper and ambitious views of Alberoni, and how little reliance could be placed on his professions and promises, thought that the time for negotiation with him had gone by, and said in his answer to Dubois*, "We shall act wrong "if we do not consolidate the peace by the removal of the "Minister who has kindled the war; and as he will never "consent to peace till he finds his ruin inevitable, from the "continuance of the war, we must make his disgrace an ab"solute condition of the peace. For, as his unbounded ambi"tion has been the sole cause of the war which he undertook, in defiance of the most solemn engagements, and in "breach of the most solemn promises, if he is compelled to "accept peace he will only yield to necessity, with the "resolution to seize the first opportunity of vengeance. It "is not to be imagined that he will ever lose sight of his vast designs, or lay aside the intention of again bringing them "forward whenever the recovery of his strength, and the "remissness of the Allied Powers, may flatter him with the "hopes of better success. He is skilled in procuring all "the connections necessary for the accomplishment of his "schemes. He will be careful to cultivate those connec"tions, and in due time he will employ them so much the "more dangerously for your nation and ours, inasmuch as "his past imprudencies will render him more circumspect, "and his past failures more ardent. He himself has warned 'us against the dangers of a deceitful peace; he is incapable "of consenting to any other; he thinks it no reproach to do "any thing to which his strength is equal; and we ought "to thank God that he did not more exactly calculate his "power, and his undertakings. He acknowledges no other "peace but exhaustion and weakness; and when, therefore, "he is reduced to these, let us not allow him to recover. "Let us exact from Philip his dismissal from Spain. We * Stanhope to Dubois, Hanover, August 22. 1719. Hardwicke Papers, and Coxe's Copies. Original in French. "cannot propose to His Majesty any condition which will "be more advantageous both for himself and his people. "Let us hold forth this example to Europe, as a means of "intimidating any turbulent Minister who breaks the most "solemn treaties, and attacks the persons of Princes in the "most scandalous manner. When Cardinal Alberoni is once "driven from Spain, the Spaniards will never consent to his "again coming into administration; even their Catholic Ma"jesties will have suffered too much from his pernicious "counsels to desire his return. In a word, any peace made "by the Cardinal will be only an armistice of uncertain dura"tion; nor can we depend upon any treaty till we make it "with a Spanish Minister whose system is directly opposite "to that of Alberoni, as well in regard to France in parti"cular, as to Europe in general." This determination, backed by that of France, produced, as might be expected, a powerful effect at Madrid. However great the genius of the Prime Minister, men felt that it might be purchased too dearly by the prolongation of an unequal and disastrous war. His old friends began to drop from him; his enemies to renew and redouble their attacks. The Confessor of Philip, finding that Alberoni wished to supplant him and appoint another to his office, immediately discovered that the Cardinal was a very dangerous Minister. The ASSA FETA, moved by some womanish resentments*, began to shake his influence with her Royal mistress. The Grandees looked down with ignorant pride on the son of a gardener, and could neither forgive his origin below nor his elevation above them. Several of their order even went so far as to enter into a concert of measures with the Regent, who on his part well knew that though it might be unsafe to trust their friendships, he could rely on their sincerity of hatred. ** Alberoni, during the last few months of his power, had grown more and more imperious. "Muchos hombres," says San Phelipe, "dignos de "la mayor atencion, salian ajados de su presencia..... Decian algunos que menores trabajos havian padecido en tan dilatada guerra que en estas "violencias de un Estrangero." (Coment., vol. ii. p. 234.) odia non ***Sensit (Artabanus) vetus regnandi, falsos in amore, "fingere." (Tacit. Annal. lib. vi. c. 44.) 1719. THE EARL OF PETERBOROUGH. 363 But the finishing stroke to the power of the mighty Minister came from an English hand-from one of the most singular and striking characters of that or of any age. Charles Lord Mordaunt, born in 1658, became in 1689 Earl of Monmouth by creation, and in 1697 Earl of Peterborough by descent. As a military man his character stands deservedly high; as a diplomatist also he possessed great merit; but as a politician it seems scarcely possible to award him any praise. In that department, his splendid genius was utterly obscured and eclipsed by his wayward temper. Vain, selfish, and ungovernable- always in a quarrel, and on a journey he was never thoroughly trusted by any party, nor perseveringly active at any place. His conduct in Fenwick's conspiracy appears to have been most unjustifiable, and provoked even the mild and cautious Somers into expressions of undisguised contempt: "As to my - "Lord Monmouth, his discourses are so various, and if those "were of the same tenor, his resolutions are so changeable, "that what he will do must be left to chance. His main "business is to get out of the Tower, and in order to that "he is ready to do any thing." ·.”*—But it might not be difficult to confirm the least favourable features of his portrait from the words, not of his enemies, but of his personal and political friends: "I can assure you," writes Bolingbroke to the ambassador at the Hague, "that all I found by the letters "sent by the courier from Lord Peterborough was that "his head was extremely hot, and confused with various "indigested schemes." And again, "I may tell your Excel"lency in confidence, that I have a letter of twenty sheets "from Lord Peterborough, wherein the whole world is par"celled out, as if with a FIAT and the breath of his mouth "it could be accomplished.' "** In the same correspondence we find Prior sneering at Lord Peterborough's fondness for Quixotic enterprises: "I do not question but he will take *Lord Somers to the Duke of Shrewsbury, January 26. 1696, printed In the Shrewsbury Correspondence. ** Letters to Lord Raby, May 8. and May 18. 1711. |