Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1839, by JOHN BOUVIER, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1843, by JOHN BOUVIER, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1848, by JOHN BOUVIER, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1852, by ELIZA BOUVIER AND ROBERT E. PETERSON, TRUSTEES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1867, by ELIZA BOUVIER AND ROBERT E. PETERSON, TRUSTEES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1883, by ROBERT E. PETERSON, in the Crice of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. Copyright, 1897, by R. EVANS PETERSON, Trustee. Copyright, 1914, by LOUIS D. PETERSON, Trustee. (2 Bouv.)† 202608 F A F. The sixth letter of the alphabet. fighter or maker of frays, if he had no ears, and a felon on being admitted to clergy, was to be branded in the cheek with this letter. Cowell; Jacob. Those who had been guilty of falsity were to be so marked. 2 Reeve, Hist. Eng. L. 392. F. 0. B. Free on board. A term frequently inserted in contracts for the sale of goods to be conveyed by ship, signifying that the buyer will be responsible for the cost of shipment. In London, when goods are so sold, the buyer is considered as the shipper and the goods are shipped at his risk; 3 Hurlst. & N. 484; 4 id. 822; 29 L. J. C. P. 213; Knapp Electrical Works v. Wire Co., 157 Ill. 456, 42 N. E. 147. Its use extends to all carriers. The ordinary effect is to pass title on delivery to the carrier; Hoffman v. Gosline, 172 Fed. 113, 96 C. C. A. 318; Murphy v. Lumber Co., 125 Wis. 363, 103 N. W. 1113; the railroad is the buyer's agent; Blakeslee Mfg. Co. v. Hilton, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 184. Where machinery is sold f. o. b. cars at place of manufacture, title passes on delivery to the railroad; Dentzel v. Island Park Ass'n, 229 Pa. 403, 78 Atl. 935, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 54. Otherwise when f. o. b. at destination; Havens v. Fuel Co., 41 Neb. 153, 59 N. W. 681. See FRAIS JUSQU'À BORD. FABRIC LANDS. In English Law. Lands given for the repair, rebuilding, or maintenance of cathedrals or other churches. It was the custom, says Cowell, for almost every one to give by will more or less to the fabric of the cathedral or parish church where he lived. These lands so given were called fabric lands, because given ad fabricam ecclesiæ reparandam (for repairing the fabric of the church). Called by the Saxons timber-lands. Cowell; Spelman, Gloss. FABRICARE (Lat.). To make. Used in an indictment for forging a bill of lading; 1 Salk. 341. FABRICATE. To invent; to devise falsely. Invent is sometimes used in a bad sense, but fabricate never in any other. To fabricate a story implies that it is so contrary to probability as to require the skill of a work Βουν. man to induce belief in it. Crabbe, Syn. The word implies fraud or falsehood; a false or fraudulent concoction, knowing it to be wrong. L. R. 10 Q. B. 162. FABULA. In old European law, a contract or covenant. Also, in the laws of the Lombards and Visigoths, a nuptial contract; a will. Burrill. FACE. The outward appearance or aspect of a thing. The words of a written paper in their apparent or obvious meaning, as, the face of a note, bill, bond, check, draft, judgment, record, or contract, which titles see. The face of a judgment is the sum for which it was rendered, exclusive of interest. Osgood v. Bringolf, 32 Ia. 265. FACIAS (Lat. facere, to make, to do). That Occurring in the phrases scire you cause. facias (that you cause to know), fieri facias (that you cause to be made), etc. Used also in the phrases Do ut facias (I give that you may do), Facio ut facias (I do that you may do), two of the four divisions of considerations made by Blackstone, 2 Com. 444. FACILITIES. A name formerly given to certain notes of some of the banks in the state of Connecticut, which were made payable in two years after the close of the war of 1812. President, etc., of Springfield Bank V. Merrick, 14 Mass. 322. As to facilities in transportation, see INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. FACIO UT DES (Lat. I do that you may give). An expression applied in the civil law to the consideration of that species of contract by which a person agrees to perform anything for a price either specifically mentioned or left to the determination of the law to set a value on it; as, when a servant hires himself to his master for certain wages or an agreed sum of money. 