motive that works on the mind, to put it upon action, which, for shortness' sake, we will call determining of the will."1

With this brief survey of the philosophy of human action, to which our attention will be called hereafter, we may now, somewhat more in detail, examine the distinction between Divine positive law and natural law, or the unwritten Divine will, together with the means by which it is to be ascertained.

The sources of law are the Deity, sovereignty, and the individual. To avoid confusion, the student must distinguish between the following subjects, and the appropriate matter of each :—(1) Divine positive law; or, revealed religion. (2) Natural law; or, the unwritten will of God. (3) Positive law; or, what may be termed the law of the land. (4) International law; or, the rules regulating the intercourse of nations. (5) Constitutional law; or, the principles of the internal constitution of a given state. (6) Positive morality; and (7) Objects metaphorically termed laws.

Lord Mackenzie gives, as the principal divisions of law,-(1) The Divine positive law; (2) Natural Law; (3) The positive law of Independent States; and (4) The Law of Nations, or International Law.2

Divine Positive Law.-Lord Mackenzie says,'The positive law of God is that which concerns the duties of religion, being the principles regarding faith and manners revealed in the Holy Scriptures. The precepts derived from revelation are called the divine positive law, as distinguished from the divine natural law, which is composed of principles 1 Human Understanding, Bk. ii. ch. 21, § 29. 2 Studies in Roman Law, p. 46.

recognized by reason alone, without the aid of revelation."1

In this all civilized nations, whether ancient or modern, have concurred-there is a God, and to Him man owes his being, obedience, and worship. In this also the same nations have agreed-that He has revealed Himself to man, not only in His mighty works, which we call Nature, but also more directly in Holy Scripture, or sacred writings. But here unanimity ends. The sacred writings of the Jew, the Christian, the Mohammedan, the Buddhist, the Confucian, are not the same; and, while each conscientiously adheres to his own, each persistently rejects those of the rest. Implicit, then, as may be individual belief in the sacred books of his race,-unquestionable as is the fact that the Christian religion forms an important element in the laws of those nations that entertain that belief, and conspicuously amongst them our own, it is no less clear that the laws of every other nation are bound up with its peculiar theology. Whilst, therefore, on the one hand, the student of general jurisprudence is, in order to understand any particular legal system, compelled to familiarize himself with the theology of its founders,for otherwise he cannot trace its influence upon that system, he is, upon the other hand, precluded from adopting his own religious views as the standard of right and wrong, and must confine himself, during his investigations, to the consideration of the Almighty as He has been pleased to reveal Himself in nature, i. e., to what is termed natural religion, or the unwritten will of God, or natural law. Nor need the Christian jurist hesitate to accept this position, for he may be 1 Studies in Roman Law, p. 46

satisfied that revelations of Omniscience can never be repugnant the one to the other.

Natural Law.'Natural law, as the term is commonly understood by modern writers upon jurisprudence, has two disparate meanings. It signifies the law of God, or a portion of positive law and positive morality."

Dr. Paley considers natural law as equivalent to moral science, which embraces our duties to God, to our neighbours, and to ourselves.2

The Roman jurist Ulpian describes natural law as the law which nature has taught all living creatures, and declares it to be common to men and beasts.s

Chancellor Kent says,-'By the law of nature, I understand those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator has prescribed to man as a dependent and social being, and which are to be ascertained from the deductions of right reason, though they may be more precisely known, and more explicitly declared, by Divine revelation.'4

Natural Law is defined by Grotius to be the dictate of right reason, pronouncing that there is in some actions a moral obligation, and in other actions a moral deformity, arising from their respective suitableness or repugnance to the rational and social nature, and that, consequently, such actions are either forbidden or enjoined by God, the Author of nature. Actions which are the subject of this exertion of reason, are in themselves lawful or unlawful, and are therefore, as such, necessarily commanded or prohibited by God.'5

'Though,' says Locke, 'God has given us no in

1 Austin, p. 38.

2 Paley's Moral Philosophy, Book I. ch. i. p. 1.

3 Just. Dig. 1. 1. 3.

4 Wightman v. Wightman, 4 Johns. ch. R. 2, § 348,
5 De Jur. Bel. ac Pac., lib. i. cap. i., § x. 1, 2.

nate ideas of Himself,-though He has stamped no original characters in our minds, wherein we may read His being,-yet, having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, He hath not left Himself without witness; since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of Him as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point, since He has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover and know Him, so far as is necessary, to the end of our being, and the great concernment of our happiness. But though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though its evidence be, if I mistake not, equal to mathematical certainty; yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to a regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions which are in themselves capable of clear demonstration."

Good and Evil.-Things are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure, or preserve, us the possession of any other good, or absence of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished; though, in truth, they be only different constitutions of the mind, sometimes occasioned by 1 Human Understanding, Bk. ii. ch. 10, § 1.

disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.'

'Actions,' says Paley, 'are to be esteemed by their tendency. Whatever is expedient, is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone, which constitutes the obligation of it. Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency; the agent is virtuous or vicious according to his design. Thus, if the question be, whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? We enquire into the tendency of such a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether a man remarkable for this sort of bounty is to be esteemed virtuous for that reason? we enquire into his design, whether his liberality springs from charity or from ostentation ? It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract.

'But to all this there seems a plain objection, viz., that many actions are useful, which no man in his senses will allow to be right. There are occasions, in which the hand of the assassin would be very useful. The present possessor of some great estate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or oppress all about him. His estate would devolve, by his death, to a successor of an opposite character. It is useful, therefore, to dispatch such an one, as soon as possible, out of the way; as the neighbourhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wise and generous benefactor. It might be useful to rob a miser, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness, by being laid out in food and clothing for half-a-dozen distressed families, than by 1 Human Understanding, Bk. ii. ch. 20, § 2.