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the congress of Vienna restored to Austria all the possessions, she had ceded to France and her allies by the treaties of Campo Formio in 1797, of Luneville in 1801, of Presburg, in 1805, of Fontainbleau in 1807, and of Vienna in 1809, except Belgium and the former Austrian territories in Swabia. To these retrocessions, were added Venice, and all the other parts of the ancient Venetian states of the Terra Firma, so as to include the whole of the territory between the Tessino, the Po, and the Adriatic, which has been since constituted into the Lombardo Venetian kingdom, together with the valleys of the Vatteline, the Bormio, and Chiavenna.

The duchy of Modena was restored to the Archduke Francis of Este, and that of Massa and Carrara to the Archduchess Maria Beatrix of Este, and their descendants, subject to the rights of succession and reversion of the house of Austria.

The duchies of Parma, Placentia and Guastalla were ceded to the Archduchess Maria Louisa, subject to the same rights in favour of the house of Austria and Sardinia.

The grand duchy of Tuscany was restored to Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, with the addition of certain other territory.

The duchy of Lucca was vested in the Infanta Maria Louisa and her descendants, subject to the right of reversion in the grand duchy of Tuscany.

Ferdinand IV. was re-established upon the throne of Naples, and recognized by the powers as King of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

The King of Sardinia was restored to his former possessions in Piedmont and Savoy, with some changes of frontier towards France and Switzerland. To these were added the states belonging to the former republic of Genoa.

This ancient republic had been subverted, in consequence of the French invasion and conquest of Italy, and was annexed to the French empire in 1805. In 1814 the city of

Union of Genoa to Sardinia.

Genoa was surrendered to the British troops under the command of Lord W. Bentinck, who issued a proclamation, on the 26th April, "stating that considering that the general desire of the Genoese nation seems to be to return to that ancient form of government under which it enjoyed liberty, prosperity and independence; and considering likewise that this desire seems to be conformable to the principles recognized by the high allied powers, of restoring to all their ancient rights and privileges ;" and declaring "that the Genoese state, as it existed in 1797, with such modifications as the general wish, the public good, and the spirit of the original constitution seem to require, is re-established." Lord W. Bentinck seems to have been uninformed of the real views and intentions of his government, since in a paper communicated by Mr. Pitt to the Russian ambassador in London on the 19th January, 1805, that minister had proposed that the allies should, in case of success in the approaching campaign against France, cede the states of Genoa to the King of Sardinia, in order to form a stronger barrier against France on the side of Italy. This intention was confirmed by the second secret article of the treaty of Paris of the 30th May, 1814; and was now carried into effect by the congress, in spite of the remonstrances of the provisional government of Genoa, appealing to the guarantee of its independence contained in the treaty of Aix la Chapelle, 1745.r

In the debate in the British house of commons on the resolutions proposed, on the 27th April, 1815, by Sir James Mackintosh respecting this transaction, he contended, that independent of the question of the supposed pledge to the Genoese nation contained in the proclamation of Lord W. Bentinck, Great Britain could not morally treat the Genoese territory as a mere conquest which she might hold as a province, or cede to another power at her pleasure. In

Klüber, Acten des Wiener Congresses, vii. Band, §§ 420-433.