2 Bla. Com. 445. See CONSIDERATION. FACIO UT FACIAS (Lat. I do that you may do). An expression used in the civil law to denote the consideration of that species of contract by which I agree with a man (1175) to do his work for him if he will do mine | possession or control. He is simply an agent for me; or if two persons agree to marry with very limited powers; J. M. Robinson, together, or to do any other positive acts on Norton & Co. v. Cotton Factory, 124 Ky. 435, both sides; or it may be to forbear on one 99 S. W. 305, 102 S. W. 869, 8 L. R. A. (N. side in consideration of something done on S.) 474, 14 Ann. Cas. 802. the other. 2 Bla. Com., 444. See CONSIDERATION. When the agent accompanies the ship, taking a cargo aboard, and it is consigned to him for sale, and he is to purchase a return cargo out of the proceeds, such agent is properly called a factor; he is, however, usually known by the name of a supercargo (q. v.). Beawes, Lex Merc. 44; Livermore, Ag. 69; 1 Domat, b. 1, t. 16, § 3, art. 2. A factor differs from a broker in some important particulars: namely, he may buy and sell for his principal in his own name, as well as in the name of his principal; on the contrary, a broker acting as such should buy and sell in the name of his principal; 2 B. & Ald. 143; 3 Kent 622; Slack v. Tucker, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 321, 23 L. Ed. 143; Ward v. Brandt, 11 Mart. O. S. (La.) 331, 13 Am. Dec. 352. FACT (Lat. factum). An action; a thing Again, a factor is intrusted with possession, mandone. A circumstance. Fact (factum, fait) stands in lawbooks for: 1. An act; 2. For a completed and operative transaction brought about by sealing and executing a certain sort of writing, and so for the instrument itself, a deed (factum); 3. As designating what exists, in contradistinction to what should exist (de facto as contrasted with de jure); 4. As indicating things, events, actions, conditions, as happening, existing, really taking place. Thayer, Evid. 190. Material facts are those which are essential to the right of action or defence. See Boggs & Leathe v. Ins. Co., 30 Mo. 68; Clark v. Ins. Co., 40 N. H. 338, 77 Am. Dec. 721. Immaterial facts are those which are not essential to the right of action or defence. Material facts must be shown to exist; immaterial facts need not. As to what are questions of law for the court and of fact As for the jury, see Wells, Law and Fact. to pleading material facts, see Gould, Pl. c. 3, § 28. Facts constituting a cause of action are those facts which the evidence upon the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of such facts. Clay County v. Simonsen, 1 Dak. 403, 46 N. W. 592. See Ram; Moore, Facts. FACTIO TESTAMENTI (Lat.). In Civil Law. The power of making a will, including right and capacity. Also, the power of receiving under a will. Vicat, Voc. Jur. FACTOR. An agent employed to sell goods or merchandise consigned or delivered to him, by or for his principal, for a compensation, commonly called factorage or commission. Pal. Ag. 13; Sto. Ag. § 33; Com. Dig. Merchant, B; Malynes, Lex Merc. 81; Beawes, Lex Merc. 44; 3 Chit. Com. L. 193; 2 Kent 622; 1 Bell, Comm. 385, § 408; 2 B. & Ald. 143. An agent for the sale of goods in his possession or consigned to him. Lawson, R. & Rem. § 227. A factor or commission merchant is one who has the actual or technical possession of goods or wares of another for sale. A merchandise broker is one who negotiates the sale of merchandise without having it in his agement, disposal, and control of the goods to be bought and sold, and has a special property and a lien on them; the broker, on the contrary, has usually no such possession, management, control, or disposal of the goods, nor any such special property or lien; Paley, Ag. 13; 1 Bell, Com. 385. The business of factors in the United States is usually done by commission merchants, who are known by that name, and the term factor is but little used; 1 Pars. Contr. 78. The term factor, however, is largely used in the Southern States in the cotton business, and in a different sense from commission merchant; Fordyce v. Peper, 16 Fed. 516. He not only sells cotton, but makes advances to the merchant or planter, in cash or goods, to be paid when the crop comes in. He thus has a lien upon the crop before it is shipped to him. In Alabama the term "commission merchant" as used in the revenue laws is synonymous with "factor"; Perkins v. State, 50 Ala. 154. A domestic factor is one who resides in the same country with his principal. By the usages of trade, or intention of law, when domestic factors are employed in the ordinary business of buying and selling goods, it is presumed that a reciprocal credit among the principal and the agent and third persons has been given. When a purchase has been made by such a factor, he, as well as his principal, is deemed liable for the debt; and in case of a sale the buyer is responsible both to the factor and principal for the purchase-money; but this presumption may be rebutted by proof of exclusive credit; Story. Ag. § 267, 291, 293; Paley, Ag. 243, 371; 9 B. & C. 78; 15 East 62. A foreign factor is one who resides in a different country from his principal. 