It is evident that as long as the American troops were in front of Pinon, the enemy necessarily held to their position. In moving off, the former could gain one day the start. This brought the only difficult parts of the Chalco route actually nearer General Scott than the Mexican chief. If to this we add the delay necessary in moving heavy artillery, and breaking up from a fortified position, it would seem that instead of oversight it was rather impossible for General Santa Anna to meet our forces sooner

than he did.

This view seems confirmed by observing the works thrown up at San Antonia and vicinity, which could have had reference only to the route in question.

The United States troops being situated, as before mentioned at the point commanding the four approaches to the capital, reconnaissances made during the 12th, 13th, and 14th of August determined, first, that Pinon was too strong to be attacked, unless absolutely necessary; next, that the route around the lakes was practicable for our trains and artillery, and preferable to attacking by Mexicalzingo. This movement was finally determined upon and commenced the 15th of August, the order of march being the reverse of that by which the army had entered the valley, with this exception: General Worth's division, passing that of General Pillow, was in the advance, General Twiggs's division now bringing up the rear. The movement was completed, comparatively speaking, without opposition, as the few Mexican troops that showed themselves upon our flanks near Santa Cruz fled at the first approach of our light troops, and the third day after breaking up from before Pinon the advance of the army entered San Augustin, and the next day the rear division came up. The army was now on the great southern road, leading to Cuernavaca, and if the enemy were taken by surprise, they could advance along it unmolested towards the city, as far at least as where the Mexicalzingo road unites with it.

A strong party sent forward to ascertain what was in front, at a sudden turn of the road were met by a discharge of grape, which killed Captain Thornton of the dragoons, and caused the reconnoitring officers to recoil in surprise from before the strong position of San Antonio and the line of works which stretch off to the left into the marshy grounds of Lake Xochimilco.

From these works, it would seem that the enemy had anticipated the possibility of this movement of the army. Certain it is, they were prepared, as before, to resist a nearer approach to the capital. The entire Mexican force had left the positions first occupied, the eastern approach being no longer threatened, and were ready to make that obstinate defence that shortly ensued.

The army having reached this point, it was for the commander-inchief now to decide whether, after having avoided Pinon to spare life, he would rush his forces against San Antonio, or, threading his way across the pedrigal to the San Angel road, avoid this strong position, and, at the same time gain the high grounds, where his movements would for a time be unimpeded by marshes and ditches.

The latter course was decided upon, and, on the 19th, General Pillow's division advanced to open the road. As the movement commenced, it was ascertained that General Valencia, with the troops which had been at Tezcuco, was in front ready to dispute the possession of the San Angel road. After advancing about three miles the progress of the division was arrested, it having come within reach of Valencia's guns.

The only route across the pedrigal is a rocky path, considered practicable for mules and persons on foot only, although a horseman can pick his way along it. It was at the point where this path struck the road just referred to, that Gen. Valencia had chosen his position, fortified it with breastworks, within which there were above 20 pieces of artillery sweeping the path and main road. Avoiding the enemy's artillery by deviating from this path to the right, our light troops succeeded in making the way over the field of rock without much loss, and gained the road in question at a point between Valencia's position and that of Santa Anna, at San Angel. The successful attack on the rear of the entrenched camp by our troops, under General Persifor F. Smith, and the brilliant victory of Padierna or Contreras, on the 20th, are well known.

Immediately after this success and during the same morning, General Worth, whose position had been in front of San Antonio, succeeded in turning this strong work, and at the same time that General Pillow's and Twiggs's divisions were pursuing the Mexicans through San Angel and onward, he was pressing their retreat along the San Antonio road towards the city, capturing men and artillery. This double pursuit brought the three divisions about the same time to the river Churubusco, and, very unexpectedly to all, upon the formidable works defending its

passage.

These works consisted, first, of a church and adjoining building, with a high stone wall enclosure, all strongly fortified, defended by about 2,000 men, and mounting 7 guns; second, of a tête du pont, mounting three heavy pieces, and swarming with troops, as well as the river banks to the right and left; also the road to the rear leading to the city. The fortified church fell to General Twiggs's and Pillow's divisions to take, commanding the road

leading from San Angel to this point, by which they were advancing, and the tête du point effectually arrested the progress of General Worth until carried. Almost simultaneously with the attack on these two works, carried after a prolonged and most obstinate defence, a movement was ordered under General Shields to turn the enemy's right flank. This command found the enemy in overpowering force: the number of wounded and slain, however, attests the bravery and determination with which they struggled on to accomplish the object; but it was not until General Worth, having carried the tête du pont, came dashing along the road, that the Mexican force was driven from its position, and precipitated headlong towards the city.

After gaining the battle of Churubusco, General Scott was in possession of everything except the last line of works encircling the city; and for the first time since his entrance into the basin, could, in reality, select his point of attack, and fight on something like an equality.

