1. Where, in an action brought by a creditor for the purpose, a conveyance is adjudged to come within the operation of section 17, of the Act regulating assignments in trust for the benefit of creditors, the correctness of the adjudication is not the subject of inquiry, in a collateral proceeding. Shorten v. Woodrow, (34 Ohio S. 645) distinguished.

2. In a subsequent proceeding, by the assignee, in the probate court, to administer the trust, the probate court is bound by the distribution ordered by the court in the action in which the conveyance was adjudged fraudulent. Judgment affirmed.

Okey, J., took no part in the aecision of this case.

No. 16. Canal, Warehouse & Elevator Co. v. Richard Mathers. Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. Judgment affirmed on the ground that the Act of April 4, 1866, did not authorize the leasing of the land in controversy. Boynton, C. J. and White, J. did not concur. No. 86. James Cullen & Co. v. Bimm & Herchelrode. Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. Judgment affirmed. To be reported hereafter.

No. 87. Swift's Iron & Steel works v. Dewey, Vance & Co. Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. Judgment affirmed. To be reported hereafter.

No. 104. Andrew McLaughlin et al. v. Belle Stults. Error to the District Court of Union County. Judgment affirmed.

MOTION DOCKET.

No. 147. Seth F. Eldredge v. The State of Ohio. Motion

149. Ohio ex rel. Eliza W. Schmidt v. W.S. Capeller, Auditor, &c. Application for a writ of mandamus. Writ refused.

150. The State v. M. A. Mook. Motion for leave to file a bill of exceptions, to the rulings of the Court of Common Pleas of Sandusky County. Motion granted.

152. Catharine E. Snyder et al. v. City of Cincinnati. Motion to take cause No. 972, on the General Docket, out of its order for hearing. Motion granted.

153. James Coleman v. The State of Ohio. Motion for leave to file a petition in error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County. Motion overruled. Application should be made to the district court.

SUPREME COURT RECORD.

[New cases filed since our last report, up to June 29, 1881.] 1102. First National Bank of Gallipolis v. William F. Butler. Error to the District Court of Gallia County. 8. A. Nash for plaintiff; Bradbury & Ecker for defendant. 1103. Louise C. Boltz v. Clemens Stolz. Errror to the District Court of Cuyahoga County. Robinson & White for plaintiff; Goulder & Hadden for defendant.

1104. George Spencer v. the Union Central Life Insurance Company. Error to the District Court of Hamilton County. Jordon & Beltman for plaintiff; Matthews, Ramsey & Matthews for defendant.

1105. M. B. Albery v. Henrietta and Henry Roberts. Error to the District Court of Mercer County. Godfrey & LeBlonde, Randolph & Armstrong for plaintiff.

1106. Union Central Life Insurance Company v. Emma A. Cheever. Error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. Matthews, Ramsey & Matthews for plaintiff; Throop Jordan and others for defendant.

TEXAS.

VENDOR'S LIEN-EVIDENCE-PLEADINGS-STATEMENT OF FACTS.

1. The defense will be confined to the matters alleged in the answer. The probata must confirm to the allegata.

2. Where the vendee gives his note for the purchase money, and takes a deed with general warranty, and there is no fraud on the part of the vendor, nor ignorance on the part of the vendee as to a defect in the title, the vendee cannot successfully resist the payment of the note

OKEY, J.

A general verdict of guilty, on an indictment containing two counts charging distinct misdemeanors, will authorize a sentence upon each count. Motion overruled.

127. Andrew Jackson et al. v. Benjamin F. Brashear et al. Motion to dispense with printing the record and to take cause No. 1005, General Docket, out of its order. Motión granted as to printing, and overruled as to taking out of order.

130. Samuel B. England et al. v. John A. Shaw, Treasurer, et al. Motion for an order reinstating cause No. 105 on the General Docket. Motion overruled.

137. George Cornell v. The State of Ohio. Motion for leave to file a petition in error to the Court of Common Pleas of Meigs County. Motion overruled.

141. Daniel G. Ray v. Hugh Quinn. Motion for leave to file a petition in error to the Superior Court of Cincinnati. Motion overruled.

148. Julius C. Bowen et al. v. Charles L. Bowen et al. Motion to make order dismissing cause No. 38, on the General Docket, absolute. Motion overruled, without prejudice to the merits thereof on the final hearing of the cause.

evicted. Proof of a paramount title outstanding in a third person is no defense.

John Tarltan v. Daniel Daily, Commissioners of Appeals-April 29, 1881.

