1718.

BATTLE OFF CAPE PASSARO.

329

guns. On the approach of the English, Mari and six men-of-war, which were separated from the main fleet of the Spaniards, drew nearer to the Sicilian coast; and Byng despatched a division, under Captain Walton, to intercept them. There seems little doubt that the English Admiral would not have shrunk from the responsibility of the first attack; but the firing, in fact, was begun by Mari's ships, and, being returned by the English, there ensued a general engagement.** A slight breeze, which sprung up, carried the English fleet into the very midst of the Spanish, and mingled the ships of both nations together. The Spaniards, without order and concert, and vessel after vessel attacked in succession by a superior force, found even the highest courage, the most stubborn resistance, unavailing. Castañeta himself, as bold in action as irresolute in council, endeavoured to cheer his seamen by the most determined bravery; and even when wounded in both legs, this Spanish Widdrington still continued to fight upon his stumps. But both his efforts and his example were in vain. Even had the English been fewer, I may be pardoned for believing that they would still have been victorious. Castañeta was made prisoner, and the greater part of his fleet either taken or destroyed. Admiral Cammock alone, with ten ships of war, forced his way from the battle, and found shelter in the port of La Valetta. In an opposite direction Mari had also made his escape with some ships of the line; but Captain Walton, being sent in pursuit, compelled them to surrender. Walton's report, on this occasion, is remarkable for simplicity, the usual attendant and the surest recommendation of merit.

* The total number of guns in the English fleet was 1400, in the Spanish 1284; and two vessels included in the latter list were not in the action, having been sent to Malta under Admiral Guevara. (Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, vol. iv. p. 427. and 438.)

That the Spaniards began the action is always urged in the English State Papers of this period, and is distinctly admitted by San Phelipe (Coment. vol. ii. p. 195.). The Spanish historian is somewhat testy at this battle. He observes, that the English are superior seamen to the Spaniards, because they study nothing else (porque estos no tienen otro oficio), but that the Spanish courage is far higher (imponderable valor, mas que los Ingleses!) (p. 191. and 195.)

66

It was merely, "Sir, we have taken and destroyed all the 'Spanish ships which were upon the coast: the number as "per margin." A naval writer well observes, that the ships which Captain Walton thrust into his margin would have furnished matter for some pages in a French relation.*

The loss of the English in the action of Passaro was not considerable; only one ship, the Grafton, suffered severely. To have thus annihilated the Spanish armada might be thought something more than merely a declaration of war; yet Byng affected not to consider it as such, and sent a complimentary letter to De Lede, urging that the Spaniards had begun the battle, and that they ought not to look upon this accident as a rupture between the two nations. This compliment, it may well be supposed, was very coldly received by men still smarting under the loss and shame of their defeat. Nor did it deaden their zeal for the reduction of Messina; on the contrary, they pushed their attacks with so much vigour, that, in spite of the efforts of the Austrian troops at Reggio, and the activity of the British fleet in the straits, the place surrendered at the close of September; and Byng thereupon sailed back with his squadron to Naples.

The conduct of the English Admiral in fighting the Spanish fleet was entirely approved by the English Ministry. It is remarkable that Stanhope, who had left Spain before any news of the action had arrived, ** writes to Byng from Bayonne on the 2d of September, recommending the very course which the Admiral had already taken: "Nothing has "passed at Madrid which should divert you from pursuing "the instructions you have..... If you should have an op

*

Campbell's Admirals, vol. iv. p. 428.

** Coxe conjectures that "before Earl Stanhope quitted the capital, some intelligence of the discomfiture of the fleet probably reached Al"beroni." (House of Bourbon, vol. ii. p. 330.) But this is certainly an error. The action was fought on the 11th, Lord Stanhope set out on the 26th; and on examining the dates at which other tidings of the Sicilian army reached Madrid, it will be found that they never came in so short a time. Nor could a vessel be speedily despatched from a fleet just defeated and dispersed. Moreover Coxe's supposition is not readily to be reconciled with Alberoni's burst of indignation at the first public announcement of the battle.

1718.

FURY OF ALBERONI.

331

"portunity of attacking the Spanish fleet, I am persuaded "you will not let such an occasion slip; and I agree perfectly "in opinion with what is recommended to you by Mr. Secre"tary Craggs, that the first blow you give should, if pos"sible, be decisive. The two great objects which I think “we ought to have in view are, to destroy their fleet if pos"sible, and to preserve such a footing in Sicily as may "enable us to land an army there." The manner in which the Admiral had anticipated these directions was much praised; even the Spaniards acknowledged his high personal merit; and, on his return from his command, this brave and skilful officer was deservedly raised to the rank of Viscount Torrington.

