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animated beings with which we are acquainted. It must be allowed, indeed, that, apart from every thing which we usually refer to instinct, animals frequently discover a remarkable sagacity, even something hardly to be distinguished from human reason. If any

one chooses to call such instances exam. ples of a rational faculty in brutes, it is of no consequence to our present argu ment. Should we grant that brutes possess reason, it is evidently in a very small degree, and within a very limited range, compared with man. Their acts of rea son, if we are so to call them, consist of but a very few links; man's reason exhibits itself in endless and complicated chains. Whatever knowledge brutes may be said to possess, remains stationary from age to age. Man alone engages in the pursuit of truth. He alone is capable of continual progression in knowledge, and of accumulating wisdom from one generation to another. form some conception of invisible and creating power. He can reflect on his own consciousness. He possesses a moral sense, which takes cognizance of right and wrong. In short, reason is man's leading distinction. It is the master-faculty of his nature. It is the proper guide of all his other powers. What, then, is its just use? What objects are worthy of so high and dignified a function? What objects are most worthy of it?" (Page 3.)

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To these important questions Dr. Hoppus gives a brief but weighty reply:

"We may reply, in general, that it is the province of reason to aim at the discovery of truth; and to make a fit and proper, that is, a rational, use of such discovery. Truth of every kind, as apprehended by the mind of man, is the harmony of his ideas with the reality of things. Without this harmony, it is obvious, there can be nothing deserving the name of knowledge. The pursuit of truth, therefore, is an employment which, in all ages, has been deemed worthy of a being possessing reason; and it has engaged the utmost energies, and called forth the highest eulogies, of reflective men." (Page 4.)

The pursuit of truth, the Lecturer states, is not only valuable for its own sake, but for the improvement which it effects in the condition of society. But here a momentous question arises. Dr. Hop

pus thus refers to it. Speaking of "the useful arts" which reason has invented and arranged, he says,—

"They have done all that is done to preserve health, to cure disease, to benefit, in a thousand ways, the condition of man in the present world; an object always worthy to exhaust a large portion of the energies of benevolence; and which would deserve to absorb them all, if it were only certain that the life which now is were the whole of man's existence. It would then be rational, it would be most philanthropic, to direct the whole of man's attention to his present lot. If it could be ascertained, I repeat, that man's existence beyond the grave were only a poetic vision, or an invention of Priests and Rulers, with a selfish view to gain the mastery over men's minds; then, it would be folly in man not to lavish all his powers, and not to exhaust all his affections, on a scene which, however short, and however uncertain in its du ration, were his all. The reflection would indeed be most gloomy; but the use made of it would be wholly consistent with reason." (Page 5.)

For this inquiry Socialism makes no provision. It either denies existence beyond death, or takes no account of it. As the Lecturer ob. serves, "it leaves futurity to chance." And were there no other reason, yet this would show that

"Mr. Owen has very lamentably failed of being that benefactor to the hu man race which he has supposed himself adapted to be." (Page 5.)

The vast importance of this sub. ject, Dr. Hoppus thus forcibly pre

sents :

"Will it be denied by any rational being, that it is worthy of his reason to inquire, with the utmost eagerness, and the most unwearied search for such data as he can find, whether this be the only scene in which he is to exist? Whether there is not evidence of another life? Whether death may not be a mere prelude to a new mode of existence, possibly an existence that may never end? And should there be another life, what is its complexion? Has the present any connexion with the future? Is it not

possible that my present state of mind, the use I make of my intellectual powers, the emotions which I cherish, the con duct I pursue, may have an important

relation to my destiny in some other scene of being? How can I know the contrary 2 May not what I now am, determine what I shall hereafter be ? Is it likely that the only rule of action under which man is placed, is his own inclinations, modified by the conventional rules of society? or do not nature, the history of mankind, and even some still more express testimony, furnish ample evidence to the diligent and impartial inquirer, that there is not only a Power exerting its energy in what we term 'the laws of nature;' but that this Power is an intelligent mind, possessed of moral qualities, and capable of governing man; that man is actually placed under a system of moral government; and that this consideration may be of infinitely greater consequence to him than any thing relating merely to his condition in the present world?"

