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to them, and that which is the property of the collective incorporated person we call a corporation, and subject to taxation as such, has been repeatedly pointed out. See Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; Railway Company v. Loftin, 98 U. S. 559; Bank v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 129; Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134; Shelby County v. Union &c. Bank, 161 U. S. 149; Central Railroad &c. Company v. Wright, 164 U. S. 327; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371; Owensboro National Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664; Citizens' Bank v. Parker, 192 U. S. 73; Delaware, L. &c. Railroad Company v. Pennsylvania, 198 U. S. 341.

In the first of these cases a bank's charter provided that the company "shall pay to the State an annual tax of one-half of one per cent on each share of the capital stock subscribed, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes," and it was held that that was a contract in reference to the property of the shareholders, and prevented further taxation upon their separate property. In the opinion it was said (pp. 686, 687):

"The capital stock and the shares of the capital stock are distinct things. The capital stock is the money paid or authorized or required to be paid in as the basis of the business of the bank, and the means of conducting its operations. The capital stock and the shares may both be taxed, and it is not double taxation."

In the second is this ruling (p. 707):

"In general, an exemption of capital stock, without more, may, with great propriety, be considered, under ordinary circumstances, as exempting that which, in the legitimate operations of the corporation, comes to represent the capital."

And in Tennessee v. Whitworth, supra, p. 136, this description of separable elements of value was given:

"In corporations four elements of taxable value are sometimes found: 1, franchises; 2, capital stock in the hands of the corporation; 3, corporate property; and, 4, shares of the capital stock in the hands of the individual stockholders. Each

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of these is, under some circumstances, an appropriate subject of taxation."

In several of the cases attention is called to the qualifying words which show an intent on the part of the legislature of something other than that generally embraced within the term capital stock." But it is unnecessary to review these cases in detail.

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By section 9 the tax is "on the capital stock of said company -paid in." Clearly that refers to the property which the corporation has received and presumably holds. It is not the individual property of the shareholders which is contemplated, but that which is in the treasury of the corporation, or included among its assets. This, as we have seen, is the ordinary meaning of the term "capital stock." Further, we find that this tax is to be "in lieu of all other taxes, except for penalties imposed upon said company." In other words, the tax upon the company of one per cent may be increased by penalties imposed upon the company and in no other way. Again, the tax is to "be estimated upon the last annual report of said corporation." While such report might be expected to include not merely the property belonging to the corporation but also the number and names of the stockholders and the number of shares held by each, and possibly also the amount paid in by each, yet the word "estimated" carries with it the idea of valuation rather than of mathematical apportionment. It suggests that the property reported by the corporation is to be the basis upon which the assessors shall make their valuation, so that the tax is "estimated" upon that property rather than fixed by the mere process of multiplication or division. That the tax is to be paid by the company is of course not conclusive on the question, but it is in harmony with all the other provisions of the section. Still further, we have the practical construction placed by the authorities for a long series of years-continued up to the year 1898. Under those circumstances we are of opinion that the tax provided for by section 9 is a tax upon the propVOL. CCI-36

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erty of the corporation and not a tax upon the shares of stock held by the shareholders. There was, however, a contract between the State and the corporation which prevented the subjection of the property of the corporation to any other than the tax prescribed in the statute.

The decree of the Circuit Court is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissented.

HADDOCK v. HADDOCK.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 119. Argued December 11, 1905.-Decided April 12, 1906.

The husband and wife being domiciled in New York, the husband left the wife, acquired, in good faith, after a lapse of years, a domicil in Connecticut, and obtained in that State, and in accordance with its laws, a judgment of divorce based on constructive, and not actual, service of process, on the wife, who meanwhile remained domiciled in New York and never appeared in the action. The wife subsequently sued for divorce in New York and obtained personal service in that State on the husband who pleaded the Connecticut judgment. Held,

Without questioning the power of the State of Connecticut to enforce the decree within its own borders, and without intimating any doubt that the State of New York might give it such degree of efficacy that it might be entitled to in view of the public policy of the State, that the Connecticut decree, rendered as it was without being based on personal service of the process on, and therefore without personal jurisdiction of the court over, the wife, was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.