The high-flown hopes which Alberoni had cherished of the Spanish armament may give us some idea of his burst of rage at its defeat. He wrote to the Marquis de Monteleon in most vehement terms, loudly complaining of breach of faith, and commanding that Minister to depart immediately from England. His letter and the ambassador's to Mr. Craggs, were also, by his direction, made public in London, with the view of raising a national ferment against the Ministry. But the indignation of Alberoni was not confined to words; he gave orders, in direct violation of the Treaty of Commerce, to seize the British goods and vessels in the Spanish ports, and to dismiss the British Consuls from the Spanish territory. Numerous privateers also were fitted out and sent forth against the British traders. Yet it is remarkable that, in spite of these mutual injuries, the breach was not yet considered complete and decisive, and that a declaration of war from England was still withheld.

We are also assured that an edict was published at Madrid by beat of drum, prohibiting all persons from speaking of the disaster of the fleet; an order which, as it seems suited only for the meridian of Tunis or Algiers, I should have thought utterly incredible in Spain, were it not recorded by most unimpeachable authority.*

**On publie au son du tambour une défense de parler du désastre de

Alberoni himself, irritated and not dismayed by his reverses, haughtily persevered in his domestic preparations and foreign cabals; and I shall now proceed to relate the issue of his manifold schemes in Holland, Piedmont, Sweden, France, and England.

The commercial jealousy of the Dutch, and their natural slowness, were turned to the best advantage by the Marquis Beretti Landi, the Spanish ambassador. He had, however, an able antagonist in the Minister from England, Earl Cadogan, whose great influence with the States rested not merely on his talents and services, but also on his known intimacy with the Duke of Marlborough, and on his marriage with a Dutch lady of powerful connexions. Neither of these distinguished rivals altogether prevailed. Cadogan, indeed, obtained the accession of Holland to the Quadruple Alliance; but Landi delayed it for several months, and until the cause of Spain had been struck by further disasters.

At the Court of Turin there was no such opportunity for hesitation; the difficulties of Victor Amadeus were pressing and immediate. He found his kingdom of Sicily at the same time claimed by Charles and attacked by Philip. No succour, no hope appeared for him in any quarter; on the one side stood the Quadruple Allies, présenting the treaty and demanding his signature, and on the other side there gleamed 30,000 Spanish bayonets against him. Even after the expedition to Sicily, Alberoni had not altogether lost his hope of cajoling Victor Amadeus: he represented the conquest of the island as only a precautionary measure to prevent its transfer from its rightful owner, and expressed an ardent zeal for the preservation of the Peace of Utrecht. But the artifice was too gross, and easily seen through.* The King of Sicily determined, that if he must lose his island, he would at least incline to that power which offered a positive, "la flotte." (Duc de St. Aignan to the Regent, Sept. 17. 1718. Mém. de Noailles, vol. v. p. 96.)

*

Esta carta (del Cardinal) en la realidad era absolutamente inutil, y 66 no debiera haber Alberoni perdido tiempo en ella." (Ortiz Compendio, vol. vii. p. 836.)

though insufficient, compensation for it; he therefore broke off all intercourse with Spain, acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, and consented to give over to Imperial troops the remaining fortresses of Syracuse, Melazzo, and Trapani. His Regal title of Sicily was soon after exchanged for that of Sardinia, still held by his descendants; and this was perhaps the only negotiation which the House of Savoy had ever yet carried on without extracting from it some advantage.

In Sweden and Russia, the schemes of Alberoni seemed at first more hopeful; and, according to his own expression, there was reason to expect that the northern clouds would break in thunder and hail-storms.* A negotiation between Charles the Twelfth and the Czar had been opened in the Isle of Aland, under the mediation of a Swedish agent; and the Duke of Ormond had hastened to Russia as plenipotentiary of the Pretender.** It was agreed that Peter should retain Livonia, Ingria, and other Swedish territories to the southward of Finland; that Charles should undertake the conquest of Norway and the recovery of Bremen and Verden; and that both monarchs should combine for the restoration of Stanislaus in Poland, and of the Stuarts in Great Britain. The latter point was foremost in the wishes of Gortz, who had planned and forwarded the whole design who enjoyed more than ever the confidence of his master - and who had left his Dutch captivity, stung with disappointment at his failure, and burning with revenge against King George and King George's Minister. So active and embittered an enemy was the very man to raise and direct the tempest against England The tempest was raised; but it burst open his own head. Charles, pursuing his plans and impatient of delay, led an army into Norway, notwithstanding the severity of winter; and on the 11th of December, with the snow and ice deep around him, he was pressing the siege of the frontier

* St. Simon, vol. xv. p. 308. ed. 1829.

Amongst the Stuart Papers is the original passport given to Ormond in Russian and Latin, and signed by Peter the Great. Ormond travelled under the name of Brunet.