(Page 7.)

Owen has neither the praise of ori-
ginal discovery, nor the guilt of
original impiety. He has simply
carried out a given line in its own di
rection. He has cultivated the seed,
and glories in the production of the
plant; but that plant is so uncon-
querably, unconcealably offensive,
that we are, after all, strongly in-
clined to the opinion, that they who
hold and endeavour to spread the
principles, which, by a rational ex-
tension, produce the Socialism of
Mr. Owen and his followers, are far
Owen himself.
more dangerous to society than Mr.

"An open foe may prove a curse,

But a pretended friend is worse." Dr. Hoppus rightly observes,

"There is an emancipation of reason which is its enslavement; an emancipation which is like the deviation of the needle from the magnetic pole in consedisturbing influence of some local attracquence of its being brought under the

tion. There is a mistaken notion in some minds, that a sceptical indifference to evidence argues a manly independence of intellect; but there may be just as much credulity in believing too little, as in believing too much. It does not argue a more enormous aberration of reason to give credit to all the legendary tales of Hinduism, than to adopt the universal scepticism of David Hume."

(Page 12.)

We are glad that Dr. Hoppus has referred so pointedly to this view of the subject. There is scarcely a part of Mr. Owen's scheme-we know not that there is a single part -which may not be referred to some statement or other on the part of those who have still "professed and called themselves Christians." It is a favourite way of speaking with those who arrogate to themselves the high praise of "liberalism," and "rationalism," to represent "the life of the world to come" as a continuation of the present, under greatly improved circumstances, and to omit from the consideration of the subject all notice of the moral connexion between time and eternity, as determined by a moral Governor, in a public process which is best described to us in its analogies with the judicial proceed- He first considers the EXTENT of ings of human society. Mr. Owen the province of Reason, in reference has rightly perceived, that if there to religion and morals; and in probe no moral connexion between the secuting the inquiry, his remarks present and the future, the conare arranged in three divisions: struction of rules for the govern- 1. Christianity is founded on natument of society requires no referral theology. 2. Supposing it posence to a topic with which they have no assignable relation; and from the omission of a doctrine, as practically useless, to its entire rejection, the distance is very small.

Mr.

*A term employed by Socialists, mostly in a

sense little different from that of the ancient

Atomic Atheists."-DR. H.

A brief view of the scheme of Dr. Hoppus's Lecture will enable the reader to judge of the entire argument, and to form his own opinion concerning its bearings on the system to which the Lecturer is opposed.

sible that a religion should be revealed to man by a special dispensation from the Creator and Governor of the world, it is clearly the dictate of reason to inquire carefully whether it has actually been made. And, 3. As it belongs to the province of reason to search with the

greatest care, diligence, and impartiality, into the evidence there is for believing Christianity to be, as it professes, a religion revealed from God; so it is also the part of reason to endeavour to ascertain the import of its contents. Under these distinct but closely-related heads, a number of particular reasonings and illustrations are adduced, designed to explain what really is the province of reason in matters of religion and morality. Where not only the general execution is so excellent, but where, likewise, the signification of the author's statements is plainly right, any approach to hypercriticism would be unjust. The first of Dr. Hoppus's subdivisions states, that "Christianity is founded on natural theology." Now, while it is most true that Christianity, as a system of remedy and restoration, rests on the great truths which, from their connexion with original nature, may be termed truths of natural theology,—such as, that there is an eternal and independent Being, that all things were made and are sustained by him, and that he has the absolute right of governing, by laws suited to their respective natures, all things that he has made, it is not true, either in fact or argument, that Christianity rests upon this natural theology, considered as a system established by human investigation and discovery. What unfallen man might have done, we know not; though even in this case, the proper basis of religion, as due to the great Author of nature and Lord of all, would seem to be the direct proposition to him of divine truth, and the direct promulgation of divine law. But what man, as he is, has attempted to do, and what he actually has done, we do know very well. Never yet has man by searching found out God. By the light of nature only man has at any time seen God." Beautiful systems of natural religion have indeed been constructed, but always by those who have possessed the great truths of divine revelation. Had no light, flowing directly from the heavenly bodies, revealed their existence to Newton,