1 Term 112; 4 Maule & S. 576. Foreign factors are held personally liable upon all contracts made by them for their employers, whether they describe themselves in the contract as agents or not. In such cases the presumption is that the credit is given exclusively to the factor. But this presumption may be rebutted by proof of a contrary agreement; Story, Ag. § 268; Mech. Ag. 1051; Bull, N. P. 130; 1 B. & P. 398; 9 B. & C. 78. His duties. He is required to use reasonable skill and ordinary diligence in his vocation; 1 Ventr. 121; De Bavier v. Funke, 66 Hun 633, 21 N. Y. Supp. 410; Foster v. Bush, 104 Ala. 662, 16 South. 625. If for any reason not tortious, he delays selling the goods consigned to him, he is not liable for a subsequent loss occurring through an act of God; Dunbar v. Gregg, 44 Ill. App. 527. He is bound to obey his instructions; Marfield v. Goodhue, 3 N. Y. 62; Clark v. Cumming & Co., 77 Ga. 64, 4 Am. St. Rep. | 35, 23 L. Ed. 64. His rights. He has the right to sell the goods in his own name; and, when untrammelled by instructions, he may sell them at such times and for such prices as, in the exercise of a just discretion, he may think best for his employer; 3 C. B. 380; Bessent v. Harris, 63 N. C. 542; but he must obey instructions if given; Ernest v. Stoller, 5 Dill. 438, Fed. Cas. No. 4,520; Scott v. Rogers, 31 N. Y. 676; but when the instructions are to wait until a certain law has produced its effect on the market, a certain discretion as to time may be exercised; Milbank v. Dennistoun, 21 N. Y. 386. He may sell on credit when such is the usage of the market; Forrestier v. Bordman, 1 Sto. 43, Fed. Cas. No. 4,945; but if he sell on change he is held to a high degree of diligence to ascertain the solvency of the purchaser; Foster v. Waller, 75 Ill. 464. In the absence of instructions he may give a warranty; Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 359, 17 L. Ed. 642; and he may insure the goods of the principal in his own name; Johnson v. Campbell, 120 Mass. 449. He is, for many purposes, between himself and third persons, to be considered as the owner of the goods. He may, therefore, recover the price of goods sold by him in his own name, and, consequently, he may receive payment and give receipts, and discharge the debtor, unless, indeed, notice has been given by the principal to the debtor not to pay. But the title to goods consigned to a factor to be sold remains in the principal until sold, and may not be sold on execution to pay debts of the factor; Barnes Safe & Lock Co. v. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158, 18 S. E. 482, 22 L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. Rep. 846. He has a lien on the goods for advances made by him, and for his commissions; this exists by law and apart from any agreement; Plattner Implement Co. v. International Harvester Co., 133 Fed. 376, 66 C. C. A. 438; but he is not to be considered as the owner, beyond the extent of his lien; id.; Haebler v. Luttgen, 61 Minn. 315, 63 N. W. 720; U. S. v. Villalonga, 23 Wall. (U. S.) He has no right to barter the goods of his principal; Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Givan, 65 Mo. 89; Victor Sewing Mach. Co. v. Heller, 44 Wis. 265; nor to pledge them for the purpose of raising money for himself, nor to secure a debt he may owe; Odiorne v. Maxcy, 13 Mass. 178; Berry v. Allen, 59 Ill. App. 149; Bowie v. Napier, 1 McCord (S. C.) 1, 10 Am. Dec. 641; Van Amringe v. Peabody, 1 Mas. 440, Fed. Cas. No. 16,825; Rodriguez v. Hefferman, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 429; Macky v. Dillinger, 73 Pa. 85; L. R. 10 C. P. 354. See FACTOR'S ACTS. But he may pledge them for advances made to his principal, or for the purpose of raising money for him, or in order to reimburse himself to the amount of his own lien; 2. Kent 625; Urquhart v. Mc-. Iver, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 103; 7 East 5; Story, Bailm. § 325; Field v. Farrington, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 141, 19 L. Ed. 923. He may raise money by pledging the goods for the payment of duties or any other charge or purpose allowed or justified by the usages of the trade; Evans v. Potter, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 13, Fed. Cas. No. 4,569; Laussatt v. Lippincott, 6 S. & R. (Pa.) 386, 9 Am. Dec. 440; 3 Esp. 182. A custom in the diamond trade, that it is not usual for agents employed to sell diamonds to pledge them, cannot be set up to prevent the application of the factors act to a pledge by such an agent; [1907] 1 K. B. 510. See PLEDGE. He has a lien upon the