in other parts of the Constitution, not in this clause. In what part? I answer, in that which restricts the power of punishment.

"Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust, or profit, under the United States." It is this clause, and this alone, that restricts the power of punishment, and that is said to restrict, by implication, the power of impeachment also. The power of punishment, it is contended, is restricted to officers by this clause; and it would be absurd to extend the power of impeachment beyond the power of punishment. The former, therefore, must be considered as restricted to officers, as well as the latter.

This reasoning has been already combated, and, I think, entirely overthrown; but admitting it, for the present, to be perfectly well founded, let us, Mr. President, inquire how far it will aid the plea relied on by the defendant. Admitting that none but officers of the United States can be impeached; let us inquire whether a Senator be not an officer in the sense of the Constitution? This is the second great question in the cause. If I can prove that, in the true sense of the Constitution, a Senator of the United States is an officer, and that a seat in this honourable body an office under the United States, it will follow that the defendant, in this case, is liable to impeachment, and that his plea must be overruled.

It is to be remarked, that the term "office," in that clause of the Constitution which, restricting the power of punishment, is said to restrict thereby the power of impeachment also, is used in the most general sense. The clause does not speak of a civil office, a military office, or any particular species of either; but of any "office of honour, trust, or profit," which is genus generalissimum, and includes every possible designation of office, of what nature or kind soever. It is, therefore, into the signification of the word "office," in its most comprehensive sense, that we are now to inquire.

In order to ascertain the meaning of a term, we may have recourse to its derivation, to its definition by writers of authority, who have had occasion to employ it, and to its established acceptation in common use. Let me be per

mitted, Mr. President, to try the meaning of the term "office" by these three standards.

As to the derivation of this term, it is derived from the Latin word officium, which signifies, duty, charge, or employment. As far, therefore, as its meaning can be inferred from its derivation, it must signify" a post, place, trust, or employment, which requires the performance of certain duties." Where those duties are of a public nature, the office is a public office.

It is in this sense that the term "office" is used among us. In common language, in legal proceedings, in public acts, when we speak of an "office," we mean "a post, place, or employment, which requires the performance of some duty of a public nature." These duties may be of various kinds. They may relate to the civil government; and then the office is a civil office. They may relate to the public defence, to the superintendence and direction of the public force; and then the office is a military office: but still it is an "office," in the general and universally received sense of the word.

Where these duties relate to the civil government they may also be of various kinds. They may appertain particularly to the enaction of the laws, which is the highest department of the civil government; and then the office is a legislative office. They may appertain to the execution of the laws; and then the office is an executive office. They may appertain to the administration of justice, or the application of the laws to individuals; and then the office is a judicial office. They may appertain to the relations between the nation and foreign nations; and then the office is a diplomatic office. But still, in every case, it is an office, and a civil office. Wherever a man holds a place

which requires from him the performance of a duty of a public nature, we call him an officer. We apply the term to a constable, or the cryer of a court, as well as to the Chief Justice of the United States; to a midshipman in the Navy, an ensign in the Army, or a weigher in the Custom House, as well as to the President of the United States. It is the official obligation to perform a public duty that constitutes the office in one case as well as in the other. There is no difference, except in the importance and nature of the duties.

I admit, indeed, Mr. President, that the application of the term to members of the Legislature is less frequent, in common language, than to persons employed in the executive or judicial departments; but, that it is frequently so used and so understood, I shall hereafter prove by the most authoritative examples. Its being less frequently used in that sense, is by no means an argument to show that it does not bear that sense. It is not very frequently used in application to persons employed in the diplomatic department. We do not commonly say of a foreign minister or consul that he is an officer; and yet there can be no doubt that the post of foreign minister is an "office," in the strictest sense of the word. The term officer is more frequently and appropriately applied to persons holding military commissions, than any others; and yet nobody supposes, on that account, that a general in the army is more an officer of the United States than the Secretary of State. The question is not, how the word is most frequently used, but to what extent its common and received acceptation will justify its use? There can be no doubt that, in its common and received application, it includes all persons holding posts which require the performance of some public duty. Surely a member of this honourable body holds a post which requires the performance of public duties, and those of the most important kind; for he participates in the enaction of the laws, by his share in the legislative authority; in their exccution, by his control over executive appointments; and in the administration of justice by his power of impeachment. He, therefore, if any person, is to be considered as peculiarly an" officer under the United States."

He is even a civil officer: for we have seen that "civil offices" are contradistinguished from "military offices" by the nature of their duties; being "those posts which require the performance of some duty, of a public nature, relating to the civil government." They constitute one general division of offices; and include, as subdivisions, offices legislative, executive, judicial and diplomatic; all of which require the performance of duties relating to the civil government. Hence it appears, that the argument of the learned counsel, who immediately preceded me, would avail him nothing, even were it well founded. He contends that the clause declaring that "the President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed on impeachment, &c." is restrictive of the power of impeachment; and that, consequently, none but civil officers can be impeached. Be it so: but still the plea cannot be supported, for a Senator is a civil officer.

