by the way of Vienna and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, with the entrenchments on the Potomac and the base of operations at Washington.

His force thus skilfully disposed, General McDowell proceeded to execute his plan of battle, which is best described in his own words:

"My personal reconnoissance," he says, "of the roads to the south had shown that it was not practicable to carry out the original plan of turning the enemy's position on their right. The affair of the 18th, at Blackburn's Ford, showed that he was too strong at that point for us to force a passage there without great loss; and if we did, that it would bring us in front of his strong position at Manassas, which was not desired. Our information was that the stone bridge, over which the Warrenton road crossed Bull Run, to the west of Centreville, was defended by a battery in position, and the road on his side of the stream impeded by a heavy abattis. The alternative was, therefore, to turn the extreme left of his position. Reliable information was obtained of an undefended ford about three miles above the bridge, there being another ford between it and the bridge, which was defended. It was therefore determined to take the road to the upper ford, and after crossing, to get behind the forces guarding the lower ford and the bridge, and after occupying the Warrenton road east of the bridge, to send out a force to destroy the railroad at or near Gainesville, and thus break up the communication between the enemy's forces at

Manassas and those in the valley of Virginia, before Winchester, which had been held in check by Major-General Patterson.

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Brigadier-General Tyler was directed to move with three of his brigades on the Warrenton road, and commence cannonading the enemy's batteries, while Hunter's division, moving after him, should, after passing a little stream called Cub Run, turn to the right and north and move around to the upper ford, and there turn south and get behind the enemy; Colonel Heintzelman's division was to follow Hunter's as far as the turning-off place to the lower ford, where he was to cross after the enemy should have been driven out by Hunter's division; the fifth division (Miles') to be in reserve on the Centreville ridge.

"I had felt anxious about the road from Manassas, by Blackburn's Ford, to Centreville, along this ridge, fearing that while we should be in force to the front, and endeavoring to turn the enemy's position, we ourselves should be turned by him by this road; for if he should once obtain possession of this ridge, which overlooks all the country to the west to the foot of the spurs of the Blue Ridge, we should have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed. I had, therefore, directed this point to be held in force, and sent an engineer to extemporize some field-works to strengthen the position."

The divisions were ordered to march at two o'clock in the morning, that they might avoid the sweltering heat of a July sun.

There was, however, con

siderable delay in breaking up the enJuly campments and getting into march21. ing order. The movement at last began.

The division of Tyler in advance on the Warrenton turnpike was the first to move. This was composed only of Sherman's, Schenck's, and Keyes' brigades; the fourth, that of Richardson, being posted on the road leading to Blackburn's Ford, in order to act in conjunction with Miles' division, held in reserve in case the enemy should attempt to make a flank movement from this di

rection.

General Tyler did not succeed in getting his troops to move until half-past two o'clock, half an hour after the time ordered. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades, with Ayres' and Carlisle's batteries, were pushed on in advance, and arrived in front of the bridge where the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run, at half-past six in the morning. Keyes' brigade had been halted within two miles of the stream, in order to watch the cross road which communicates at that point with the Warrenton turnpike. Tyler, having been ordered to threaten the bridge, posted his troops accordingly. Schenck's brigade was formed into line, with its left resting in the direction of the bridge and the battery which the enemy had established to defend it, with the view of threatening both. Sherman's brigade was posted to the right of the turnpike, so as to be ready to sustain Schenck or to cross the stream of Bull Run when the progress of Hunter's division should justify the

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movement. The thirty-pounder gun attached to Carlisle's battery was posted in advance on the road, and Ayres' battery also, but at a considerable distance in the rear. Carlisle's battery was placed on the left of Sherman's brigade. Having thus disposed his force and fired his signal-gun, Tyler awaited the movement of the main body on his right and the enemy's left, which we now proceed

to trace.

Colonel Hunter's division, the second, had followed the march of Tyler along the Warrenton turnpike until it crossed the streamlet termed Cub Run, when it turned to the right and took the byroad through the woods, which, by a circuitous course, led to an upper ford of Bull Run, called Sudley's Spring, where the enemy's left was posted. This movement was in accordance with McDowell's plan of flanking Beauregard in that direction and getting in his rear, with the view of seizing and cutting off his communication by means of the Manassas Gap Railroad with Winchester, where Johnston was known to be with a considerable rebel force.

The circuitous road through the wood was found to be longer and more difficult to march than was anticipated, and accordingly Hunter's division did not reach the ford of Bull Run at Sudley's Spring until half-past nine o'clock in the morning. General Burnside's brigade was foremost. The men being greatly prostrated by the heat of the day, now considerably advanced, and their intemperate ardor in marching, could not be prevented from breaking from the ranks

to fill their canteens and slake their thirst in the stream. This caused much delay in re-forming and crossing the ford. Finally, however, order was restored, and the brigade crossed Bull Run and advanced, Colonel Slocum, of the Second Rhode Island Regiment, having thrown out skirmishers on either flank and in front.

The enemy now showed themselves, and soon the head of Burnside's brigade was confronting them. The Second Regiment of Rhode Islanders was immediately pushed forward with its battery of artillery, and the rest of the brigade was formed in a field to the right of the road. The enemy had already begun their fire, and General Hunter, who commanded the division, had been wounded and obliged to retire from the

field.

