tain that while it subsists, the equilibrium of Europe cannot be entirely overthrown; one of its states cannot be subjugated by another; and the treaty of Westphalia will perhaps for ever remain the basis of our political system. Thus the science of public law, studied with such diligence by the Germans, is still more important even than they suppose. It is not only the public law of Germany, but in some respects that of all Europe. But if the present political system of Europe cannot be shaken by the preponderance of any one power, it must be admitted that it is only maintained in this position by an action and reaction, which keeps its different parts in a perpetual agitation unfavourable to the development of the internal prosperity of each particular state. In order to substitute for this imperfect association a solid and durable confederacy, all its members must be placed in such a state of mutual dependence, that no one shall be able to resist all the others united, or to form separate alliances capable of resisting the general league. For this purpose it is indispensable that the confederacy should embrace all the European powers; that it should have a supreme legislature, capable of establishing general regulations for its government, and a judicial tribunal adequate to give effect to these regulations; that it should possess a coercive power capable both of restraining and compelling the action of its members; and sufficient authority to prevent any of them from withdrawing from the union whenever caprice or interest may dictate. Nor would the establishment of such a confederacy be attended with insurmountable difficulties. It is only necessary that statesmen should renounce the puerile prejudices of their craft; that sovereigns should abandon the uncertain objects of vulgar ambition for the certain security which would be afforded to themselves, their dynasties, and their people by the proposed innovation; and that nations should relinquish those absurd prejudices, which have hitherto induced them to consider the difference of language, race, and religion as constituting in surmountable obstacles to a more perfect union among the members of the great European family. In order to be convinced of the possibility of rendering such a confederacy both efficient and durable, it is only necessary to take into consideration the example of the Germanic body, composed of so many different states of such unequal forces, and which has so long maintained the public peace among its members, imperfectly and with some exceptions to be sure, but still sufficient to justify the application of the same principle on a still larger scale. If the ambition of princes is now restrained to some extent by the fear of provoking the general hostility of Europe by attacking one of its members, still more effectually would such aggressions be restrained by the certainty of being encountered by the law of the European diet possessing adequate powers of execution. Without appealing to those higher motives, for addressing which to sovereigns Saint Pierre had most unjustly incurred the ridicule of practical statesmen, such as the love of true glory, of humanity, and a regard to the dictates of conscience and the precepts of religion. Rousseau merely supposes princes to be endowed with common sense, and capable of estimating how much their interests would be promoted by submitting their respective pretensions to the arbitration of an impartial tribunal, rather than resorting to the uncertain issue of arms, which even to the victor seldom brings with it adequate compensation for the blood and treasure expended in the contest. HISTORY OF THE MODERN LAW OF NATIONS. PART THIRD. HISTORY OF § 1. First Poland, 1772. We are now arrived in the course of our historical deduction at that period which was stained by the first parti- Partition of tion of Poland, the most flagrant violation of natural justice and international law which has occurred since Europe first emerged from barbarism. The perpetration of this great political crime was facilitated by the obstinate adherence of the Poles to the radical defects of their national constitution, by their blind intolerance and factious dissentions. The absurd institution of the liberum veto, which legalized anarchy, could only be checked by the right of confederation, which legalized rebellion. These faults rendered them an easy prey to the powerful military monarchies by which they were surrounded, but are far from excusing this original act of violence which has been consummated in our own times by the total extinction of Polish independence. John Casimir, the last king of Poland of the house of Wasa, predicted the consequences of the internal dissentions by which the nation was distracted in his time. In a speech addressed to the Polish diet in 1661, he said: "In the midst of our intestine divisions we have to fear the invasion and dismemberment of the republic. The Muscovites, (God grant that I may prove a false prophet!) will subdue the people who speak their language; the grand duchy of Lithuania, Great Poland, and Prussia, will fall into the hands of the house of Brandenburg; and Austria will not forget herself in the general devastation: her share will be Cracow and the surrounding territory."a The time was come when these prophetic words were to be fulfilled. Stanislaus Poniatowsky had been raised to the throne of Poland in 1764 by the influence of Catharine II, of Russia. The non-catholic subjects of the republic, both Greeks and Protestants, claimed her powerful protection against the oppression of the dominant sect. Frederick II, of Prussia, who was then left without a single ally against his inveterate enemy the house of Austria, formed a secret convention with the Empress by which he engaged to sustain her measures in favour of the confederation, which the dissidents had formed against the national diet. A Russian army occupied Poland, and a treaty of alliance was concluded in 1768, between the Empress and the republic, by which the anarchial constitution of the liberum veto was guarantied and the toleration of the dissidents secured. The anarchy of Poland was thus perpetuated under Russian protection seconded by the selfish and short sighted policy of Prussia. The discontented party formed the confederation of Bar under the patronage of France, and took up arms to expel the foreign intruders. In this state of things the Austrian troops crossed the southern border of Poland in 1770 under pretext of setting up monuments to mark the boundaries of Hungary. They occupied the rich salt mines of Bochnia and Wieliczka the principal sources of the revenues of the Polish kings. a Lanigii, Orat. Procerum Europe, Lips. 1713, P. ii. p. 243. Frederick II, availed himself of the pretext of a contagious disease which desolated the country to enter Great Poland with a sanatory cordon. Stanislaus Poniatowsky appealed in 1771, to his protectress Catharine II, against these aggressions. She was then engaged in war with the Turks, which though successful, exhausted her resources, and which she was desirous of speedily terminating on advantageous terms. Prince Kaunitz, the Austrian minister, had already made a secret convention with the Porte, by which Austria stipulated to compel Russia to make peace on the basis of the status quo. Austria sought to engage Frederic II, to remain neutral in case war between the two empires should be the consequence of the Empress persisting in her designs upon Turkey. Frederick declared in favour of Russia, but sent his brother Prince Henry to the court of Catharine to endeavour to persuade her to consent to moderate conditions of peace with the Porte. The Empress communicated to Prince Henry the intelligence she had just received of the Austrian invasion of the Polish frontier; adding, "that Poland seemed to be a country where it was only necessary to stoop in order to pick up what one would. If Austria chose to take a piece of that country, the other neighboring states had as good a right to do the same." Upon this hint Prince Henry spake, and developed a plan for the partition of Poland, by which Catharine might aggrandize Russia without exciting the jealousy of Austria, which power could not look with the same indifference on the dismemberment of Turkey; whilst the king of Prussia might receive in such an arrangement a compensation for the sacrifices he had made. to the Russian alliance. Kaunitz, who wished to avoid the odium of being considered the author of the partition project, and to quiet the scruples of conscience felt, or affected, by Maria Theresa, endeavored to get Russia to make the first proposition. For this purpose he declared to Prince Gallitzin the Russian minister at Vienna, in October, 1771, that the Austrian |