614 Opinion of MURPHY, J. cents. And the testimony about the use of these additional articles sold, the use that can be made of them, will enable you to determine that they were sold at prices— and the prices are on all these slips that are in evidence— entirely out of line with any value that attaches to them, so that it is almost entirely profit to these defendants, and in doing that, by making the purchase of these things at the prices fixed, the defendants both realized a greater consideration than the Office of Price Administration allows for the commodity sold." He also told the jury that the "one question in the case is whether the sale of the chicken skin and feet was a necessary condition to the purchase of the other [poultry]." The jury acquitted petitioner's president but convicted the petitioner on nine counts. Petitioner was fined $2,500 on each count, a total of $22,500. The conviction was affirmed by the court below, one judge dissenting because of the exclusion of petitioner's proffered testimony. 149 F.2d 773. In our opinion, however, the conviction must be set aside. Section 205 (b) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 imposes criminal sanctions on "Any person who willfully violates any provision of section 4 of this Act . . .' Section 4 (a) of the Act in turn provides that "It shall be unlawful . . . for any person to sell or deliver any commodity, . . . in violation of any regulation or order under section 2 . . ." Section 2 (a) authorizes the Price Administrator under prescribed conditions to establish by regulation or order such maximum prices "as in his judgment will be generally fair and equitable and will effectuate the purposes of this Act." Section 2 (g) further states that "Regulations, orders, and requirements under this Act may contain such provisions as the Administrator deems necessary to prevent the circumvention or evasion thereof." The Price Administrator, pursuant to § 2 (a), issued Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269 on Decem 3 Opinion of MURPHY, J. 327 U.S. ber 18, 1942, which regulation was in effect at the time the poultry sales in question were made. Section 1429.5 of this regulation, referred to in the informations, stems from § 2 (g) of the Act. It is entitled "Evasion" and reads as follows: "Price limitations set forth in this Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269 shall not be evaded whether by direct or indirect methods, in connection with any offer, solicitation, agreement, sale, delivery, purchase or receipt of, or relating to, the commodities prices of which are herein regulated, alone or in conjunction with any other commodity, or by way of commission, service, transportation, or other charge, or discount, premium, or other privilege or other trade understanding or otherwise." The manifest purpose of Congress in enacting this statute was to preserve and protect the economic balance of the nation during a period of grave emergency, thereby achieving the prevention of inflation and its consequences enumerated in § 1. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 423. That aim was implemented by criminal sanctions to be imposed on those who deliberately choose to ignore the national welfare in this respect by selling commodities at prices above established levels. As appears from a combined reading of §§ 205 (b), 4 (a) and 2 (a), criminal liability attaches to any one who willfully sells commodities in violation of a regulation or order of the Price Administrator establishing maximum prices. Cf. United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677. Recognizing that 3 Reissued with amendments on October 8, 1943. See note 2. *Section 205 (b) is somewhat inartistically drawn. It does not specifically impose criminal liability on those who violate the regulations and orders of the Administrator. But the hurdle of United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, is cleared by the reference in § 205 (b) to § 4, which makes it unlawful, among other things, to sell or deliver any commodity in violation of any regulation or order. See In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506; United States v. George, 228 U. S. 14; Singer v. United States, 323 614 Opinion of MURPHY, J. sales at above-ceiling prices may be accomplished by devious as well as by direct means, Congress in § 2 (g) authorized the Administrator to make provisions against circumvention and evasion of maximum prices. Hence one who willfully sells commodities at prices above the maximum in an evasive manner specified by the Administrator subjects oneself to criminal liability. These statutory warnings are clear and unambiguous. When incorporated with such definite and clear regulations and orders as the Administrator may promulgate, the provisions of the Act leave no doubt as to the conduct that will render one liable to criminal penalties. This delegation to the Price Administrator of the power to provide in detail against circumvention and evasion, as to which Congress has imposed criminal sanctions, creates a grave responsibility. In a very literal sense the liberties and fortunes of others may depend upon his definitions and specifications regarding evasion. Hence to