The Second Rhode Islanders being closely pressed, Burnside ordered up to their support the Seventy-first New York Militia and the Second New Hampshire Volunteers. As, however, they were slow in forming, the First Rhode Islanders were brought up. Their commander, Major Balch, led them gallantly to the field of action, where they "performed most effective service" in assisting their "comrades to repel the attack of the enemy's forces. The Second Rhode Island Regiment of Volunteers," continues General Burnside in his official report from which we quote, "had steadily borne the enemy's attack, and had bravely stood its ground, even compelling him to give way. At this time Colonel Slocum (of the Second Rhode

Island) fell, mortally wounded, and soon after Major Ballou was very severely injured by a cannon-ball that killed his horse and crushed one of his legs. The regiment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wheaton, continued gallantly to hold its position. Soon after, Colonel Martin, of the Seventy-first Regiment New York State Militia, led his regiment into action, and planting the two howitzers belonging to the regiment upon the right of his line, worked them most effectively. The battery of the Second Rhode Island Regiment, on the knoll upon the extreme right, was used in silencing the heavy masked battery in front, occasionally throwing in shot and shell upon the enemy's infantry, six regiments of which were attempting to force our position. Captain Reynolds, who was in command of this battery, served it with great coolness. precision, and skill. The Second Regiment of New Hampshire Volunteers, under Colonel Marston, was now brought into the field, and rendered great service in defending the position. Colonel Marston was wounded early in the action, and Lieutenant-Colonel Fiske ably directed the advance of the regiment. Thus my whole brigade," declares Burnside with just exultation, "was brought into the engagement at the earliest possible moment, and succeeded in compelling the enemy to retire. We were wholly without support, bearing the brunt of the contest until relieved by Major Sykes, of the Third Infantry, United States Army, who formed his battalion most admirably in front of the

enemy, and pouring in a destructive fire upon his lines assisted in staggering him."

Colonel Andrew Porter, commanding a brigade in the same division, that of Hunter (the second), followed closely upon the advance of Burnside. Porter's brigade was composed of Griffin's battery, with a detachment of marines to support it, of the Twenty-seventh New York Volunteer Regiment, Colonel Slocum; of the Fourteenth New York State Militia, Colonel Wood; of the Eighth New York State Militia, Colonel Lyons; of a battalion of regulars, Major Sykes; of the first company of Second Dragoons and four companies of cavalry, Major Palmer with a total strength of 3,700

men.

Porter following closely upon the advance of Burnside's brigade, as soon as he reached the scene of action turned the head of his brigade slightly to the right, in order to gain time and room for deployment in that direction. Griffin's battery pushed through the woods to the fields beyond, followed promptly by the supporting corps of marines and the Fourteenth New York State Militia, at considerable distance behind, while the Twenty-seventh advanced at the same time, but more to the left. All went spiritedly forward and at a "double quick."

The enemy," says Porter in his report, "appeared drawn up in a long line, extending along the Warrenton turnpike, from a house and haystack upon our extreme right to a house beyond the left of the division. Behind

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that house there was a heavy masked battery, which, with three others along his line on the heights beyond, covered the ground upon which we were advancing with all sorts of projectiles. A grove in front of his right wing afforded it shelter and protection, while the shrubbery along the road in the fences screened somewhat his left wing.

"Griffin advanced to within one thousand yards, and opened a deadly and unerring fire upon his batteries, which were soon silenced or driven away.

"Our right was rapidly developed by the marines, Twenty-seventh, Fourteenth, and Eighth, with the cavalry in rear of the right; the enemy retreating in more precipitation than order as our line advanced. The second brigade (Burnside's) was at this time attacking the enemy's right with perhaps too hasty vigor.

"The enemy clung to the protecting wood with great tenacity, and the Rhode Island battery became so much endangered as to impel the commander of the second brigade to call for the assistance of the battalion of regulars."

At this moment Colonel Porter learned that Hunter had been wounded, and that the command of the division de volved upon him. He therefore detached at once the battalion of regulars to the support of the hard-pressed brigade of Burnside in advance.

In the mean time, the third division, under Heintzelman, had followed the road taken by the second (Hunter's), with the view, however, of stopping at an intermediate ford before reaching

that of Sudley's Spring, covered by the latter. 'Between two and three miles beyond Centreville," reports General Heintzelman, "we left the Warrenton turnpike, turning into a country road on the right. Captain Wright accompanied the head of Colonel Hunter's column, with directions to stop at a road which turned in to the left to a ford across Bull Run, about half way between the point where we turned off from the turnpike and Sudley's Spring, at which latter point Colonel Hunter's division was to cross. No such road was found to exist, and about eleven o'clock we found ourselves at Sudley's Spring, about ten miles from Centreville, with one brigade of Colonel Hunter's division still on our side of the Run. Before reaching this point the battle had commenced.”

General McDowell himself had hastened to his right to direct the movement in person at that point where the main battle was, in accordance with his plan, being fought. His own statement of the progress of the action, therefore, based upon his personal experience, is the most interesting, while its frankness and modesty guarantee its truthfulness: "On reaching the ford at Sudley's Spring," reports the General, "I found part of the leading brigade of Hunter's division (Burnside's) had crossed, but the men were slow in getting over, stopping to drink. As at this time the clouds of dust from the direction of

• Another striking proof of the recklessness with which our army was being led to battle against a concealed foe in an unknown country.

Manassas indicated the immediate approach of a large force, and fearing it might come down on the head of the column before the division could all get over and sustain it, orders were sent back to the heads of regiments to break from the column and come forward separately as fast as possible. Orders were sent by an officer to the reserve brigade of Heintzelman's division to come by a nearer road across the fields, and an aide-de-camp was sent to Brigadier-General Tyler to direct him to press forward his attack, as large bodies of the enemy were passing in front of him to attack the division which had crossed over. The ground between the stream and the road leading from Sudley's Spring south, and over which Burnside's brigade marched, was for about a mile from the ford thickly wooded, while on the right of the road for about the same distance, the country was divided between fields and woods. About a mile from the road the country on both sides of the road is open, and for nearly a mile farther large rolling fields extend down to the Warrenton turnpike, which crosses what became the field of battle through the valley of a small watercourse, a tributary of Bull Run.