rule the District Court here too lacked power to grant an injunction.

Just as in the Myers case, the claim here is that the contracts are not covered by the applicable statute. And the applicable statute, the Renegotiation Act, like the National Labor Relations Act in the Myers case, empowers administrative bodies to rule on the question of coverage. The Renegotiation Act authorizes the Chairman of the Maritime Commission to conduct investigations in the first instance to determine whether excessive profits had been made on contracts with the Commission. A contractor aggrieved by the Chairman's determination of excessive profits may have them redetermined in a “de novo" proceeding before the Tax Court. Section 403 (e) (1) of the Act provides that the Tax Court "shall have exclusive jurisdiction, by order, to finally determine the amount, if any, of such excessive profits . . Contrary to respondent's contention that this language limits the Tax Court's jurisdiction so as not to include the power to decide questions of coverage, we think the language shows that the Tax Court has such power. For a decision as to what are and are not negotiable contracts is an essential part in determining the amount of a contractor's excessive profits. The legislative history of the Renegotiation Act, moreover, shows that Congress intended the Tax Court to have exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of fact and law, which latter include the issue raised here of whether the contracts in question are subject to the Act. In order to grant the injunction sought the District Court would have to decide this issue in the first instance. Whether it ever can do so or not, it cannot now decide questions of coverage when the administrative agencies authorized to do so have not yet made their determination. Here, just

One of the sponsors of the Renegotiation Act in the House explained the Bill as providing that the Tax Court could make decisions on all "questions of fact and law . . ." 90 Cong. Rec. 1355.

540

Opinion of the Court.

as in the Myers case, the administrative process, far from being exhausted, had hardly begun. The District Court consequently was correct in holding that it lacked jurisdiction to act.*

Respondent urges several grounds for not applying the rule of the Myers case here. It points out that wilful failure to comply with the Adjustment Board's request for information would subject it to penalties under the Act; that the Chairman of the Commission and the Tax Court can enforce their orders without court enforcement proceedings; that the Act specifically provides that the Tax Court's determination is not subject to court review; and that, even if respondent could, subsequent to a Tax Court determination, have resort to the courts, it would be subjected to a multiplicity of suits in order to recover the money due on the contracts. Even if one or all of these things might possibly occur in the future, that possibility does not affect the application of the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. The District Court had no power to determine in this proceeding and at this time issues that might arise because of these future contingencies. Its judgment dismissing the complaint was correct. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS Concurs in the result.

Reversed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

4 The same principles which justified dismissal of the cause insofar as it sought injunction justified denial of the prayer for a declaratory judgment. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U. S. 293, 299; Coffman v. Breeze Corporations, 323 U. S. 316; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450; Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U. S. 491, 494, 499.

UNITED STATES EX REL. TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY v. WELCH.

NO. 528. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.*

Argued March 7, 1946. Decided March 25, 1946.

Tennessee Valley Authority built a power dam creating a large reservoir, thus flooding a highway which afforded the only reasonable means of access to a large area of mountainous land constituting part of the watershed and lying between the reservoir and a national park. A new road could have been built at a cost disproportionate to its value to the public. After lengthy consideration of all public and private interests, it was agreed between the national, state and county authorities that the best solution of the problem was for T. V. A. to acquire all land in the isolated area and add it to the national park, making satisfactory financial adjustments with all interests, public and private, and reserving all rights required to carry out the T. V. A. program. T. V. A. adopted a resolution that it deemed the acquisition of the land necessary to carry out the purposes of the T. V. A. Act. All landowners in the area sold their property voluntarily, except the six respondents here. They contested condemnation proceedings on the ground that the taking was beyond the authority conferred by §§ 4 and 25 of the T. V. A. Act to condemn all property that T. V. A. "deems necessary for carrying out the purposes" of the Act, which places broad responsibilities on T. V. A. relating to navigability, flood control, reforestation, marginal lands, and agricultural and industrial development of the whole Tennessee Valley and specifically admonishes it to cooperate with other governmental agencies, federal, state and local, in relation to the problem of "readjustment of the population displaced by the construction of dams, the acquisition of reservoir areas, the protection of watersheds," etc. Held:

1. The condemnation is sustained, since it was for a public purpose authorized by the Act and T. V. A. proceeded in complete accord with the congressional policy embodied in the Act. P. 552.

*Together with No. 529, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Burns et al.; No. 530, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Lollis et al.; No. 531, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Bradshaw et al.; No. 532, United States

2. The common law rule requiring a strict construction of powers to condemn is not applicable here, because of the specific provision of § 31 that the Act shall be "liberally construed" to carry out its broad purposes. P. 551.

3. In construing the Act, a court should not break one inseparable transaction into separate units but should view the entire transaction as a single integrated effort on the part of T. V. A. to perform its functions. Pp. 552, 553.

4. It is the function of Congress to decide what type of taking is for public use and the agency authorized to do the taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority. P. 551.

5. The provisions of the Act show a clear congressional purpose to grant T. V. A. all power needed to acquire by purchase or condemnation lands which it deems necessary for carrying out the purposes of the Act. P. 554.

6. Neither the fact that T. V. A. wanted to prevent a waste of public funds nor that it intended to cooperate with the National Park Service detracted from its power to condemn. P. 554. 150 F.2d 613, reversed.

The United States instituted proceedings under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act to condemn certain land. The District Court dismissed the petition. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 150 F. 2d 613. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 714. Reversed, p. 555.

Joseph C. Swidler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McGrath and Charles J. McCarthy.

McKinley Edwards argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 528.

George H. Ward argued the cause for respondents in Nos. 529 to 533, inclusive. With him on the brief was G. L. Jones.

ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Rust et al.; and No. 533, United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hyatt et al., on certiorari to the same court, argued and decided on the same dates.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

The United States, on behalf of the Tennessee Valley Authority, filed petitions in the District Court to condemn six tracts of land located in North Carolina and owned by the several respondents. It asserted that the power to condemn the land in question was conferred upon the Authority by the provisions of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act as amended. 48 Stat. 58 as amended, 16 U.S. C. 831-831dd. The District Court held that the Act did not authorize condemnations under the facts shown by the evidence and dismissed the petitions. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 150 F. 2d 613. Since the grant of power to condemn needed properties is an essential part of the Act, we granted certiorari.

The following basic facts form the background of this proceeding: Congress in 1942, in order to meet pressing power needs for war production, empowered the Authority to construct Fontana Dam, on the Little Tennessee River in North Carolina. H. Rep. 1470, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 25. The dam is one of the world's largest and creates a reservoir twenty-nine miles long. Between this reservoir and the Great Smoky Mountains National Park lie forty-four thousand acres of mountainous land, including the tracts which the Government wants to condemn here. When Congress authorized construction of the dam, two hundred and sixteen families occupied this area. Their only convenient means of ingress and egress, except for foot trails, was North Carolina Highway No. 288, a road approximately fifty miles in length. When the dam was built the reservoir flooded most of the highway, rendering it useless for travel. As a result the area remained practically isolated.

As events have shown, the problem this situation created could not be easily solved. Any solution had to take into consideration the interests of the United States, of North Carolina, and of Swain County, N. C., as well as the in