Ohio Law Journal.

COLUMBUS, OHIO, : : : JULY 7, 1881.

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

Owing to the precarious condition of President Garfield, Judge Ranney, of Cleveland, Tuesday, telegraphed to Secretary Holmes of the State Bar Association, in this city, to give notice that the State Bar Association would not meet until Tuesday, July 19, at Toledo, at which time it is hoped the Nation's Chief Magistrate may be out of danger.

PERSONAL.

THE Supreme Court has adjourned for the summer. The Court will not re-convene until September 26.

-Ex-Judge Courtright, of Circleville, while in the city last week, was a visitor at the LAW JOURNAL office.

—A. R. Bolin, of the firm of Bolin & Grigsby, of Circleville, was in the city Tuesday and made a pleasant call at the LAW JOURNAL office.

-Orange Frazer, Deputy Clerk of the Supreme Court, left yesterday for the headwaters of the Allegheny river, in New York State, intending to spend three or four weeks, pleasantly floating in a canoe down the Allegheny and Ohio rivers, probably to Cincinnati. He will, no doubt, have an enjoyable time, and we wish we could join him in just such a trip.

SUPREME JUDGES.

Hon. Nicholas Longworth, of Cincinnati, has been selected by the Republican party, as its candidate for the Supreme Bench, to take the seat of Chief Justice Boynton, whose term of office expires February next. The Democratic State Convention, for the nomination of a State ticket meets in this city next week. In addition to the name of Judge Bingham of this district, we hear that the name of Judge Charles M. Hughes, of Lima, will be brought before the convention, as a candidate for Supreme Judge. Both of these gentlemen stand eminently high in the profession, and either would no doubt grace and dignify the Bench, if elected. Judge Hughes is a native of Allen county, a graduate of Cincinnati Law School, and 48 years of age. He was elected Common Pleas Judge in 1878.

THE BEST LAW JOURNAL IN THE

COUNTRY.

The Central Law Journal, of St. Louis, Mo., enters this month upon its thirteenth volume and is rapidly approaching a time when it will be entitled to a patriarchal position among the journals of the west. Its well earned success, which has been steady and uniform from its first day of publication has been due to the careful and thorough manner in which it is edited, the energy and enterprise of its publisher in sparing neither pains nor expense in his efforts to procure the latest and freshest cases and the most able leading articles, and in some degree to the general nature of its contents, making it of equal interest to the profession in all the States.

We know of no paper which is of greater practical utility to the profession. Wм. H.STEVENSON, Publisher, St. Louis, Mo.

THE OLD AND THE NEW.

In no department of progression is the distinction between the new and the old more clearly marked than in the methods adopted by courts and lawyers to secure the rights of suitors and clients. In the olden time the administration of justice, and more especially, all equitable claims thereto, was little more than a laborious summing up of the "Legends of the Law." Books were then as rare and imperfect, as they are now plentiful and filled with valuable rules and precedents. The growth of this branch of progressive art-book making-would alone furnish matter for a volume. The absolute necessities of increasing litigation and of accumulating legends and precedents, compelled the compilation of the latter, and a deduction of rules from the former, for the guidance of courts and the assistance of advocates. But although the necessity was urgent for law books, the demand was limited because of the comparatively small number of successful advocates. Therefore, the writer of a law book had greater labor in finding a publisher, if possible, than in writing the book. This has been true of all legal publications until a comparatively recent date. One of the unfortunate results of this lack of demand for, and profits from legal publishing, was a tendency, on the part of legal writers, to make books touching upon nearly the whole range of legal topics, and, necessarily touching all, but lightly.

Recently, however, a few of the shrewd publishers of law books, in this country, becoming cognizant of the absolute requirements of the profession have found it practicable and profitable to employ the best legal talent of the country, to prepare a finished, logical and practical treatise upon some given branch of law and practice, or upon a subject especially important to lawyers. As may be readily supposed such business sagacity has a two-fold good result. The publishers are repaid for their enterprise by a heavy demand for their books, and the profession gains by such transaction, an exhaustive treatise upon a topic not previously discussed at length by any, author, or at the least, a work which mends the defects of those which have preceded it.

These remarks are suggested by a perusal of two books recently published by that most excellent law book publishing house, Baker, Voorhis & Company of New York. We refer to Great Speeches by Great Lawyers, a collection of the wonderful efforts of lawyers whose names are familiar to all readers of history, and students of the politics of this country and of England.