The armistice followed immediately after this battle; the army, during its continuance, occupied the towns of San Augustin, San Angel, Coyacan, Miscoac, and Tacubaya.

From this disposition of the forces, they threatened at once. both the southern and western approaches to the city, and could, with almost equal facility, attack along either. In looking at the capability for defence of the roads leading from these two directions, it can scarcely be doubted but that the army entered the city from its strongest side. This fact affords but another proof of the foresight and skill of the general commanding, who could so deceive his enemy in reference to the real point of danger, as to make him dismantle his works on the side at last attacked, and leave them in a measure defenseless.

After the armistice was broken, the battle of Molino del Rey, the storming of Chapultepec, and taking the city, followed in rapid succession. Of these I shall only remark in reference to the battle of Molino del Rey.

It has been frequently asserted that this battle was fought unnecessarily, that the American loss was great without any corresponding advantages, and that it had little or no bearing upon the subsequent capture of Chapultepec.

That our loss was greater than it would have been could the force and position of the enemy have been more accurately known, is doubtless true: true, also, that greater advantages than those resulting from that battle were gained in the course of the war, and with far less loss; but this by no means shows that the results of the battle of Molino were not of the greatest importance in the after successes. The Molino del Rey, or Mill

of the King, from its position, stands in the relation of a very strong outwork to the castle of Chapultepec, which is situated on a small rocky isolated mount, 150 feet high, and half a mile nearer the city. As the mill is commanded and defended by the castle, so it reciprocally commands and defends the only good approach to the latter.

The consequences of the battle to the enemy were, that in addition to the loss of an important outwork, and the weakening the main work necessarily resulting from it, also the usual results in killed, wounded, dispersed, and taking prisoners, they were driven from a commanding position into the low grounds at the base of Chapultepec, these grounds being completely commanded from the Molino, and were powerless in preventing the siege pieces from taking up the most favorable position for battering the castle. In the final attack upon the castle, one of the two assaulting columns (General Pillows's) started from this very mill; and from what has been remarked, should have been the successful one, as was the case, for it started from within the enemy's work and found itself on an equality with him up to the very moment of scaling his walls at the crest of the mount, whereas the other assaulting column (General Quitman's) taking the only remaining approach to the castle, a causeway road leading from Tacubaya, was successfully held at bay by the outworks defending this road at the base of the hill, until after the castle was taken; and the opposing force was taken in rear by troops passing through and around Chapultepec.

The victory of Molino also had, as it could not well fail to have, the effect of completely demoralizing the enemy, destroying his confidence to hold any position.

In glancing over the operations in the valley, one cannot but be astonished at the uninterrupted success which attended every movement; neither can one fail to admire the unshaken resolution and steady confidence in himself and troops exhibited by the commander-in-chief, under circumstances when one reverse would probably have been followed by utter annihilation.

It would have been fortunate, in view of the number of lives lost, had the force led into the valley been greater. Could General Scott, at the time of moving round Lake Chalco, have left a strong force at Ayotha, Mexico would have fallen, comparatively speaking, an easy prey; for had Valencia left his position and gone to defend the southern part of the city, the northern would have been left defenceless. Had General Santa Anna left his position at the Penon and Mexicalzingo for those of Churubusco and San Antonio, the eastern approach to the city would have been unprotected, or he would have been taken in rear by the

Mexicalzingo road; or had both generals remained as at first, the troops moving round the lakes would have met with no opposition in entering Mexico by the south: again, had their troops been so distributed as to guard every approach, their line of defence would have been weak at all points from its great extent.

THE BATTLE OF MARENGO.*

The first thing which Bonaparte did on assuming the reins of government as First Consul was to write a letter to the King of England soliciting peace.

"French Republic-Sovereignty of the People-Liberty—

Equality.

"Bonaparte, First Consul of the Republic, to His Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland.

"Called by the wishes of the French nation to occupy the First Magistracy of the Republic, I have thought proper, in commencing the discharge of the duties of this office, to communicate the event directly to your Majesty.

"Must the war, which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the world, be eternal? Is there no room for accommodation?

"How can the two most enlightened nations in Europe, stronger and more powerful than is necessary for their safety and independence, sacrifice commercial advantages, internal prosperity and domestic happiness to vain ideas of grandeur? Whence is it that they do not feel peace to be the first of wants, as well as the first of glories?

"These sentiments cannot be new to the heart of your Majesty, who rule over a free nation with no other view than to render it happy.

Your Majesty will see in this overture only my sincere desire to contribute effectually, for the second time, to a general pacification, by a prompt step taken in confidence, and freed from those forms, which, however necessary to disguise the ap prehensions of feeble states, only serve to discover in those that are powerful a mutual wish to deceive.

*From Hazlitt.