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istry, I should be glad to lose sight of every other object, and mingle with them in the sentiments and feelings of friendship-a friendship peculiar to the ministers of the gospel by as much as their labours and trials are peculiar to themselves. But when duty calls we must obey, though it cost us a sacrifice of inclination. My design, however, is not at variance with friendship, nor with the duties of the sacred office, but is one with the design of the gospel, and is directed to the grand object of all our labours,-the salvation of immortal souls.

Should any misjudge our labour, and represent us as the enemies of mankind for preaching against that licentious doctrine which promises salvation to all men in the future world, let them live as they please in this; we appeal to the gospel, and we appeal also to the conduct of the ministers of the gospel. While the former promises eternal life to them only who obey our Lord Jesus Christ, and threatens with destruction and damnation all the impenitent and unbelieving; the latter have given up and forsaken all to preach that gospel,

"To pluck poor sinners from the fire,

To snatch them from the verge of hell."

The love of Christ constrains them to do thus; and they could not be the lovers of men if they were knowingly to deceive them, and cry, "peace, peace when the Lord hath not spoken peace." Their object in preaching against the doctrine of Universal Salvation is to prevent the destruction of souls by shewing them the danger of living in sin, and to bring them to repentance and faith in Christ that they may be saved. They know there is no other way to obtain salvation. When our Lord commissioned his apostles to preach the gospel, and through them his ministers in every age, he enforced obedience to their doctrine by these high and awful sanctions, He that believeth shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned. We must, therefore, insist on the penalties, as well as on every other part of the gospel.

And you, my brethren in the ministry, know how much occasion there is for this. You know what obstacles are opposed to the success of your ministry, and that there is none more fatal than that blinding, stupefying, and hardening doctrine which teaches sinners that they shall be saved in the future world, let them live as they please in this. You have had occasion to lament the pernicious effects of this doctrine in every part of our country. Wherever it has been received by the thoughtless, it produces an indifference to religion, contempt of the threatenings of God's word, neglect of salvation, and encourages men to indulge in whatever dissipation and folly their depravity may incline them to pursue. With these facts before our eyes, and with ardent prayers for the blessing of God upon the present undertaking, I venture upon the examination which I have proposed.

The first thing that strikes the mind on looking into the "Treatise upon Atonement," is an attempt to diminish the demerit of sin and the guilt of transgression. We are expressly told, that "sin is the violation of a law which exists in the mind, which law is the imperfect knowledge men have of moral good;"-that "the legislature of this law is a capacity to understand, connected with the cause and means of knowledge," (p. 15, 16.) The Treatise we are examining does not allow that we are under even the law of love to God; for it is said, that the "law of divine love is that infinite law of perfection, which is higher than our capacities extend in a finite state," (p. 23.)

But what does this strange language imply? If I understand its meaning it is this: we are under no law of God-we never broke a divine law, and therefore we have no sin. We may, indeed, through the imperfection of our knowledge be led to think that we commit sin; but God, whose knowledge is perfect, beholds no sin in any man. No proof is offered to support these dangerous sentiments, and none could be offered. And it is sufficient to show their absurdity, barely to mention them. If our knowledge is the same with the rule of duty, it will follow that the more ignorance a person has the less sin he has and it is only required that he should be profoundly ignorant in order to be perfectly innocent. But though ignorance, in some cases, may be a reason for showing mercy; yet surely it can be no justification of bad actions.

The design of that part of the Treatise which I am now examining, is to show that sin cannot be an infinite evil; and the reasoning is directed against its being infinite in degree, or magnitude. But the word infinite is used, not only for that which is infinite in degree, but also in duration. And in my opinion it is with respect to duration only that sin can be said to be infinite, and in this sense it is properly so that is, it is a crime of such a nature as to deserve everlasting punishment. But against this sense of the word our author has said nothing. All therefore that he has written is foreign from the question. He reasons like one who beats the air. He has no object. "In order for a law to be infinite, says he, the legislature must be so; but man's capacity to understand is finite," &c. (p. 20.) Here it is admitted that if man were infinite his sin would be infinite. But is not man immortal? And are not all his faculties immortal? Most certainly they are. Upon our author's own reasoning, therefore, man may commit an infinite offence.

But in attempting to show that sin is not an infinite evil, he has told us in substance that it is a great good. He gives us to understand that sin is an evil only in a comparative sense. "We call an action evil, he says, by comparing it with one which we call good. We then see, that what in a limited sense we may justly call sin or evil, in an unlimited sense is justly called good." "He tells us that "God intended sin, and is the first cause of it; and every where

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confounds the good, which the over-ruling hand of Deity produces, with the sinful actions of men, (p. 20, &c.) Nor can he pretend that we wrong him when we say that upon his principles men ought to commit sin. For he tells us that he cannot admit that sin is a real evil," when he takes into consideration "all the consequences which attend it, and that "sin may be of advantage even to the sinner himself," (p. 22, 57.) Here let it be observed, 1. That to attribute these sentiments to the gospel is to make Christ the minister of sin with a witness. 2. That before these sentiments can be adopted the judgment must be strangely perverted by prejudice, by false education, or by a vicious inclination.

Secondly. Let us notice what the book under examination teaches respecting the cause, and introduction of sin into our world. Pursuing his design to make sin appear a small evil, the author found it necessary to set aside the whole account of its introduction as given by Moses, by taking it allegorically, (p. 33, 34.) According to him there was no literal garden, no literal trees, no literal serpent, no literal transgression, no literal expulsion of our first parents, &c. I know not why he omitted to add that there was no literal man or woman.