This book conceived by the thoughtful publishers and most ably executed for them by Mr. William L. Snyder, of the New York Bar, is one of the most valuable additions to legal literature that we have met with in a long time. Not only because it is valuable and interesting, as preserving some of the choicest gems of eloquence and argument, but for the reason that it opens the door to an effort to give to the thinking, reading and intelligent public that which is purest and best in forensic and eloquent reasoning. We will not concede that the names of those whose speeches are preserved therein, are greater lawyers or more eloquent men than many others now in the profession. On the contrary, while we would pluck no leaf from the laurels they so justly wear; nor take a single impulse from the laudations so worthily bestowed upon them, we still believe this great country can produce scores of lawyers as eloquent and as logical as they, and who would be as eminent did but opportunity present itself. But this collection of speeches ought to

be read by every lawyer, young and old in the land. No man can give it a perusal without rising from that labor with a sense of exhileration-inspiration almost, born of the convincing logic and eloquent words therein; and no man can avoid taking up-insensibly almost, very many of the ideas suggested in some of the sentences read, which will combine with others purely original in his own mind and thus coin expression to his great satisfaction and advantage. If painters gain advantages by studying the old masters, lawyers old and young will assuredly be instructed in thought and polished in expression by a study of this book. The advertisement on our first page of cover gives other information which we need not repeat here.

The second special work to which we refer and which was also undertaken and completed at the instance of Messrs. Baker, Voorhis & Co., is a treatise on "The Specific Performance of Contracts," by Thomas W. Waterman, of the Binghampton, (N. Y.) Bar.

This work is the result of several years persistent and diligent study and is full and exhaustive. It is divided into four books as follows:

Book I-embraces the definition and nature of the subject, and a general enumeration of the contracts which are capable of being specially enforced. Book II-Parties to the suit, Pleadings, Injunction, and writs of ne exeat. Book III-The grounds on which a decree may be successfully resisted. Book IV-Compensation and Damages.

The subject of this work is of constant recurrence in the ordinary transactions of daily life, and the immense number of legal decisions to which it has given occasion, shows, that it presents a great variety of nice and difficult questions. All of these questions are collated and discussed in this treatise, and their determination by the courts, as established by the weight of authority, explained.

The work is practical, and designed to be a useful and ready help to lawyers who are engrossed in active professional duties, and with whom economy of time is a necessity, as well as to younger members of the bar, and students.

The author has been a reliable legal writer for over thirty years. Among the best known works with which his name is connected may be mentioned: Waterman's Adams on Ejectment, Waterman's Eden on Injunctions, Waterman's Archbold's Criminal Pleadings, &c., &c. Further information concerning this book, its price &c., may be found on first page of cover.

THE PUBLICATION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

The Western Jurist, Des Moines, Iowa, in speaking of the Federal Reporter, St. Paul, Minn., and the enterprise of the West Publishing Co., in publishing all the decisions rendered in the United States Circuit Court, remarks, very truly: "Although law reports are accumulating with bewildering rapidity, and the lawyer must make a intelligent selection, this is a series of reports absolutely indispensable to any one whose practice calls him into Federal tribunals. * * Of course, very many useless and trifling opinions cumber its pages; but the profession must do the winnowing part, for experience has abundantly proved that we cannot safely delegate that duty to reporters." The Jurist strikes a most proper note in its latter sentence. It is true that the reports of the courts of last resort are rapidly accumulating in number,

*

and it is none the less true that, with the wonderful array of legal talent composing these courts, nearly all the decisions they render and the opinions they write, are of the greatest value to the profession. Of course, while it may be true that many of the points decided in the Circuit Courts of the United States are trifling and uselessthese not being courts of last resort-this cannot be said of the decisions in the Supreme Courts of the various States. There are very few cases taken to the Supreme Court of any State, except they be of sufficient importance to justify a persual, at least. In very many of the States, the higher court requires a motion to be filed for leave to bring the case from the lower courts into that forum. If there is no doubtful point of law involved, the case is not allowed to be brought up. In such States, very few cases, therefore, are decided, except those of importance, and in all States, and all the high courts, the new combinations of law and fact raise some point that must prove of interest to some practitioner. But each lawyer must decide for himself which cases are useless and which useful-which are important and which are not so. The very cases which may be rejected by the self-appointed reporter, might prove to be of vital importance to a thousand different lawyers. It is this fact that makes the "American Reports" publshed in Albany, N. Y., Irving Browne editor, so very unsatisfactory to the profession. The cases there reported are all good and all important, as current rulings upon the points decided, but the cases left out have many times been brought in, and overwhelmed the attorney relying upon the "American Reports." No matter how gifted the editor of such a series may be, he cannot, at once, discriminate and do justice in this matter. The decisions must all be given, must all be indexed properly, and the rest left to the attorney who is seeking a case in point.