the year 1797, when Genoa was conquered by France (then at war with England,) under pretence of being revolutionized, the Genoese republic was at peace with Great Britain, and consequently in the language of the law of nations they were friendly states. Neither the substantial conquest in 1797, nor the formal union in 1805, had ever been recognized by that kingdom. When the British commander, therefore, entered the Genoese territory in 1814, he entered the territory of a friend in the possession of an enemy. Supposing him, by his own unaided force, to have conquered it from the enemy, could it be inferred that he conquered it from the Genoese people? He had rights of conquest against the French. But what right of conquest could accrue from their expulsion against the Genoese? How could Great Britain be at war with the Genoese? Not with the ancient republic of Genoa, which fell, when in a state of amity with her :-not as subjects of France, because she had never legally and formally acknowledged" their subjection to that power. There could be no right of conquest against them because there was neither the state. of war, nor the right of war. Perhaps the continental powers, who had either expressly or tacitly recognized the annexation of Genoa in their treaties with France, might consistently treat the Genoese people as mere French subjects, and, of consequence, the Genoese territory as a French province conquered from the French government, which to them had become the sovereign of Genoa. But England stood in no such position. To her the republic of Genoa still of right subsisted. She had done no act which implied the legal destruction of that commonwealth, with whom she had no war, nor cause of war. Genoa ought to have been regarded by England as a friendly state, oppressed for a time by the common enemy, and entitled to reässume the exercise of her sovereign rights, as soon as that enemy was driven from her territory by a friendly force. Voluntary, much more cheerful union, zealous coöperation, even long submission, might have altered the state of belli

gerent rights. None of these were here pretended. In such a case, he contended that, according to the principles of the law of nations, anterior to all promise, and independent of all pledged faith, the republic of Genoa was restored to the exercise of her sovereignty, which in British eyes she had never lost, by the expulsion of the French from her soil. These were no reasonings of his he read them in the most accredited works on public law, delivered long before any events of our time were in contemplation, and yet applicable to this transaction as if they had been contrived for it. Vattel, in the 13th and 14th chapters of his third book, had stated fully and clearly the principles respecting the application of the jus postliminii to the case of states, which he had taken from his eminent predecessors.

"When a nation, a people, a state, has been entirely subjugated, it may be asked whether a subsequent revolution entitles it to enjoy the right of postliminy? We must here distinguish the cases in order to answer this question satisfactorily. If the state has not yet acquiesced in this new dominion, if it has not voluntarily surrendered, and if it has merely ceased to resist for want of power; if its conqueror has not laid down the conqueror's sword in order to assume the sceptre of an equitable and pacific sovereign, this people has not in truth submitted; it is only vanquished and oppressed; and when it is delivered by the arms of an ally, it returns, without doubt, to its former condition. Its ally cannot become its conqueror; he is a liberator who is merely entitled to be rewarded for the service he has rendered. If the last conqueror, not being the ally of the state of which we speak, pretends to retain it under his dominion as the price of his victory, he puts himself in the place of the first conqueror, and becomes the enemy of the oppressed state, which may lawfully resist him, and profit of a favourable occasion to recover its liberty. If it has been unjustly oppressed, he who delivers it from the

yoke is bound to restore it, generously, to all its former rights.s

Whoever carefully considered this passage would observe that it was intended to be applicable to two very distinct cases that of deliverance by an ally, where the duty of restoration is strict and precise; and that of deliverance by a state unallied, but not hostile, where, in the opinion of the writer, the reëstablishment of the oppressed nation, is at least the moral duty of the conqueror, though arising only from our common humanity, and from the amicable relation which subsists between all men, and all communities till dissolved by wrongful aggression. It seemed very difficult, and had not hitherto been attempted, to reconcile this passage with the annexation of Genoa. It was not his disposition to overrate the authority of this class of writers, or to consider authority in any case as a substitute for reason. But these eminent writers were at least necessarily impartial. Their weight, as bearing testimony to general sentiment and civilized usage, received a new accession from every statesman who appealed to their writings, and from every year in which no contrary practice was established, or hostile principles avowed. Their works were thus attested, by successive generations, to be records of the customs of the best times, and depositaries of the deliberate and permanent judgments of the more enlightened part of mankind. Add to this, that their authority was usually invoked by the feeble, and despised only by those who are strong enough to need no aid from moral sentiment, and to bid defiance to justice. He had never heard their principles questioned but by those whose flagitious policy they had by anticipation condemned.t

§ 15. Union

The Swedish revolution of 1809, and the abdication of Gustavus IV, were followed by the peace of Fredericksham, of Norway

and Sweden.

• Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 3, ch. 14, § 213.

'Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. xxx. pp. 894–935.

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