But in all these cases, you see, the representation is just and as it should be; and it would not be just, were it otherwise. It is therefore an indubitable fact, that where the organs of sense are the same, and the circumstances the same, the perception will also be always the same."*

"Febr. 15. I am very glad you had the conversation you mention with Charles Barker, though I am by no means of the same opinion with him in every point. A parsonphysician is, doubtless, not likely to do great things in either way, or even in both ways together. Bishops will certainly not prefer him, and physicians will as certainly set their faces against him. Yet surely a clergyman may be so situated, as to be able to add not inconsiderably to

*[I am disposed to digress for one moment to notice a curious fact, connected with the history of philosophy, to which my attention was, some years ago, first directed by my amiable and intelligent friend, Mr. Serjeant Rough: - Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding was first published in 1690, and Bishop Pearson's Exposition of the Creed first appeared in 1659. To the learned Bishop, then, belongs the honour of having first, if cursorily, yet luminously and fearlessly promulgated the great truth, which was fully demonstrated by Locke, that all our ideas proceed from sensation and reflection. For he thus writes p. 18.:-" As for the existence of such a being, how it comes to be known unto us, or by what means we are assured of it, is not so unanimously agreed upon, as that it is. For, although some have imagined that the knowledge of a Deity is connatural to the soul of man, so that every man hath a connate, inbred notion of a God, yet I rather conceive the soul of man to have no connatural knowledge at all, no particular notion of anything in it from the beginning; but being we can have no assurance of its pre-existence, we may more rationally judge it

his income by a moderate share of medical practice. In a plan of this kind, however, the clerical part must go first, and every idea of the medical profession must be kept out of sight till things are ripe for the assumption of it. But it is impossible to fix a matter of this kind by writing; nor is it by any means necessary, that at present anything should be fixed. Your path is obvious, to improve yourself, as much as possible, both in classical and philosophical, (in which I include mathematical,) knowledge. This knowledge will be of essential service to you, whatever be your profession. Were you absolutely to determine for orders, I cannot by any means enter into Mr. Barker's ideas of Hebrew, and much less

to receive the first apprehensions of things by sense, and by them to make all rational collections. If, then, the soul of man be at the first like a fair smooth table without any actual characters of knowledge imprinted in it,—if all the knowledge, which we have, comes successively by sensation, instruction, and rational collection, then must we not refer the apprehension of a Deity to any connate notion, or inbred opinion, at least we are assured God never chargeth us with the knowledge of him upon that account." It was a right noble instance of independent thinking in a Christian preacher to proclaim, in those early days, contrary to the general, if not the universal belief, that we had no connate, inbred notion of a God.' To a very intelligent friend I am indebted for a sight of Archdeacon Paley's MS. Lectures on Locke's Essay, and from them I shall make the following extract: "It was maintained before Locke that the idea of God was innate. This may be divided into two questions, the answers to which will be evident, 1. Whether the belief of God is innate? 2. Whether the

image of the Deity is innate? A negative answer will appear so just as to need no further illustration." E. H. B.]

can I enter into his reasons for it. Had you a particular talent for learning languages, and had you a particular delight in it, I should by all means wish to encourage you in pursuing studies of this kind. But I think this is not your talent; and I think, too, that the study of languages is to you rather disgusting than pleasant. You never will, in my opinion, have application enough in this way, to reach anything, that can be called eminence. Stick, therefore, for the present at least, to Latin, Greek, and French. As to any views of advancement from even a more than ordinary knowledge of Hebrew, they appear to me to be wild and chimerical. Blaney, to be sure, obtained his professorship solely from the proofs he had given of his Hebrew erudition. But there is only one Hebrew professorship; and I leave you to judge how far there is common sense in studying Hebrew, or indeed anything else, only with a view to one single piece of preferment. Your turn seems to be philosophical investigation. In medical studies, therefore, I think, with a competent degree of application, you cannot fail of succeeding."

"March 26. What does Mr. Barker, say of Twining's book? And what do you hear of it from anybody? From Dr. Parr I hear not a word. In his last Letter he talked of being in London in April. apon you in his way.

If so, he will certainly call

"April 19. You will probably have seen Dr. Parr before you receive this. I hope what you have heard of him, is not true; yet it is not a very unlikely thing to happen. Nothing can exceed his violence in politics; and disappointment has not probably tended to soften his violence. I shall see him, if possible, in town.”

"Oct. 25. I had yesterday a Letter from Matthew, communicating to me his intention of resigning his pupils on account of the bad state of his health, and recommending Parsons to me in the strongest manner, as your Tutor. Parsons, you know, was the man I originally wished to be your Tutor, from his connexion with Dr. Parr, and the high character he, as well as Charles Barker, gave me of him; and I really think him by far the best man in the College."

"Oct. 29. What can you mean by saying that you have not seen Twining's Pliny? You had it from me, and read several of the Epistles. I cannot find it.”*

"Dec. 15. I should be very glad to give Samuel any assistance in his prize-exercise; and still more glad to do anything in that way for your advantage. But upon such a subject I scarce know what to say. In the first place, what is meant by general knowledge? Science, I suppose, or philosophy, and what is commonly called literature. The former comprehending mathematics, physics, metaphysics in all its branches, and ethics; the latter implying an acquaintance with history, ancient and modern, and all compositions of whatever kind, that are addressed to the imagination particularly. What a field is here opened? And how is it possible to traverse the whole compass of it with anything like accuracy and precision? What in the next place is the extent of this knowledge? Here it seems scarce possible to draw a clear line. Is each of these branches of knowledge to be exhausted? Or does a general knowledge mean no more than a partial

* [I have not discovered that Mr. Twining ever published an edition of Pliny's Letters; and yet, from the words in the text, he seems to have done so. E. H. B.]

knowledge of them? And what is a partial knowledge, whether of science, or literature? A superficial knowledge or a smattering merely, it cannot mean. It must suppose at least a knowledge of the principles and elements of each branch. But in many instances this knowledge cannot be attained without entering much into detail. Where, then, are we to stop? A question this, which I cannot answer. Most probably indeed this is not the meaning of the proposer. General knowledge must be opposed to some other kind of knowledge. What is this? Is it professional? Most probably it is. So at least I think I should take it, though it is by no means clearly expressed. In this view the question will be how far an acquaintance with science and literature is necessary to the acquisition of theological, medical, and legal knowledge; and the object of it will be to shew that the former is, or ought to be taught in our Universities, and all places of liberal education, as the foundation of the latter. Here the line of extent may be pretty easily drawn; and the advantages are obvious and important. I shall say no more at present. I do not indeed like what I have said." "Dec. 27. General knowledge may be opposed to particular in two ways, either in the same, or in different branches of science. Thus there may be a knowledge of the fundamental principles or elements of any branch of science, without a knowledge of it in detail, and through its whole extent. D'Alembert's Elements of Philosophy are an example of this kind of knowledge; and whoever possesses them completely, may be said, I think, to possess general philosophical knowledge. But the misfortune is that this general elementary knowledge is not attainable without a considerable acquaintance with the