As to the particular offense involved in this case, the legislative history shows an increasing purpose by Congress to cover rape and all related offenses fully with penal legislation. In the Federal Crimes Act of 1825, 4 Stat. 115, rape was prohibited and made punishable only within certain areas under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States. In the same Act, the assimilative crimes section was applied to federal enclaves." It thus provided the original federal prohibition of such conduct in those areas. If Congress had been satisfied to continue to apply local law to this and related offenses it would have been simple for it to have left the offense to the Assimilative Crimes Act. A contrary intent of Congress has been made obvious. Congress repeatedly has increased its list of specific prohibitions of related offenses and has enlarged the areas within which those prohibitions are applicable. It has covered the field with uniform federal legislation affecting areas within the jurisdiction of Congress.28

When Congress thus enacted the statute as to carnal knowledge in 1889 it gave special attention to the age of consent. The House of Representatives fixed the age

27 See note 22, supra.

28 Rape: (1825) 4 Stat. 115, applied to the high seas but not to federal enclaves; (1874) Rev. Stat. § 5345 applied to federal enclaves; (1909) 35 Stat. 1143. Assault with intent to commit rape: (1825) 4 Stat. 121, on high seas but not within federal enclaves: (1874) Rev. Stat. § 5346; (1909) 35 Stat. 1143. Carnal knowledge: (1889) 25 Stat. 658, age of consent fixed at 16; (1909) 35 Stat. 1143. Adultery: (1887) 24 Stat. 635, in connection with the amendment of bigamy statutes; (1909) 35 Stat. 1149. Fornication: (1887) 24 Stat. 636, in connection with revision of bigamy statutes; (1909) 35 Stat. 1149. See also, Criminal Code, § 312, obscene literature (1873); § 313, polygamy (1862); § 314, unlawful cohabitation (1882); § 317, incest (1887). 18 U. S. C. §§ 512-517.

711

Opinion of the Court.

at 14 and the Senate changed it to 16. 20 Cong. Rec. 997.29

For these reasons, we believe that the Assimilative Crimes Act does not make the Arizona Code applicable to the facts of this case. The judgment of the Court of Appeals accordingly is

MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE concurs in the result.

Reversed.

Mr. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

29 Senator Faulkner, in charge of the bill, said: ". . . the age was fixed by the committee after considerable discussion and an examination of the laws of the several States. Some of the States have changed their laws. A number of the States have fixed the age of sixteen. Some of them have fixed as high as eighteen. Mississippi, Colorado, and Alabama have fixed as high as eighteen." 19 Cong. Rec. 6501.

691100°- -47- -50

Syllabus.

327 U.S.

HEISER v. WOODRUFF ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 496. Argued March 5, 1946.-Decided April 22, 1946.

1. Where, in a bankruptcy proceeding, allowance of a claim based upon a money judgment acquired against the bankrupt before the bankruptcy is objected to on the ground that the judgment was procured by fraud, but the issue of fraud has been litigated and decided between the claimant and the bankrupt before the bankruptcy and has since been litigated and decided between the claimant and the trustee in bankruptcy, that issue is res judicata and may not be litigated further in the bankruptcy proceeding, even though, in the previous litigation, the allegations of fraud were not supported by tender of evidence or other proof. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, differentiated. Pp. 731, 736.

2. While a bankruptcy court is also a court of equity and may exercise equity powers in bankruptcy proceedings to set aside fraudulent claims-including a fraudulent judgment where the issue of fraud has not been adjudicated previously-and may subordinate the claim of one creditor to those of others in order to prevent the consummation of a fraudulent or otherwise inequitable course of conduct, no principle of law or equity sanctions the rejection by a federal court of the salutary principle of res judicata. P. 732.

3. Since the Bankruptcy Act authorizes a proof of claim based on a judgment, such a proof may be assailed in the bankruptcy court on the ground that the purported judgment is not a judgment because of want of jurisdiction of the court which rendered it over the persons of the parties or the subject matter of the suit, or because it was procured by fraud of a party. P. 736.

4. In passing upon a proof of claim based on a judgment, however, a bankruptcy court may not reexamine the issues determined by the judgment itself. P. 736.

5. It is well settled that, where a trustee in bankruptcy unsuccessfully litigates an issue outside the bankruptcy court, the decision against him is binding in the bankruptcy court. P. 733.

6. In general, a judgment is res judicata, not only as to all matters litigated and decided by it but also as to all relevant issues which could have been, but were not, raised and litigated in the suit. P. 735.

7. Nothing decided in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, requires a bankruptcy court, in applying the statutes of the United States governing the liquidation of bankrupts' estates, to adopt local rules of law in determining what claims are provable, or to be allowed, or how the bankrupt's estate is to be distributed among claimants. P. 732.

8. In passing upon a proof of claim based on a judgment, a bankruptcy court proceeds-not without appropriate regard for rights acquired under state law-under federal statutes which govern the proof and allowance of claims based on judgments. P. 732.

9. In determining what judgments are provable and what objections may be made to their proof, and in determining the extent to which the inequitable conduct of a claimant in acquiring or asserting his claim in bankruptcy requires its rejection or its subordination to other claims which in other respects are of the same class, the bankruptcy court is defining and applying federal, not state, law. P. 732. 150 F.2d 869, reversed.

Petitioner filed a claim in bankruptcy based upon a money judgment acquired against the bankrupt before bankruptcy. Respondents objected on the ground that the judgment was procured by fraud. The referee disallowed the claim. The District Court allowed the claim, sustaining petitioner's contention that the issue of fraud had been litigated previously and decided in petitioner's favor in proceedings in which petitioner and the bankrupt or his trustee, or both, had been parties, and was therefore res judicata. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 150 F.2d 869. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 715. Reversed, p. 740.

Leonard J. Meyberg and Rupert B. Turnbull argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner.

Louis A. Fischl argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were H. A. Ledbetter and Thos. W. Champion.

Opinion of the Court by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, announced by MR. JUSTICE BLACK.

This is a proceeding in bankruptcy on objections to the allowance of petitioner's claim in bankruptcy based upon a money judgment acquired against the bankrupt before the bankruptcy. Respondents objected to allowance of the claim on the ground that, so far as here relevant, the judgment was procured by fraud, that is, by perjured allegations in the complaint in the suit in which the judgment was rendered, and by perjured testimony as to the value of property alleged to have been converted by the defendant.

The referee in bankruptcy disallowed the claim. On the referee's certificate the district court, sitting in bankruptcy, allowed the claim, sustaining petitioner's contention that the issue of fraud in procurement of the judgment had been previously litigated and decided in petitioner's favor in proceedings in which the petitioner and the bankrupt or his trustee, or both, had been parties, and was therefore res judicata.

The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed. 150 F. 2d 869. Relying upon our decisions in Pepper v. Litton, 308 U. S. 295, and Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U. S. 89, it held that the court of bankruptcy could go behind the prior adjudications of the validity of the judgment and decide for itself the questions previously litigated and decided, whether the cause of action on which the judgment was entered was meritorious, and whether the claim in bankruptcy should be rejected because based on a judgment procured by claimant's fraud. The Court of Appeals accordingly remanded the cause to the district court for further proceedings on the objections to allowance of the claim. We granted certiorari, 326 U. S. 715, upon a petition which raises the questions whether the bankruptcy court may re-adjudicate the merits of a cause of action on which a judgment against