These elucidations also furnish us with a reason for the distinction made, in the clause relied on by the learned counsel, between the President, VicePresident, and civil officers. Upon the construction of the learned counsel, this distinction would, to use his own expression, be nugatory and ridiculous; for, according to him, the term "civil officer" includes the President and Vice-President: upon our construction, it is operative and necessary; for we contend, and I think have .proved, that it is the relation of the duties to particular departments of public business, that produces, and defines, the division of offices into civil and military; and of civil offices, into legislative, executive, judicial and diplomatic. Now as the duties of the President are not confined to the civil or military department, but comprise both; it follows, that his office is neither exclusively civil, nor exclusively military, but includes both characters; so that he would not have been included in the de

signation "civil officer," and it was necessary to name him expressly, which is accordingly done. The same reasoning applies to the Vice-President, who is also expressly named.

I would not, however, be understood, Mr. President, to rely solely on this division of "offices" into civil and military; and of "civil offices" into legislative, executive, judicial and diplomatic. I think it perfectly well founded. It satisfies my mind; but it is not essential to the argument. Whether a Senator be a civil officer, or not, is immaterial: to prove him an officer is sufficient for my purpose: for the only clause in the Constitution, which can, with any appearance of reason, be said to restrict the power of impeachment, speaks not of "civil offices," but of "offices" in general, of all "offices of honour, trust or profit." That a seat in this honourable body, is an office of honour and trust, cannot, I think, be denied by any who consider the nature of the post, and the derivation, force, and universally received signification of the term "office." It is even an office of "profit;" for however inadequate the sum allowed for the maintenance of the members may be, yet every public post, which entitles to receive a compensation, great or small, from the public, is considered, in the proper legal sense, as an office of "profit."

The manner in which the term "office" is used by legal writers, and their formal definitions of it, support the interpretation which I have drawn from its received and common acceptation. Without going into a detail on this point, which might be tedious, let it suffice, Mr. President, to refer to Blackstone, who has been justly relied on by the learned counsel for the defendant, as a standard authority on subjects of this kind. Speaking of “offices" in the 2d volume of his Commentaries, page 36, as cited by the learned counsel who preceded me, that great writer lays it down, that offices are a right to exercise a public or private employment, and to take the fees and emoluments thereunto belonging." Now let me ask, is not a seat in this honourable body, "a public employment?" Has not the member "a right to exercise this employment," and to receive the emoluments thereunto belonging?" Surely, to answer in the negative, would be a strange abuse of language.

The learned counsel who immediately preceded me, has contended that a Senator cannot be considered as an "officer," because there could be no quo warranto to remove him from his place, if he held it improperly, nor mandamus to place him in it, if unjustly kept out. But surely this cannot be a well founded argument, for if it be, it applies as well to the President, the Judges, the Secretaries, and the Commander-in-Chief of the army, as to a Senator. Not one of them could be removed by quo warranto or replaced by mandamus. Did any one ever hear of a quo warranto to remove a Colonel of a regiment? Was a quo warranto ever brought in England against the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or a Secretary of State, or a Lord of the Admiralty? Certainly not, and yet that these are officers, will not be denied. The truth is, Mr. President, that the doctrine of quo warranto and mandamus, as far as it relates to officers, is confined exclusively to certain local municipal officers, of a subordinate nature, who are placed, by the common law of England, under the superintendence of the Supreme Court of Justice; to which, from the nature of their offices, recourse could most conveniently and effectually be had, for their punishment, their removal, or their reinstatement. But this reason did not extend to the great officers of the State, of the army, or the navy, or to any of their subordinates. They could best be punished, removed and replaced, in a different manner, and by a different authority. To them, therefore, nobody ever dreamt of extending the power of the Supreme Courts by quo warranto and mandamus: and yet nobody ever, on this account, thought of denying that they were "officers," which, however, would be just as reasonable, as to contend that a Senator of the United States is not an "officer," because he cannot be removed by quo warranto,

or admitted by mandamus. I admit that it would be absurd to talk of an office from which a man could not be removed, however flagitious his conduct; or into which, when entitled to it, and improperly kept out, he had no means of obtaining admission. But a Senator may be removed by a vote of expulsion; and if duly elected, but not returned, may obtain his seat by a petition to the Senate.

I conceive, therefore, that no argument can be more destitute of foundation, than that which would divest a seat in this honourable body of the quality of an "office," because it is not within the scope of writs of mandamus and quo warranto.

If from Blackstone, Mr. President, we turn to our own laws, our own writers, and even our own Constitutions, we shall equally find that a seat in the legislature is considered as an "office."