66

no

he could never have investigated the laws of the universe, nor ascertained the wonderful system actually combined in the wild magui cence of the nocturnal heavens. God must thus make known himself to man; and then, the study of his works, under the guidance of this revealed truth, will always lead us to confess that "the heavens declare the glory of God, and " that "the firmament showeth his handy work." There is more philosophical accuracy than perhaps their author himself perceived, in the truly sublime poetry of poor Christopher Smart,

"Tell them, I AM, Jehovah said

To Moses; while earth heard in dread,
And, smitten to the heart,
At once above, beneath, around,
All nature, without voice or sound,

Replied, O LORD, THOU ART!" Atheism, indeed, is reproved by nature; for the cultivated and disciplined mind sees throughout but one vast and agreeing congeries of effects, by which he is convinced that some primal causality must exist; but the nature and will of the great First Cause, the personal Godhead, as personal, must make himself known to us. And so it is. The philosophy of all Heathenism shows us the conclusion of natural theology, while suspended on argument alone, tremulous and unsettled, and shaken by every breath of doubt, and presenting a new aspect to every variety of opinion, till the mind is made giddy by the movements which it contemplates, and becomes confused by their continually-varying results. A just and luminous natural theology is only found in connexion with revelation.

It is no more than common justice to Dr. Hoppus to state, that, in the remarks arranged in his first subdivision, there are some most beautiful illustrations of this. His task was difficult, for he had to epitomize, and to secure brevity without obscurity; but he has been very successful in the performance, presenting, in the compass of some sixteen pages, a remarkably distinct miniature of nature as the intended effect of a designing cause.

We must content ourselves with quoting the sentences in which Dr. Hoppus passes to the second principal division of his Lecture, and briefly adverting to its contents :—

"If the evidences of natural and revealed religion ought to be weighed in the balances of impartial reason; and if reason, receiving those evidences, should next devoutly inquire into the interpretation of the divine message to man, and examine it by all the lights of criticism, invoking, at the same time, that inward illumination of the Spirit of God, which is promised in answer to prayer, and without which nothing is strong, and nothing is holy:' when reason has done this, can reason lay claim to any farther jurisdiction? Is it of the province of reason to decide what ought, and what ought not, to be the contents of a revelation from God? Has not reason its limits as well as its extent?"

(Page 51.)

The substance of the reply to this question, to which the remaining pages of the Lecture are devoted, is, as was to be expected from the Lecturer, that reason has its limits; and that he who exceeds them, goes greatly astray, and seldom fails of falling even into dangerous error. That revelation has its mysteries, Dr. Hoppus, of course, acknowledges that these mysteries ought to be no bar to its unqualified reception; and that into what it pleases God to envelop in darkness, iman has no right to intrude, he very forcibly argues. In a few pages of appendix, he illustrates (which will be very useful to the less-informed or youthful reader) the position which he had taken, that other subjects, besides religion, are connected with difficulties and mysteries, which, nevertheless, no