The "American Decisions" published by A. L. Bancroft & Co., San Francisco, Cal., are not of the class within this rule. That valuable collection, of which we speak elsewhere, contains the best of all the cases long since decided and recognized as authority. But any work aiming to keep abreast of the times and fully up with all current decisions, must give all, or abandon the hope of satisfying the profession.

Recognizing these facts the proprietors of this paper have now fully completed arrangements by which the profession may obtain, at moderate cost

ALL THE DECISIONS OF ALL THE COURTS OF LAST RE-
SORT IN ALL THE STATES.

We have made contracts with those competent to enter into such contracts, by which we secure the certified copies of all the opinions and a sufficient statement of each case to enable the ruling to be fully understood. This will be published monthly. Each number of the publication will contain FIVE HUNDRED CASES; will make a beautiful library volume, and at the close of each year the subscriber will find himself possessed of every case decided during the year in 48 different States and Territories, and of the Supreme Court of the United States. We will issue our first number in a short time, and in the meantime will cheerfully answer any questions concerning the details of this important project.

IN 1869 Vice Chancellor Malins ruled that a newspaper was not a periodical; now the English courts have reversed the ruling, the case being an application made by the proprietor of the Times to restrain a publishing firm

from reprinting its memoir of Lord Beaconsfield. Under the ruling of Vice Chancellor Malins, although a newspaper is not registered as a periodical, the owner of a paper is held to have sufficient property in its contents to entitle him to sue in respect of a piracy. According to the decision of the Master of the Rolls he is only entitled to sue when his paper is registered as a periodical under the Copyright Act. As the Times is not registered the application was rejected. If the author had been joined as a plaintiff in the action the decision might have been different. Some years ago Mr. Charles Reade successfully prosecuted the Glasgow Herald in the Scotch Court of Session for pirating his articles on "A Hero and a Martyr," from the columns of the Pall Mall Gazette; but in that case the action was brought by the author and not by the publishers.

COURTS AS LAW-MAKERS.

One of the most popular fallacies of the present age is, that the organic law of the land resides in the Constitution of the United States as a main stem, and in the various State constitutions which are subservient thereto, in a general way, and simply provide, in detail, for the application of the principles of each State government. Belonging to this fallacious idea is the belief that to the legislatures belong the exclusive power to make laws, and that the laws they make are laws in fact, with all the name implies. It is also a common belief that to the courts belong the power simply to interpret and enforce, by its orders and decrees, the laws so made.

These things may all be true, in theory, but, in fact and in practice, they are far from the truth. We know that the term judicial legislation is one of contempt, applied to that judicial interpretation of laws which sets aside their obvious intent, and, in a word, makes a

new law.

The courts of this country, from the Supreme Court of the United States to the blear-eyed justice of the peace, who knows no more of law than a deaf man does of music, have been in recent years gradually encroaching upon the prerogatives of the legislatures, until the passage of a law is not much more than a mild request that the desire of the law-makers may be taken into consideration by the courts, in passing upon questions arising from the subject matter of their enactments.

The interpretation of the organic law-the Constitution-goes hand in hand with the in

terpretation of the laws made to carry into effect the provisions of the former; and while the interposition of the judicial power is very properly invoked in extreme cases of improper legislation, its exercise is becoming entirely too frequent. The lower courts, especially, should enforce laws as they find them, and let the remedy be sought by appeal, or by application to the Supreme Court, if the law be improper.

It is becoming evident, considering this subject more at large, that conflicts between Federal and State rights, and the supremacy of each in various questions of foreign and interState commerce, and other questions involving State sovereignty, are gradually drifting into th the courts and away from Congress and the State legislatures. The danger which may thus become a Damoclean sword to threaten the peace and unity of this country, is not imaginary. With politicians in the Supreme Court of the United States, short work would be made of State sovereignty, or of Federal supremacy, as the politicians might desire. But this is only an instance of danger, and the cheerfulness with which a common pleas judge now attacks a law and refuses to enforce

it because of some fancied conflict with some constitutional right of somebody, demands that a halt be called before it is too late. We constantly see instances of the most gross and perpetual violation of some law eminently just and proper in all its provisions, because some justice of the peace, or some common pleas judge, has, at some time, said it was un

constitutional!