A suit for divorce brought in a State other than that of domicil of matrimony against a wife who is still domiciled therein is not a proceeding in rem justifying the court to enter a decree as to the res, or marriage relation, entitled to be enforced outside of the teritorial jurisdiction of the court.

Questions concerning alleged fraud in contracting a marriage and laches on the part of one of the parties in bringing an action for divorce are matters solely of state cognizance and may not even be allowed to in

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directly influence this court in determining the Federal question which is involved.

The States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution possessed full power over the subject of marriage and divorce and the Constitution delegated no authority to the Central Government in regard thereto, and the destruction of the power of the States over the dissolution of marriage as to their own citizens cannot be brought about by the operation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution of the United States.

Previous decisions of this court hold in regard to the full faith and credit to be given by States to the judicial decrees of other States that: The requirement is not that some, but that full, faith and credit, equal

to that to which it is entitled in the State where rendered, shall be given to a judicial decree of another State. Harding v. Harding, 198 U. S. 317.

A personal judgment against a non-resident-not a proceeding in rem— based merely upon constructive service and therefore jurisdiction not being acquired over the defendant's person may not be enforced in another State under the full faith and credit clause. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714.

All governments possess inherent power over the marriage relation, its formation and dissolution, as regards their own citizens, and where a court or legislature of a State has acted conformably with its own laws concerning the marriage tie as to a citizen of that State, its action is binding in that State as to that citizen, and its validity under the due process clause of the Constitution may not therein be questioned. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190. As a corollary to the power of the State, irrespective of any extraterritorial effect, any other sovereign may, under the principles of comity give to such a decree the efficacy which its own conception of duty and public policy may justify.

Where husband and wife are domiciled in a State jurisdiction exists in that State, for good cause to enter a decree of divorce, entitled to enforcement in another State under the full faith and credit clause; and where a bona fide domicil has been acquired in a State by either husband or wife, a decree of divorce obtained by either in a court having personal jurisdiction of the other is likewise entitled to be so enforced in other States. Cheever v. Wilson,

9 Wall. 108.

Where the domicil of a matrimony is in a particular State, and the husband abandoning the wife, wrongfully goes into another State in order to avoid his marital obligation, such other State does not become a new domicil of matrimony, nor the actual or constructive domicil of the wife. That continues in the original State until she actually acquires a new one. Barber v. Barber,

21 How. 582,

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Where the domicil of the husband is in a particular State, which is also the domicil of matrimony, the courts of that State may, in virtue of the wife's duty to be at the matrimonial domicil, disregard her unjustifiable absence therefrom and treat her as having her domicil therein for the purpose of dissolving the marriage and render a judgment to that effect entitled to recognition in all other States under the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155.

THE facts, which involved the full faith and credit to be given by the courts of the State of New York to a decree of divorce, obtained in Connecticut by the husband, formerly a resident of New York, from his wife still residing in New York, based on substituted service of the summons, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Abram J. Rose, with whom Mr. William H. Willits and Mr. Alfred C. Pettè were on the brief, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Henry Willis Smith, with whom Mr. William T. Tomlinson and Mr. William W. Smith were on the brief, for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error will be called the husband and the defendant in error the wife.

The wife, a resident of the State of New York, sued the husband in that State in 1899, and there obtained personal service upon him. The complaint charged that the parties had been married in New York in 1868, where they both resided and where the wife continued to reside, and it was averred that the husband, immediately following the marriage, abandoned the wife, and thereafter failed to support her, and that he was the owner of property. A decree of separation from bed and board and for alimony was prayed. The answer admitted the marriage, but averred that its celebration was procured by the

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