is not derived from, but exists in the States independently of, the United States Constitution and may be exercised to an unlimited extent, upon all property, trades, business and avocations carried on within the territorial boundaries of the State except so far as it has been surrendered to the Federal Government, either expressly or by necessary implication. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5; McCulloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; Picard v. East Tenn. &c. R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 641. It is most essential to the State and most extensive in its operation, and where it exists it recognizes no limit. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 466; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 351, 353.

The Fourteenth Amendment is general. It was not designed or intended to limit the taxing powers of the States but for an entirely different purpose, as is indicated by the history of its enactment and the early decisions-the protection of the newly emancipated negro. Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206:

The presumption of constitutionality following taxing statutes is stronger than applies to laws generally and only where a taxing system clearly and palpably violates the fundamental law will it be held invalid. Bridge Company v. Henderson City, 173 U. S. 592; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 174 U. S. 754; Florida Central &c. R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 479; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Evans, 111 Fed. Rep. 76.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution was not designed or intended to prevent the State from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways, nor intended to compel it to adopt an iron rule of equality, to prevent the classification of property for purposes of taxation or the imposition of different rates upon different classes; but permits classification for purposes of taxation, the application of different rules of assessment, valuation and review to different classes and the imposition of different rates thereon; and

it is sufficient that all persons within the same class are treated alike and that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class. Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 662; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 228; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 293; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97.

The State may distinguish, select and classify objects of legislation, and necessarily this power must have a wide range of discretion. Merchants & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Home Insurance Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; Gulf &c. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; New York v. Barker, 179 U. S. 279; Charlotte &c. R. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386; Travelers' Life Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U. S. 364; Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U. S. 730; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 269; Coulter v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 196 U. S. 608, 609; Field v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 194 U. S. 621, 622.

The limitations upon this power require it to rest upon some difference, bearing a just and reasonable relation to the act in respect to which the classification is proposed, and it is enough that there is no discrimination in favor of one as against another of the same class. Gulf &c. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 155; Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27; Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, 382; Bell's Gap Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; Home Life Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339.

Different rules apply to, and fix and limit the power of classification in cases of taxation than in other cases. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 562, 563; American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283; Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 102; Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 274.

The classification made by Act 173 is based upon such reasonable differences of property, situation, circumstance, or use, as to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. That the Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to railroad and other public service corporations, permits separate classification of those corporations and their property, for purposes of taxation, must be regarded as. placed at rest by the cases, and the laws of the several States have uniformly provided separate and distinct systems and rules of taxation for railroad property, which have been generally sustained. State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321 (81 Kentucky, 492, 512); Columbus &c. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470; S. C., 89 Georgia, 574; Charlotte R. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U. S. 386; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; S. C., 133 Indiana, 625; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. Dak. 310; McHenry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651; Florida R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 480; Missouri River R. R. Co. v. Morris, 7 Kansas, 210; State Board of Assessors v. Central R. R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 146, 278; Central Iowa Ry. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Iowa, 199; City of Dubuque v. C. D. & M. R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 200; Owensboro & N. Ry. Co. v. Davies County, 3 S. W. (Ky.) 164; Ames v. People, 56 Pac. Rep. (Col.) 656; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 25 So. Rep. 355; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Louisville, 29 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 865; St. Louis &c. Ry. Co. v. Worthen, 52 Arkansas, 529; Chamberlain v. Walter, 60 Fed. Rep. 788; Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nevada, 390, 398; State v. Severance, 55 Missouri, 378; Elliott on Railroads, § 740 and cases eited; Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., 72 et seq.; Guthrie on the Fourteenth Amendment, 113 and cases cited.

Rep.

Railroad corporations possess franchises of a character peculiar to themselves and different from those possessed by other corporations as follows: The right of eminent domain; perpetual existence; the use of public property (Comp. Laws 1897, § 6234); the right of succession to franchises of existing corporations is permitted to purchasing corporations (Comp.

Argument for Appellee.

201 U. S.

Laws 1897, § 6224); power to enforce connections with other companies; the sale value of franchises is recognized by statute and provision is made for their transfer (Comp. Laws 1897, §§ 6328, 6331, 6333,.6339, 6341).

The intangible value attaching to railroad property differs from that attached to property generally: It exists in more permanent character with railroad than other corporations; the railroad corporation's business is, in a sense, monopolistic; railways are peculiarly benefited by the growth of the territory in which they exist; in railway business, economies are made possible by increased density of traffic.

The railway corporation is engaged in rendering a public service in which the State itself might engage and to which it may attach such limitations as it chooses. Cotting v. Goddard, 183 U. S. 93, 94.

The property of railroad corporations exists as a connected whole in a large number of municipalities, rendering it impossible to reach its actual value through assessment and taxation as other property is assessed and taxed. Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 219; S. V. R. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 78 Virginia, 279; Rohrer on Railroads, 1499, § 14; Dubuque v. C. D. & M. Ry., 47 Iowa, 202; State Board of Assessors v. Central Railroad, 48 N. J. L. 322. See briefs in California & Pacific R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1.

As a public service corporation, the railroad has received public aid to a large extent.

Perpetual existence is denied to other corporations. Mich. Const. 10, Art. XIV.

The right to alter, amend, or repeal is reserved in the charters under which Michigan railroad corporations do business; this permits different treatment for taxation purposes, as long as fundamental rights are not interfered with. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 408, 409.

The usage and practice in Michigan has always been to tax railroad corporations by a distinct rule or system. Such requirements as proceed within reasonable limits and general

usage are within the discretion of the legislature. American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 94; Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 233; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 294.

The same principles which permit the taxation of railroad corporations by a specific system allow its separate treatment for the purposes of an ad valorem system. The specific tax has been uniformly sustained. Delaware Railway Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 231; McHenry v. Alvord, 168 U. S. 651; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. Dak. 310, 395.

The rates of railroad companies are, and have always been, regulated by the State. Const., Art. XIXA, § 1; subd. Ninth, 89, Art. II, Mich. General Railroad Law, § 6234, Comp. Laws 1897.

The differences above pointed out between the property, business, privileges and franchises possessed by railroad corporations from those possessed by other property owners and individuals, are such as to justify their separate classification for taxation or other purposes. The fact of difference appearing, the question of the propriety of the classification is one of policy for the legislature.

Numerous elements exist in the classification made, which justify the legislature in making it: No claim is made in the pleadings or the lower court that property other than railroad property was possessed by complainant or included in its assessment. The purpose of Act 173 is to subject to its provisions, and to the system of taxation which it invokes, only property engaged in railroad business. Secs. 5, 9, Act 173 of 1901. Section 5 of the act construed by the rule that general, following special, words are to be confined to things ejusdem generis is limited to railroad property. American Transportation Co. v. Moore, 5 Michigan, 368; S. C., 24 How. 1; McDade v. People, 29 Michigan, 50; Brooks v. Cook, 44 Michigan, 617.

The system of taxation under Act 173 was intended to cover the same property previously taxed specifically. This was