We are told that "man was created in Christ, the image of God;" that he was "afterwards formed of the dust of the ground;" that he was "made a carnal man, mortal, and subject to vanity;" that his "mind, immortally pure, was opposed to the passions which would immediately rise from the fleshly nature, and said, in the understanding of the creature already made subject to vanity, 'yield not to the passions and powers of the flesh, for they are death.' But immediately the powerful vibrations of the fleshly nature absorbed his mind, he sought to the carnal man for food, ate, and died." (p. 31, 32.)

Our author's design was to give us a rational account of the introduction of sin; but a doubt exists whether he has accomplished his Here we are told of a purpose. 66 mind created in the image of God and immortally pure;" but, it should seem, without understanding or passions; for directly after these are ascribed to the "fleshly nature formed from the dust," or the "creature made subject to vanity." Again. Is it reasonable to suppose that the "fleshly nature," the inferior part of man, should have had power to "absorb his mind," which was the superior part, "created immortally pure," and draw it into the vortex of its passions and appetites? But we pass over these things as matters of minor importance, and would ask, by what authority he takes a simple narrative, embracing a number of historical facts, and turns it into an allegory? It is in this way the Scriptures are made to serve every man's whim, and to support the greatest absurdities.A rule in interpreting the Scriptures, and one which ought ever to be kept in mind, is, never to depart from their literal meaning

without necessity. And the reason is obvious: for if we depart from their literal meaning we have no rule for ascertaining their

true sense.

The account of the creation in the Treatise we are now examining, is not only repugnant to reason but it is contradictory to the word of God. The Scripture tells us, that "God saw every thing that he had made, and behold it was very good." But if man was "mortal, and subject to vanity," as he came from the hand of his Creator, he was not very good. Besides, the Scripture doctrine upon this point is, that man became mortal and was "subjected to vanity" in consequence of his transgression. "In the day thou transgressest thou shalt surely die," was the original threatening. And St. Paul tells us that "death is the wages of sin-that death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned." This account is both rational and scriptural. It makes death the consequence and punishment of sin; while that of the Treatise makes it the effect of his being formed of the dust of the earth.

We see not how man could have been made subject to vanity, pain, and death, before he had done any thing to deserve pain and death. Justice as well as mercy would forbid it; unless indeed his future salvation is intended as a compensation for the injury he sustained by the hands of his Creator. But how then is his salvation not of grace, but of debt!

This is not all. We are told that "God is the author, the innocent and holy cause of that, which, in a limited sense is sin;" and the Treatise considers all sin in a limited sense. The author says, "if moral agency, created by God, is not the original cause of moral righteousness, by what rule of reasoning can it be made the original cause of transgression," (p. 34, 36.) Here we are given to understand that God is as much the "original cause of transgression," as of "moral righteousness;" and for ought we can see, upon this author's principles, the one is as congenial to his nature as the other. And rather than it should not appear that God is the author of sin, that accursed thing which his soul hateth, is reckoned among the things which shall finally terminate for good to the moral system, and then it is oddly said, "it will be necessary to admit that God is its first cause, or we cannot say that God is the author of all good," (p. 35.)

But does not the Treatise before us admit that there are other causes of sin, and that God is its "innocent and holy cause?" It does admit this; yet it is easy to show from the principles there laid down, and the arguments used, that God is the sole and proper cause of it. Let it be asked, has man the liberty of choice? We are answered in the negative. "In order for choice to take place, the mind must have perception of two or more objects; and that object which has the most influence on the judgment and passions will be the chosen object; and choice in this instance has not even the shadow of liberty-It is evident that will or

choice has no possible liberty," (p. 36, 37.) There is much said upon this point, and the arguments are designed to prove that the power of choice is not in the mind, but in the object chosen; and that the mind could not choose between two objects of equal value in the judgment formed of them. Again. Did God know that sin would enter into the world? It is admitted that he did. When God knew that sin would be committed, did he intend that it should be committed. It is said, "if God in a direct sense of speaking, is the Legislator of the law which is thwarted by transgression, in the same direct sense of speaking, his intentions in legislation are thwarted, which is erroneous- -To reason justly we must conclude, that if God possesses infinite wisdom, he could never intend any thing to take place, or be, that will not take place, or be; nor that which is or will be, not to be at the time when it is," (p. 16.) Once more. Are the intermediate or secondary causes of sin any thing more than the instruments by which God accomplishes his "intentions," or purposes? Hear the answer. “As the act of selling Joseph respected the purpose of Deity, and the plan of grace, those who sold him do not stand even as the shadow of a cause, but only as instruments by which God effected his own divine and gracious purposes," (p. 22.) Here then the whole is resolved into the will of Deity as the sole and proper cause of sin. He knew all the sin that ever men would commit; he "intended," all that he knew; those who commit sin are only the instruments by which he effects his own purposes." And indeed they are only instruments, mere machines, the moment liberty of choice is taken from them. They move as they are moved; act as they are acted upon. Here is a system of necessity "as strong as fate." A chain of causes and effects, the smallest link of which, the mind of man cannot break; the power of choice "not being in the mind, but in the object." This would make God as truly and properly the cause of all the sin and misery in the world, as David was the cause of Uriah's death, or as a man would be the cause of the death of his neighbour, who should employ a third man to dig a pit, and then by motives which he knew and "intended" should be irresistible, tempt him to walk in the way of that pit, that he might be taken and destroyed.

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As our author has several times mentioned the case of Joseph, to show that God "intended" his brethren should sell him, it may not be improper to observe that he has evidently mistaken the meaning of the scripture, which simply teaches us that while his brethren did wickedly in selling him, God "intended" to overrule their design, and produce good where they meant evil. It would be blaspheming the design, the holiness, and the goodness of God, to say he "intended" they should commit that wicked deed of selling their brother. Gen. 1. 20. Another passage produced for the same purpose is Acts iv. 27, 28. But it is no more to the point than the former. In this passage the "holy child Je

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