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scribere ; quod peringeniosis hominibus neque satis doctis plerumque contingit. Cicero c. 61. verbatim : Propter expeditam ac profluentem quodam modo celeritatem. Park: Hæc cui contingant, eum iterum ac sepius dixerim Attice loqui. Cicero C. 84. Hæc cui contingant, cum scito Attice dicere. CICERO C. 93. Nemo erat qui videretur exqui
memory, and which, if they had not the freshness of youth, had the raciness of antiquity to recommend them. It will be right to quote what Dr. Parr himself says in this Preface p. lxxiii, about the imitation of the ancients in respect to Latin style :
“ Imitatio veterum, qualis tandem esse debeat, non est nostrum dijudicare. Suus est cuique in hac re gustus, suum etiam judicium. Verbis fere omnibus, modo perspicua et apta sint, in Latine scribendo locum esse crediderim. Neque enim solæ phrases, aut sola vocabula, (vide Scheller. Append.,) sed totius orationis habitus colorque potissimum spectandi sunt. Habeat igitur, per me licet, ipsa morositas aliquid tum excusationis tum etiam laudis, in peletńuaoi concinnandis. Hujusmodi autem in opusculis, arbitror parum referre, utrum scriptores, e quibus verba petita sint, aurea an argentea in ætate linguæ Latinæ floruerint. Quicquid rei cuique, quæ tractanda sit, maxime conveniens fuerit, id demum mihi videtur optimum. Aliorum vero, sive obscuram in verbis conquirendis diligentiam et Trepuepylav, sive aurium sensum fastidiosum et prope kakósnov, is sane ego sum, qui neque acriter improbandum, neque arcte et ambitiose sequendum esse statuam. 'Aurea ex ætate', inquit Cellarius (Cur. Poster. 93,) cum
pauci scriptores ad nostra tempora pervenerint, nimis pauper • Latinitas esset, si nihil approbandum sit, quod e Cicerone aut • æquali non habeamus. Altera quoque ætas, quæ argentea • dicitur, subvenire nobis debet, nova verba, non minus ele‘ganter tamen, et suffragio populi Romani formata superadsitius — studuisse litteris, — nemo, qui philosophiam complexus esset, matrem omnium bene factorum beneque dictorum, — nemo, qui memoriam rerum Romanarum teneret,nemo, qui -- laxaret judicum animos, atque a severitate paulisper ad hilaritatem risumque traduceret, — nemo, qui delectandi gratia digredi parumper a causa ; nemo, qui — judicem — ad fletum posset adducere. Parr: Nemo, quia diligentius — litterarum scientie se dederit ; nemo, qui philosophiam illam, matrem omnium bene factorum beneque dictorum, coluerit exquisitius ;— nemo, qui rerum et veterum et recentiorum memoriam vel arctius vel copiosius tenuerit ; nemo, qui delectandi gratia jucundius sit a proposito parumper egressus, et a severitate ad risum lenius deduxerit animos audientium ; nemo, qui ad fletum — vehementius deflexerit. Cicero c. 96.: Doleo me in vitam paulo serius, tanquam in viam, ingressum, priusquam confectum iter sit, in hanc reipublicæ noctem incidisse. Parr: Antequam in hanc senatus noctem incidimus. In Cicero the metaphor is clear ; it is not so in Parr.* I have still attended only to that
On this subject the reader will find some excellent matter in J. L. Mosheim's Præfatio to his edition of Ubert Folieta's Libri tres de Linguæ Latinæ Usu et Præstantia, Hamb. 1723. p. 24. The passage is quoted in the Appendix to my edition of Dr. Lempriere's Classical Dictionary.
If there be, (and assuredly there is,) good sense in these remarks of Dr. Parr, it is idle to charge him with making a harlequin's jacket, patchwork, or a coat of many colours, because he mingles the language of Quintilian and other writers with the language of Cicero. E. H. B.]
*[Mr. Green remarks that he does not understand“ on what priuciple Dr. Parr sometimes gives, and sometimes withholds his authorities for sentences and expressions ;” but at the
part of the Preface, which gives the character of Burke.” P. 219.
6 Oct. 9, 1796. It would be difficult to find in the English language, of equal variety and length, four such compositions, as Burke's Speech to the Electors of Bristol ; Johnson's Preface to Shakespeare; Parr's Dedication to Hurd; and Lowth's Letter to Warburton.” P. 12.
