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Both are vitally interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Both are vitally interested in seeing the military Great Powers of the world divided against themselves. If these should combine, or if one of them should obtain the supremacy in Europe, it might mean the end not only of Great Britain but also of the United States.

When Washington wrote, “ 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,' the United States could stand alone. At that time a combination of military Powers possessed of powerful navies was inconceivable. Besides, formerly the United States could be attacked by no European nation except Great Britain, because all the other nations lacked ships. As the United States cannot safely meet single-handed a joint attack by the Great Powers, they must endeavour to meet a hostile combination by a counter-combination. If serious complications should arise out of the Mexican War, we must stand shoulder to shoulder with the United States, with or without a treaty of alliance. In defending the United States against a joint attack of the military Great Powers we defend ourselves. Policy should be not merely national but should be racial. Accidents have divided the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, but necessity may again bring them together. Herein lies the hope of the future. We may not approve of Mr. Wilson's policy, but we must bear in mind that he has acted with the best intentions. America's troubles are our troubles. We cannot afford to see the United States defeated or humiliated. The present moment seems eminently favourable not only for offering to the United States our unconditional support in case of need, but for approaching them with a view to the conclusion of a carefully limited defensive alliance. Such an alliance would be the strongest guarantee for the maintenance of the world's peace. The Mexican War may have the happiest consequences upon Anglo-American relations, and it may eventually bring about an Anglo-American reunion.

At the time these lines were written the political horizon

of Europe seemed free from clouds. On the other hand, it appeared possible that the Mexican trouble might involve the United States in difficulties with some European military Power or Powers. It seemed more likely that Great Britain might have to come to the aid of the United States than the United States to the aid of Great Britain. Providence has willed it otherwise, and perhaps it is better so. If, as is devoutly to be hoped, the Anglo-American brotherhood in arms should lead to the establishment of a great brotherhood in peace of all the English-speaking peoples—to an Anglo-American reunion—a great step would have been taken in strengthening the cause of freedom and the peace of the world. The British Empire and the United States combined would not dominate the world. Anglo-Saxondom has no desire for such domination. Possessing only small standing armies, merely a police force, other States need not fear their aggression. On the other hand, the numbers of their citizens, the power of their industries which can be mobilised for war, and their great wealth, would make the combined Anglo-Saxon nations the most powerful factor in preserving the peace of the world, while their own peace would in all probability be secured by their reunion for an indefinite period. Nowhere in the world does the white population increase more rapidly than in the United States and in the British Dominions. To all who have the welfare of the Anglo-Saxon race at heart it must be clear that not the least benefit of the Great War would consist in the reunion of the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race, in. the recreation of the British Empire in its greatest glory. The hope to secure the peace of the world by arbitration treaties or by some great international organisation such as a federation or a great league of nations, may prove an illusion. All attempts to eliminate war by mutual agreement among States have failed since the time when the Greek States created their Amphyctionic Council. All endeavours to link together the satisfied and the landhungry nations and to combine them for the defence of the

territorial status quo may prove futile. The peace of the world can most easily be maintained not by creating an artificial and unnatural partnership between nations of different and, perhaps, irreconcilable aims and interests, a partnership which will break down at the first opportunity, but by creating a permanent partnership between the freedom-loving and peace-loving Anglo-Saxon nations which in addition have the advantage of belonging to the same race, of speaking the same language, of having the same ideals, the same laws, and the same traditions. A British-American union devised for the protection of their possessions against foreign attack should be the most powerful instrument imaginable not only for protecting the future peace of the Anglo-Saxons but also for protecting the peace of the world.


NOTE.—The letter ‘f'following a page number signifies and following
page'; 'ff,' 'and following pages.


Adriatic, Position on the .

4, 130 ff
Agriculture, British and German compared . .

247 ff
„ Development of, 1800-43

. 229
„ Reason of backwardness of .

Alabama Incident .

. 412
Alexander I and Lord Castlereagh at Vienna Con

• 36 f
, and Napoleon I . .