Let us begin with the laws of the United States. In the 3d section of the "act to regulate the time and manner of administering certain oaths," it is provided, "that all members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, who shall be chosen or appointed before the 1st day of August next, and who shall then be in office, shall take the same oath or affirmation, which may be administered by any person authorized by the law of the State in which such office shall be held, to administer oaths." Here it is most manifest, that the expressions "shall then be in office," and "in which such office shall be holden," are applied to members of the State legislatures, as well as to the executive and judicial officers of the several States; which not only proves, incontestably, that Congress, acting immediately under the Constitution, and making provision for carrying it into effect, considered a seat in a legislative body, as an office;" but also marks, in the plainest and strongest manner, the division of "offices" into legislative, executive, and judicial.

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The same section then goes on to provide, that "the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, shall, before they proceed to execute the duties of their respective offices, take, &c." Here the station of a member of the legislative body is expressly called an "office," and the same distinction between officers legislative, executive, and judicial, is kept up and enforced.

Not less explicit on this point, are the Constitutions of the several States. When I refer to those Constitutions on this question, I refer to them as I would to the writings of Marshal Saxe, or Frederick the Third, on a military question; of Lavoisier, on a chemical question; or of Blackstone, or Lord Coke, on a question of law. I refer to them as authorities for the meaning of a constitutional term. And, surely, when a question arises about the meaning of a term used in the Constitution, we can refer for an explanation to no better authorities than the Constitutions of those States, by whose delegates the instrument was framed, and by whose conventions it was ratified.

To begin with New-Hampshire; we find in the 8th section of the Bill of Rights, prefixed to the Constitution of that State, these words: "All power residing originally in, and being derived from, the people, all the magistrates and officers of government are their substitutes and agents, and at all times accountable to them." Here we see that the term "officer" is used in the general sense for which I have contended, and means any agent of the people, any delegate of public trust or authority; a description plainly including members of the legislature.

The next section is still more express. "No office or place whatsoever, in government, shall be hereditary;" making the word "office" synonymous with the term "place in government."

So in the 11th section. "All elections ought to be free; and every inhabitant of the State, having the proper qualifications, has equal right to elect

or be elected into office." This evidently includes members of the legislature, who are therefore, said to be elected into "office."

When we come to the form of government, we find a provision under the head of "Senate," which comes expressly to the point. 'The Senate shall consist of 13 members, who shall hold their office for one year. This requires

no comment.

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Under the head of oaths and subscriptions, &c., there is an expression no less conclusive. Any person chosen Governor, Councillor, Senator, or Representative, military or civil officer, shall, before he proceeds to execute the duties of his office, make and subscribe the following declaration." Here it is expressly declared that a Senator or Representative holds an "office."

In the Constitution of Massachusetts the authorities are not so numerous; but there is one which is full and express to the point. It is found in the Bill of Rights, sec. 5th. "All power residing originally in the people and being derived from them, the several magistrates and 'officers' of government, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them." Here we see members of the legislature expressly included in the term "officers;" and the distinction between legislative, executive and judicial offices clearly laid down. The 8th and 9th sections go also to the same point, though less clearly.

In the subsequent part of this Constitution chap. 6th, art. 1st, it is provided that "any person chosen Governor, or Lieutenant-Governor, Councillor, Senator or Representative, and accepting the trust shall, before he proceed to execute the duties of his place or office, take and subscribe the following declaration." Here the place or trust of a Senator or Representative is called an office, and the words place, trust, office, are used as synonymous, according to the definition which I have endeavoured to establish. thus taken is equally explicit.

The declaration to be

The article then goes on to direct that "every person chosen to either of the places or offices aforesaid, (the place of Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, Councillor, Senator or Representative,) shall, before he enters on the discharge of the business of his place or office, take and subscribe," &c.-still using "place" and "office" as synonymous, and applying them to the post of Senator and Representative.

In the Constitution of Rhode Island, which consists merely of an ancient charter, I see nothing on this subject; nor in that of Connecticut, which also is an ancient charter; but, in an account of the manner of holding elections in the latter State, I find that the writer constantly applies the term "office" to members of the Legislature; from whence we may infer that it is so understood in that State.

In the Constitution of New York, sec. 25th, the term "office is applied to members of the Legislature, and especially of the Senate. "The Chancellor and Judges of the Supreme Court," says that section, "shall not hold any other office except that of delegate to the general Congress, upon special occasions; and the first Judges of the County Courts in the several counties, shall not, at the same time, hold any other office, except that of Senator or delegate to the general Congress."

The Constitution of New Jersey, sec. 4th, prescribes the qualifications which shall entitle a person to vote "for representatives in council and assembly; and also for all other public officers that shall be elected by the people of the country at large"-thus recognizing the principle that members of the Legislature are public officers.

In the Constitution of Pennsylvania, art. 8th, we find mention of the offices of members of the general Assembly. "Members of the General Assembly," says the article, "and all officers, executive and judicial, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this Commonwealth, and to