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it strikes farther. By saying, “Man responsible for his dispositions and opinions," Mr. Taylor marches past the camp which Mr. Owen thinks he has intrenched, and attacks a position which commands that in which the Socialists are placed, but which is itself defended,-we were going to say, by very different troops, -not, however, so different as might at first sight appear, and as might be judged by an observer, who merely looked at the superficies of a subject. Mr. Owen boasts of his originality. Of whatever else he boasts, on that subject he must be silent. For all his doctrines, a source beyond himself may be found. What? Robert Owen the first man that taught that man was not responsible for his opinions? Why, it is the grand principle of the false tolerance of the day. In attachment to true Christian liberality and forbearance we yield to none, any more than in willingness to maintain it against all the opponents whom superstition and bigotry may send forth. But for this very reason are we the more bound to attack and expose that false liberality which springs at best from total indifference to all religious opinions, and is very frequently connected with a cordial dislike to those which have from the beginning been regarded as the characteristics and the glory of the Christian faith. Is it possible to read such language as we are now going to quote, and which was addressed to no ordinary assembly, and doubt the school of which Mr. Owen has shown himself so apt a scholar? "The great truth has finally gone forth to all the ends of the earth, that no man shall render account to man for his belief OVER WHICH

HE HIMSELF HAS ΝΟ CONTROL.

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of principles which he had received from others, but which they wished to hold as the basis of certain professions, and without any thing like a careful examination of their character and tendency. Concede to Mr. Owen the doctrine of necessity; allow that man has no control over his own belief; grant him, in addition, those opinions concerning marriage which bore sway in Paris among the philosophers of the first French Revolution; grant Mr. Owen all this, and he has a right to demand the full admission of his entire system. From the very beginning of his career as a public benefactor!" Mr. Owen, we doubt not, has had his whole scheme in view; but he saw that most of those who held the very principles, the natural developement of which constituted the scheme, would be startled by the early disclosure of the results which he meditated. He began, therefore, by seeking to amend the educational system, and contented himself with the very ambiguous phrase,-education without distinction of creed; and so went

on till he threw off all concealment, and stood forth in his own character, as Mr. Owen the Socialist.

It really is time that this parleying with bad principles were stopped. There are gravitating laws in the world of mind, as well as in that of matter; and when principles are once imbibed, somewhere or other they will be carried out to their ultimate consequences. Against those consequences there is no way of protecting society, but by guarding them against the principles. In the case before us, it is an insult to the true doctrine of Christian tolerance, equally remote from superstition and bigotry on the one hand, and from infidel latitudinarianism on the other, to say, that it cannot be maintained without taking up a position which reduces all opinions to a level, and enables its occupant to smile upon all because he cares for none. Socialism is but an EFFECT; and, though it may for a time be frowned into quietness and obscurity by public indignation, yet, if its CAUSE be patronised and

cherished, it will by and by burst forth with renewed energy, and will find less disposition to rebuke it.

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We say again, therefore, that we are glad to see the open and honest manner in which Mr. Taylor comes to the task assigned him. "Over his belief man has no control; He can no more change it than he can the hue of his skin, or the height of his stature," says the school in which Mr. Owen learned his lesson. "Man responsible for his dispositions, opinions, and conduct," says Mr. Taylor. If this position be won, Mr. Owen may break up his encampment, and retreat as well as he can; but if it be won, it is won by the defeat of others as well as by that of Mr. Owen himself.

After a few introductory observations, Mr. Taylor thus states his subject, and the method governing the explanation and proof:

"Human responsibility then, using the term in its highest sense, is not an opinion to be proved, but a principal and obvious fact in the natural history of man. The consciousness of responsibility attaches to all men ; and the only really such) are of two kinds; namely, seeming exceptions (for they are not that of individuals or races, long brutalized by sensuality or ferocity; and that of a handful of sophists, who have talked themselves and one another out of common sense, until they no longer know where to find, within their bosoms, any genuine sentiments.

"Our task, then, is not to prove the fact of human responsibility, as if it might be questioned; but so to spread it out in its constituents and in its effects, as to leave no room for a contrary suppo sition.

"The doctrine of responsibility will present itself as the result of

"An analysis of man's nature, individually; of

"An explication of the nature of the Social system; and of

"A calculation (if we might so speak) of the orbit which this Social system is pursuing, on the field of the universe.

"But here let it be well understood, that our present line of argument is purely physical, and our method strictly inductive. We are asking concerning the natural history of man, visible chief as he is, of the terrestrial orders; and while we assume nothing which does not

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