. 24 ff
. Czartoryski on character of

. 23 f
Alexander II, Policy of, towards Poland

. 172 ff
Alliance, Austro-German, of 1879, Text of .

.201 ff
, Holy, Activities of, in Spain and New World

.403 ff
„ Treaty and text of

. 36 ff
„ „ Additions to, made in Verona ..

. 403 f
Alsace-Lorraine, Importance of iron beds in . .

. 286 f
Amelot de la Houssaye on Government of Venice . . . 304 ff
America-See United States.
Anglo-American Differences, how kept alive

401 ff
Anglo-American Reunion, Admiral Mahan on

416 ff, 423 f, 425
Anglo-French Agreement of 1904. ..

. . . 400
Arabia, Strategical value of .

. 94 f
Aristotle on Democracy and Government . 294, 296, 297, 299, 342
Army, American-See United States.
Army, British. See England.
Asia Minor, Populousness of, in antiquity .

. . 66
„ ., Strategical and economic significance of

6, 56 ff
Asiatic Turkey, Danger of integrity of . .

68 f, 70 f, 102
Danger of partition of .

England should become its guardian

.101 ff
England's claims to .
France's claims to ..

. 77 ff
German leaders on value of . .

. 60 ff
Greece's claims to

• 76 f
Italy's claims to .
Nationalities of .

. 68
Neutralisation of, desirable, .

74 ff, 101 ff
Position of, resembles that of Switzerland . . 72 ff
Russia's claims to

. . . . . 75 f

2 F

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Asiatic Turkey, Sparse population of

60, 65
, Strategical and economio significance of

, Value of, in hands of strong military Power . 57 ff, 61 ff
Assyria and Babylonia, Ancient prosperity of
Athens, Causes of decline of'. .

294 ff
Ausgleich of 1867 in Austria-Hungary . .

.119 ff
Austria-Hungary, Ausgleich of 1867 in . .

.119 ff
Characteristic ingratitude of .

114 f, 116 1
Church in, is part of the bureaucracy .

has created Ukrainian movement

. 124 f
Hates and persecutes the Italians

.130 ff
Illegitimacy in . ·


. 113 1
Illiteracy in ..

. 113
Ill-treatment of Serbia by, since 1690.

. 115 f
is a mediæval survival .

. 109
is and may remain a German vassal

.106 ff
is governed by the maxim Divide et Impera. 112, 114
may establish a federation after the War , 143 ff
Nationalities of, enumerated .
Position of, . .

6 ff, 105 ff
Czechs in

. . .

. 125 ff
Italians in . . . .

.130 ff
Poles in . . . . .

.120 ff
Rumanians in .

.140 ff
Ruthenians in .

120, 121, 124
Possibility of acquisition of South German States
and Silesia by . . . .

6 f, 128 ff
Press of :

. 112 f, 117 f
Prince Lich nowsky's opinion of .
Probability of disintegration of .
Religions in . .

. 113
, Revolution of 1848 in ..

.118 ff
Suppression of nationalities in .

.116 ff
The Emperor is the State in ..

. 112
The problem of ..

.105 ff
tried to Germanise nationalities under Joseph II 117
Austro-German Alliance Treaty of 1879, Text of . . . 201 ff

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Babylonia and Assyria, Ancient prosperity of . . . . . 95 ff
Bacon, Lord, on Cabinet Government . .

. 332 f
Bagehot, on British Constitution . . .

. 295 f
Baghdad Railway
. . . . . . .

59, 61
Balkan States .
w a : ... .

3, 4, 48, 51, 52, 53
Bavaria, King of, and German Constitution . . . . .195 ff
Belgium, Unreadiness of, in 1914 . .

. . 293 f
Benedek, Field-Marshal, ungrateful treatment of . . . . 115
Bismarck, and Anglo-Russian antagonism . .

Anti-Polish policy of, British diplomats on 173, 175, 176, 177
laid down that German Emperor might not declare war of

. 198 f

care are convernment


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317, 318, 319, 320

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