resisting its authority. The general usage of nations, however, regards such a war as entitling both the contending parties to all the rights of war as against each other, and even as respects neutral nations.1

Persons.-Assuming the contending parties to be sovereign persons or powers,-for with civil war we are not now concerned, and assuming, as we are bound to assume, that each has exhausted every means consistent with his notion of justice to avoid war, the two stand before us in this simple position,-the one has taken up arms as his sole means of enforcing his claim, and is said to be on the offensive; the other has taken up arms to resist that claim, and is said to be on the defensive.

If we again recal our illustration of the ships, and add, on our mental canvas, to the two already there, and which we may now designate the belligerents, several other vessels, we have before us all the elements necessary to answer the question, To what rights does the the war between the two give rise? First, Each of the newly introduced vessels has the right to take the part of either combatant; by doing so, he becomes his ally. Secondly, Each has the right to stand aloof, to refuse to take any part in the matter, or, in other words, to be neutral. The whole of the vessels are thus divisible into three classes,-Belligerent A standing alone, or identified with his allies; Belligerent B also alone, or with allies; the remainder, those represented by C, are neutrals. What, then, are the rights—1, of A as against B, and vice versá? and 2, of A and B as against C, and vice versá? Or what are the rights—1, of Belligerents as against each other? 2, What are 1 Wheaton, p. 520.

the rights of Belligerents as against Neutrals, and vice versá?

By the statement of the case in this way, it would appear that, in one sense, third persons are as much parties to every war as are the original belligerents; that is to say, they have an election, they are free to become allies or neutrals; but having made their election, they are bound to maintain in its integrity the character adopted.

As to each belligerent, it appears, on the one hand, to be his natural right, by every means in his power, to enforce his claims against his adversary, to oppress him to the uttermost, even to destroy him. And supposing the belligerents to be individual sovereign persons, the proposition would not admit either of qualification or exception. This question therefore arises: Does the fact of each belligerent being a nation in any way alter the case? Here a difficulty presents itself. To realise this point, we must distinguish accurately between two totally different conditions of things: first, a fraternity of independent sovereignties that have no commercial intercourse with each other, even when on the most friendly relations; and second, the same fraternity of independent sovereignties having by common consent sanctioned, encouraged, and established the most perfect commercial relations between their respective subjects. In the first instance, the fact of the sovereign being one or a million persons could, it may be said, and perhaps correctly, make no difference. But can that be said of the second position? The belligerents, prior to their quarrel, were parties to the bringing into existence of a peculiar state of things, upon the faith of

which all the neutrals have materially modified their normal condition. We may go further and say, they have inaugurated a condition which renders the uninterrupted continuance of these commercial relations an absolute necessity. Does, then, the natural right to attempt to enforce a claim by arms annihilate the conventional right in the neutral to the enjoyment of his right of free commerce with the subjects of either or both belligerents?

It may be said that these neutral rights were from the beginning contingent upon the continuance of peace between all parties. Unsatisfactory as this answer may seem, it is upon that hypothesis-at least so it would appear that the whole doctrine of International Neutrality rests; and to the fact of its questionable soundness we may ascribe the various modifications of neutrality law in favour of the merchant, which have from time to time been made, and that so steadily in one direction, as to point to a time when the recognition of the neutral's right will reduce war to mere duelling between armies in the field; in which condition it may possibly appear so repugnant to the intelligence of enlightened nations as to induce the substitution of a code of International Law, and the settlement of all national differences by arbitration.

One of the immediate consequences,' says Wheaton, ' of the commencement of hostilities, is the interdiction of all commercial intercourse between the subjects of the States at war without the license of their respective governments. The utility, however, of merchants, and the mutual wants of nations, have almost got the better of the law of war as to commerce." 21

1 International Law, p. 544.

These few remarks are placed by way of preface to the remaining observations on International Law, with the view of impressing upon the reader the fact that several of the rights about to be noticed are in a transition state, and consequently in some cases not easily susceptible of clear elementary definition.

Commencement of War and its immediate EffectsThe Belligerents.-The practice of making a formal declaration of war has ceased since the middle of the 17th century. The latest example was the declaration by France against Spain, at Brussels, in 1635, by heralds-at-arms, according to the form observed during the Middle Ages. The present usage is to publish a manifesto within the territory of the State declaring war, announcing the existence of hostilities, and the motives for commencing them.

A perfect war is where one entire nation is at war with another nation, and all the members of each nation are authorised to commit hostilities against all the members of the other, in every case, and under every circumstance permitted by the general laws of war. An imperfect war is limited to places, persons, and things.1

The regularly commissioned naval and military forces of the nation, and all others called out in its defence, or spontaneously defending themselves in case of urgent necessity, though without express authority for that purpose, are alone authorised to engage in hostilities against the enemy. The immediate effect of a declaration of war is that it gives the belligerent the right to use every means necessary to accomplish the end for which he has taken up arms. Bynker1 Wheaton, p. 518.

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shoek and Wolf assert that everything done against an enemy is lawful. Wheaton, however, says that no use of force is lawful, except so far as it is necessary. A belligerent has therefore no right to take the lives of those subjects of the enemy whom he can subdue by any other means.1

The custom of civilised nations has exempted the persons of the sovereign and his family, the members of the civil government, and generally all other persons, public or private, from the direct effects of military operations, unless actually taken in arms, or found guilty of some misconduct in violation of the usages of war, by which they forfeit their immunity.2 Grotius has devoted a whole chapter of his great work to prove, by the consenting testimony of all ages and nations, that good faith ought to be observed towards an enemy. And Bynkershoek who holds that every sort of fraud may be practised towards him, prohibits perfidy, saying, 'I allow of any kind of deceit, perfidy alone excepted, not because anything is unlawful against an enemy, but because, when our faith has been pledged to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an enemy.

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Ransom.-The belligerent right to destroy the captive enemy has even from the earliest ages, isolated cases excepted, been exercised in some modified form; e.g., the reduction of the captive to the condition of slavery; his release for a pecuniary payment called a ransom; or the exchange of prisoners, the exchange being in fact but a form of ransom. The agreements of modern times for exchange or ransom are termed Wheaton, p. 588. 2 Ib., p. 594. 3 Quæst. Jur. Pub. lib. i. cap. 1.