the scanty and penurious measure of a critic by profes'sion,' but evidently from the overflowings of a heart warm with the subject, he bestows his commendations on the little pamphlet I published last year,* (An Examination of the leading Principles of the New System of Morals,

[* As this tract of Mr. Green is very scarce, and probably in few hands, I hope to be considered as doing an acceptable service to literature by making an important extract from it, p. 49. I have seldom seen more interesting philosophical truth displayed with more elegant diction, more captivating eloquence, or more powerful and satisfactory reasoning: —

"Our moral sentiments, which give at once being and force to moral distinction, cannot be the result of reason. The object of reason is, simply and exclusively, truth and falsehood: and all the effect, which truth and falsehood can possibly produce upon the mind, is to excite a mere assent or dissent, as any proposition appears under one or other of these characters. Wherever the mind is affected on any occasion beyond this, we may universally affirm, and be perfectly sure, that this effect proceeds from some cause entirely independent of the powers of reason. Whatever is susceptible of truth or falsehood, is within the province of reason. Reason may investigate the properties in any object, by which these affections are produced, the relations of these properties with other parts of the system in which they act, or the effects they are designed to produce upon that system: but those properties must previously have acted, to become a subject-matter of enquiry ; and must still continue to act, independently of any speculations respecting their nature, their relations, or their ultimate destination. Reason may be employed on subjects affecting the mind with any emotion, as well as upon lines and figures: but its effects, as reason, must in both cases be the same. It may explore the causes of beauty in visible objects, or of harmony in sound, just as well as the most abstract relations of a triangle: truth and falsehood, probable or certain, are still its only concern; and unless beauty and harmony previously and independently delighted, the result

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as that Principle is stated and applied in Mr. Godwin's Enquiry concerning Political Justice, in a Letter to a Friend, Lond. 1798. 8.) Laudari a laudato viro, to be thus commended by one, to whom I am utterly unknown, and from whom praise is of such value, and this amidst

upon the mind would be equally uninteresting. It may treat of principles of action in man, just as well as of vis inertiæ in matter: but, as incapable of affecting the mind in any other way than through the agency of objects, which previously affected it, it can never operate as an original principle of action itself; though, by being frequently conversant with such powers, it may sometimes, by a natural delusion, seem to do so.

"This remark, you perceive, is of extensive application. The subject before us, must limit our present use of it. Our moral sentiments are original principles of action; and cannot, therefore, as such, be derived from reason. We do not merely believe an action to be of a certain description called moral or immoral; we approve or disapprove it as such; and this sentiment of approbation and disapprobation has a positive influence on human conduct. But approbation and disapprobation are emotions of the mind; and cannot, consequently, originate from reason. We may observe, accordingly, that Mr. Hume, who has laboured hard to refer morality as far as possible to reason, has been obliged to resort at last to 'a sentiment of humanity implanted in our nature,' to a feeling entirely underived from reason, to account for the only principle, which sets it in action, and without which it would be nothing more than an empty speculation and dead letter. (Princ. of Mor. s. 5.) No reasoning on the tendency to augment or diminish the general happiness, in which he (with others) establishes the standard of right and wrong, could give origin to this feeling. Reason, no doubt, by shewing that any action had one or other of these tendencies, might induce me to call it by one or other of these denominations, as I should name a kangaroo a quadrupede, and a penguin a bird, from their falling under one or other of these classes; but, unless I was previously so interested in the general

the cautious reserve of some, from whose friendship I should have expected a more encouraging reception, is a gratification, to which I cannot be insensible: yet the predominant effect upon my mind has been depression, rather than elation. How is this? Opposition and in

happiness, as to approve whatever promoted, and blame whatever obstructed that end, reason could no more excite these emotions from such tendencies, than Euclid could inflame me with love for a triangle, or aversion to a circle, from the remotest of their geometrical relations. The very theory, which places virtue in utility, presumes on a general affection for the general good, (which is the end of utility,) or it would not otherwise be of power to delude the public for a moment. If Mr. Godwin, who has discreetly passed over this high matter in silence, relying on an internal sentiment thus existing in his favour, if Mr. Godwin can shew me any reason, not founded on a feeling independent of all argument, why I should abstractedly prefer the production of good to the production of evil — erit mihi magnus Apollo; and I will subscribe to his dogmas as oracles tomorrow.