It is agreed by all jurists and statesmen that the very life of our form of government lies in submission to the laws solemnly made by the representatives of the people; and opposition to existing laws, whether assumed by a justice of the peace, or a whole State by nullification edicts, must occupy one and the same plane of impropriety and presumption. Whether it be a liquor law in Rhode Island, a railroad law in Georgia, a timber law in Maine or Michigan, or a slaughter-house law in Ohio, it is equally dangerous and improper for any court lower than the Supreme Court of the State to pass upon the constitutionality

"Almighty dollar."-Original with Washington Irving: "The almighty dollar, that great object of universal devotion throughout the land, seems to have no devotees in these peculiar villages."-The Creole Village.

"Barebones Parliament."-A nickname conferred upon the Parliament convened by Cromwell, July 4, 1653. It was composed of one hundred and thirty-nine persons who resigned their authority December 12, 1653; and it was so called, for a leather-seller named Praise-God Barebones, who was one of the principal members.

"Begging the question."-A common logical fallacy, petitio principii; and the first explanation of the phrase is to be found in Aristotle's Topica, VIII., 13, where the five ways of begging the question are set forth. The earliest English work in which the expression is found is "The Arts of Logike Plainlie set forth in Our English Tongue, etc., 1584."

"Star-Route Service."-The name is taken from the practice in the Government Post-office Department of designating the three words, "certainty, celerity and security," by three stars, thus: ***. It refers to that kind of mail service performed by other means than railway and steamboat, such as on horse-back, by stagecoach, horse and buggy, on foot, or in any other way permitted by the regulation.

"The memory of man runneth not to the contrary."-Blackstone, in his "Commentaries on the Laws of England," (vol. 1, book 1, page 53), in speaking of common law, says: "To make a particular custom good, the following are requisite: That it have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary. So that if any one can show the beginning of it, it is no good custom."

"Loafer."-This word was evidently coined by the ancients. At Pompeii there is said to be an inscription on the wall of what was probably a workshop of some kind, as follows:

locus non est. Diseede morato." This may be translated. "This place is not for the lazy. Loafer, depart." This inscription is as good for industrial establishments of modern times, as it was for those of ancient Pompeii. Its discovery is interesting, from the fact that it shows that hu

man nature was the same eighteen centuries ago in Italy, as it is now in America; that there were lazy folks and loafers who would intrude. into workshops and waste the time or divert the attention of the workmen, and that it became necessary to put up inscriptions giving a general warning to all such to depart.

"Snob."-A writer in the London Notes and Queries gives some curious facts concerning the origin of the word "snob." The word once meant "cobbler." ("How's Every-day Book," II., 837.) About the year 1824, it began to be used in Cambridge, England, to designate a townsman as opposed to a university man. In No. 6 of the Gownsman (the little paper which, it will be remembered, Thackeray helped to edit at Cambridge), the word "snob" is defined as a gownsman; therefore, a lewd, vulgar fellow." The writer in Notes and Queries continues as follows: "I should attribute to Thackeray's own genius the wider application of the opprobrious term, and to the popularity of his 'Snob Papers,' which appeared originally in Punch a dozen years or so later, the general adoption of it. It appears that in some American colleges the word was still used as lately as 1856 to designate a townsman as opposed to a student.

ABOUT COURT RECORDS.

Are they Public, or are they Private and Secret from Journalistic Inspection?-Journalistic Contempt of Court.

The records of a court are not common public property. They are under the control and in the custody of the officers and judge of the court wherein they are on file. To publish them, and thereby prejudice the minds of the public against persons concerned, whether parties to the suit or not, while barren of any good results, too often tends to produce bitterness of feeling, and unnecessary acrimony and annoyance, to say nothing of the pernicious consequences which invariably result in biasing the judgment of the community in one way or another and thereby frustrating on the trial, that'impartial administration of justice without which law is a mockery and a farce. An unrestrained custom, however, contrary to a wise policy, and illegal and deleterious in its exercise when indulged with impunity, comes to be regarded as the foundation of vested rights. A striking illustration of this truth is found in the claim of public journalists, as a matter of right, to publish the records of lawsuits pending in the courts, and in the judicial acquiescence, or rather tolerance, by the courts of its unrebuked indulgence. There are more ways of committing contempt of court than by using violent or opprobrious language to the judge or in publishing scandalous and contemptuous reflections upon the court or its process. That famous belligerent defendant that made the officer who summoned him eat the parchment and wax of the process, and then cudgeled and kicked him