these provisions must be applied the same strict rule of construction that is applied to statutes defining criminal action. In other words, the Administrator's provisions must be explicit and unambiguous in order to sustain a criminal prosecution; they must adequately inform those who are subject to their terms what conduct will be considered evasive so as to bring the criminal penalties of the Act into operation. See United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 94-96. The dividing line between unlawful evasion and lawful action cannot be left to conjecture. The elements of evasive conduct should be so clearly expressed by the U. S. 338. Congress has subsequently emphasized this reference even more clearly when, in adding § 204 (e) (1) to the Emergency Price Control Act, it spoke of a criminal proceeding "brought pursuant to section 205 involving alleged violation of any provision of any regulation or order issued under section 2 ..." § 107 (b), Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 639. See also § 6, Act of June 30, 1945, c. 214, 59 Stat. 306, 308, amending § 204 (e) (1) of the Emergency Price Control Act. Administrator that the ordinary person can know in advance how to avoid an unlawful course of action. In applying this strict rule of construction to the provisions adopted by the Administrator, courts must take care not to construe so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the Administrator. Words used by him to describe evasive action are to be given their natural and plain meaning, supplemented by contemporaneous or long-standing interpretations publicly made by the Administrator. But patent omissions and uncertainties cannot be disregarded when dealing with a criminal prosecution. A prosecutor in framing an indictment, a court in interpreting the Administrator's regulations or a jury in judging guilt cannot supply that which the Administrator failed to do by express word or fair implication. Not even the Administrator's interpretations of his own regulations can cure an omission or add certainty and definiteness to otherwise vague language. The prohibited conduct must, for criminal purposes, be set forth with clarity in the regulations and orders which he is authorized by Congress to promulgate under the Act. Congress has warned the public to look to that source alone to discover what conduct is evasive and hence likely to create criminal liability. United States v. Resnick, 299 U. S. 207. In light of these principles we are unable to sustain this conviction of the petitioner based upon § 1429.5 of Revised Maximum Price Regulation No. 269. For purposes of this case we must assume that the Administrator legally could include tying agreements and combination sales involving the sale of valuable secondary commodities at their market value among the prohibited evasion devices. Any problem as to his power so to provide would have to be raised initially in a proceeding before the Emergency Court of Appeals. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182; Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 427–431; Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U. S. 410, 418 419; 614 Opinion of MURPHY, J. Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 98. The only issue bearing upon the regulation which is open in this criminal proceeding is whether the Administrator did in fact clearly and unmistakably prohibit tying agreements of this nature by virtue of the language he used in § 1429.5. That issue we answer in the negative." Section 1429.5, so far as here pertinent, provides that price limitations shall not be evaded by any method, direct or indirect, whether in connection with any offer or sale of a price-regulated commodity alone "or in conjunction with any other commodity," or by way of any trade understanding "or otherwise." No specific mention is made of tying agreements or combination sales. It is urged by the Government that this language fits the type of tying agreement allegedly used by petitioner. The contention is that petitioner received for the primary commodity not only the ceiling price but also the price of the secondary commodities which the retailers were required to buy. Conversely, the retailers were compelled to pay not only the ceiling price but also the price of the secondary commodities in order to secure the primary commodity, the poultry. Under this theory it is immaterial whether the secondary products, the chicken parts, had any value to the retailers or whether their price was a reasonable one. Reference is made in this respect to § 302 (b) of the Act, defining price as "the consideration demanded or received in connection with the sale of a commodity." Hence it is concluded that the price limitation on the primary commodity was evaded "in conjunction with any other commodity" within the meaning of § 1429.5. This argument, moreover, represents the consistent interpretation of the Administrator." 5 Cf. United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F. 2d 798. • The Price Administrator has consistently maintained the position that compulsion to purchase a secondary product is an evasion of the maximum prices fixed for the primary product. Thus, in an inter |