"Holding this to be utterly impossible; and assuming that our moral sentiments, as original principles of action, operating through an affection of the mind, must proceed from some cause distinct from reason, and adapted to that effect, where, let me ask, are we

[*Whether the one effect or the other would be produced in such a case, would depend entirely on the disposition of the person, to whom the praise was addressed; and I am rather surprised that a man of such philosophical reflection, as Mr. Green exhibited, should not have perceived that the effect would be different on minds of different construction. Mr. Green was a modest, reserved, retired, pensive, and somewhat timid man; and was therefore very likely to suffer the depression, which he describes. Dr. Parr, through Lord Chedworth, expressed a desire, and intimated an intention of visiting Mr. Green at his residence. Had such a desire been expressed, and such an intention intimated to any other scholar, or to scholars in general, the effect on their

dignity, I believe, have a natural tendency to rouse, condense, and invigorate; excessive favor and commendation to dissipate, relax, and enfeeble our energies and spirits. When stung with neglect, or galled by injuries, the mind, bent back upon itself, and driven to its own resources for

to look for this cause, but in the immediate objects in which and on which it acts; in the qualities, which strike us as moral or immoral, and in the acknowledged properties of the human mind. To deduce these sentiments from a general sentiment, (for to some sentiment we must at last recur,) in favour of their ultimate end, is perfectly preposterous. The greater part of our moral sentiments are not resolvable into any such sentiment at all, general or particular; and of those, which seem so, the particular must have conducted to the general sentiment, and cannot be derived from it. We might as well affirm, that particular objects struck us as beautiful, from a reference to some abstract idea of universal beauty, as that particular acts of beneficence excited our approbation, from our general approbation of beneficence. Particular objects must have struck us as beautiful, before we had ascertained the general properties, in which beauty consists: particular actions must have excited our approbation as beneficent, before we had formed a notion of beneficence in the abstract.

"If you ask me, after this, from whence I derive our moral sen

minds would have been exhilarating- they would have rejoiced with exceeding joyfulness at the thoughts of welcoming such a venerable guest. But the effect on Mr. Green's mind was the very reverse of delight - he was distressed beyond measure-he knew not how he was to conduct himself towards such a guest he was puzzled how he could best entertain him, and what sort of company he could invite to meet him—all was difficulty and tribulation, doubt and hesitation, puzzle and vexation, helplessness and confusion, fearfulness and consternation; and thus the intended visit was never paid by Dr. Parr.

If the general effect of praise, whether appropriate or excessive, were rather depressing than exhilarating, what would become of

support, collects its scattered strength, fastens on whatever is excellent in its faculties or achievements, and dilates with conscious pride* :- when hailed with eulogy, which we are sensible far exceeds our deserts, after the first throbbings have subsided, all our defects and infirmities

timents, in what I place the efficient cause of moral distinction, I do not hesitate to refer you to the account of these sentiments by Adam Smith; not as adopting all his inferences with unqualified assent, nor as supposing that he has exhausted a subject productive, in its nature, to the power of the searcher; but from a firm and rooted conviction, that he has opened and explored the only quarry, from which any solid conclusion on the subject will ever be deduced. Passing over all speculations on the relative properties or ultimate tendency of moral qualities, as totally incompetent to form such impressions, and disdaining the clumsy artifice of a moral sense peculiarly adapted to receive them, he has looked for our moral sentiments in the acknowledged properties of the objects we regard as moral or immoral, acting on the acknowledged properties of the mind of man — and he has found them there. His solution, as far as I know, has never been contested; and, if its influence has not been adequate to its merits, it is imputable to our being but little interested in the origin of principles, which operate independently of all our speculations about

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youthful ambition? No man ever heard of any boy at school finding his generous ardour repressed by the great praises, which the master had bestowed on some particular compositions; the contrary the noble-minded youth tries to improve on his past performances, to excel himself, to become entitled to yet higher praise, and to reach the perfection of that model, which is set be

[* This observation is perfectly just, and we may instance in confirmation of it Lowth's Letter to Warburton, Bentley's Dissertation on Phalaris, Parr's Dedication to Hurd, and many other controversial pieces written in self-defence, and constituting the most finished compositions of their respective writers. E. H. B.]