66 Sept. 21, 1799. Received through Lord Chedworth a flattering message from Dr. Parr, in which, not with
same time acknowledges that he had read only a part of the Preface. Let us then hear what Dr. Parr himself says p. Ixxiž.: -
“ Laborum, qui me diu constrictum tenuerunt, eorum intercapedinem omnem impendere soleo in libris Græcis Latinisque evolvendis. Quare veniam mihi candidus lector facile dabit, si verba aut sententias, quæ mihi inter legendum arriserint, Præfationis hujusce in usus identidem transtulerim. Qui enim Bellendeni hoc opus e tenebris eripiendum esse statuissem, mihi ipsi statuebam id licere facere, quod ab eo viderem multo sæpius esse multoque solertius factitatum. Locos insigniores, qui occurrerint in scriptoribus, quorum sæpe verbis disertis, sæpe totis sententiis, ex professo usus sim, in margine notandos putavi: idque ea mente feci, non ut illa, quæ lectitassem, pueriliter et inepte ostentarem, sed, at Bellendeni fidem diligentiamque sequerer, et consilii, quo multa laudaverim, vis omnis ac ratio penitus perspicerentur. At si qui sunt, quibus propositum illud meum minus probare possim, eorum captiunculis et sannis occurrere a vitio propius foret, quam a laude."
Dr. Parr informs us that he has noticed only the locos insigniores ; and therefore he has omitted many, which are of a different character. In point of fact the marginal references are rather authorities for the matter, than vouchers for the Latinity. E. H. B.]
‘the scanty and penurious measure of a critic by profes“sion,’ but evidently from the overflowings of a heart warm with the subject, he bestows his commendations on the little pamphlet I published last year,” (An Examination of the leading Principles of the New System of Morals,
[* As this tract of Mr. Green is very scarce, and probably in few hands, I hope to be considered as doing an acceptable service to literature by making an important extract from it, p. 49. I have seldom seen more interesting philosophical truth displayed with more elegant diction, more captivating eloquence, or more powerful and satisfactory reasoning : —
“Our moral sentiments, which give at once being and force to moral distinction, cannot be the result of reason. The object of reason is, simply and exclusively, truth and falsehood: and all the effect, which truth and falsehood can possibly produce upon the mind, is to excite a mere assent or dissent, as any proposition appears under one or other of these characters. Wherever the mind is affected on any occasion beyond this, we may universally affirm, and be perfectly sure, that this effect proceeds from some cause entirely independent of the powers of reason. Whatever is susceptible of truth or falsehood, is within the province of reason. Reason may investigate the properties in any object, by which these affections are produced, the relations of these properties with other parts of the system in which they act, or the effects they are designed to produce upon that system: but those properties must previously have acted, to become a subject-matter of enquiry; and must still continue to act, independently of any speculations respecting their nature, their relations, or their ultimate destination. Reason may be employed on subjects affecting the mind with any emotion, as well as upon lines and figures: but its effects, as reason, must in both cases be the same. It may explore the causes of beauty in visible objects, or of harmony in sound, just as well as the most abstract relations of a triangle: truth and falsehood, probable or certain, are still its only concern; and unless beauty and harmony previously and independently delighted, the result as that Principle is stated and applied in Mr. Godwin's Enquiry concerning Political Justice, in a Letter to a Friend, Lond. 1798. 8.) Laudari a laudato viro, -to be thus commended by one, to whom I am utterly unknown, and from whom praise is of such value, and this amidst
upon the mind would be equally uninteresting. It may treat of principles of action in man, just as well as of vis inertia in matter: but, as incapable of affecting the mind in any other way than through the agency of objects, which previously affected it, it can never operate as an original principle of action itself; though, by being frequently conversant with such powers, it may sometimes, by a natural delusion, seem to do so. “This remark, you perceive, is of extensive application. The subject before us, must limit our present use of it. Our moral sentiments are original principles of action; and cannot, therefore, as such, be derived from reason. We do not merely believe an action to be of a certain description called moral or immoral; we approve or disapprove it as such ; and this sentiment of approbation and disapprobation has a positive influence on human conduct. But approbation and disapprobation are emotions of the mind; and cannot, consequently, originate from reason. We may observe, accordingly, that Mr. Hume, who has laboured hard to refer morality as far as possible to reason, has been obliged to resort at last to “a sentiment of humanity implanted in our nature, to a feeling entirely underived from reason, to account for the only principle, which sets it in action, and without which it would be nothing more than an empty speculation and dead letter. (Princ. of Mor. s. 5.) No reasoning on the tendency to augment or diminish the general happiness, in which he (with others) establishes the standard of right and wrong, could give origin to this feeling. Reason, no doubt, by shewing that any action had one or other of these tendencies, might induce me to call it by one or other of these denominations, as I should name a kangaroo a quadrupede, and a penguin a bird, from their falling under one or other of these classes; but, unless I was previously so interested in the general