goods of his principal in his possession, to protect himself against unpaid drafts drawn and accepted in the course of the agency; State v. Thompson, 120 Mo. 12, 25 S. W. 346; and such lien is personal to the factor; Barnes S. & L. Co. v. Tobacco Co., 38 W. Va. 158, 18 S. E. 482, 22 L. R. A. 850, 45 Am. St. Rep. 846. Where a factor disobeys instructions in selling grain which he has bought for his principal, he thereby loses his lien on money deposited with him as security; Jones v. Marks, 40 Ill. 313. It may be laid down as a general rule that when the property is found distinguishable in the hands of the factor, capable of being traced by a clear and connected chain of identity, in no one link of it degenerating from a specific trust into a general debt, the creditors of the factor who has become bankrupt have no right to the specific property; 2 Stra. 1182; 3 Maule & S. 562; even where it is money in the factor's hands; 2 Burr. 1369; Hall v. Boardman, 14 N. H. 38; Price v. Ralston, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 60, 1 L. Ed. 289; Denston v. Perkins, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 86. He may sell to reimburse advances; Brown v. McGran, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 479, 10 L. Ed. 550; unless restrained by an agreement with his principal, but if he has agreed to hold for a given time he is bound to do so; Fordyce v. Peper, 16 Fed. 516. And where the factor dies insolvent, before remitting to the shipper, the latter is entitled to satisfaction out of the proceeds of the sale or deposit in the place where workers are employed in fabricating goods, wares, or utensils. Cent. Dict. The term includes the fixed machinery when used in a policy of insurance; Mayhew v. Hardesty, 8 Md. 479. bank, as against the claim of the bank on an unmatured note; Ewart v. Bank, 70 Hun 90, 23 N. Y. Supp. 1124. And see 1 B. & P. 539, 648, for the rule as to promissory notes. Stock ordered of a broker on margin contracts belongs not to the broker, but to the customer, and may be redeemed by him from an assignee of the broker for benefit of cred-purpose of regulating the hours of work, and itors; Skiff v. Stoddard, 63 Conn. 198, 26 Atl. 874, 28 Atl. 104, 21 L. R. A. 102. But the rights of third persons dealing bona fide with the factor as a principal, where the name of the principal is sunk entirely, are to be protected; 7 Term 360; 3 Bingh. 139; 6 Maule & S. 14. See, generally, 58 Am. Dec. 156, note; Lawson, Rights & Rem. §§ 227-230; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 289; 2 Sm. L. Cas. 118; 1 Am. L. Cas. 788; Fordyce v. Peper, 16 Fed. 516, note; LIEN; AGENT; STOCK BROKER; REAL ESTATE BROKER; DEL CREDERE COMMISSION. FACTOR'S ACTS. A name given to legislative enactments in England and the United States designed to mitigate the hardships of the common-law rule governing dealings with factors, and especially with respect to pledges made by them of the goods of the principal. The object of the English legislation known under this general designation is the protection of persons dealing with those having possession of goods or documents representing the title thereto. The first acts were 4 Geo. IV. c. 84 and 6 Geo. IV. c. 94, and these were confined to persons entrusted with documents of title, not with the goods themselves. This defect was remedied by 5 & 6 Vict. c. 39, of which the Ontario act is merely a copy; R. S. Ont. c. 121. The subject was again dealt with in 40 & 41 Vict. c. 39, under which many of the deci sions under the former acts were practically set aside. As to the provisions of the English acts and decisions thereunder, see 5 Can. L. T. 145. In the United States the rule of the common law that a factor cannot pledge the property of his principal has been largely altered by statute in many of the states, founded generally it is said upon the statutes of 6 Geo. IV. c. 94; 3 Wait, Act. & Def. 300. See, as to legislation in this country, 58 Am. Dec. 165, note. See also FACTOR. FACTORAGE. The wages or allowances paid to a factor for his services; it is more usual to call this commissions. FACTORIZING PROCESS. A process for attaching effects of the debtor in the hands of a third party. It is substantially the same process known as the garnishee process, trustee process, process by foreign attachment; Drake, Attach. § 451. FACTORY. A building or group of buildings appropriated to the manufacture of goods, including the machinery necessary to produce the goods, and the engine or other power by which the machinery is propelled; FACTORY ACTS. Laws enacted for the the sanitary condition, and preserving the health and morals, of the employés, and promoting the education of young persons employed at such labor. See LABOR LAWS; EIGHT HOUR LAWS; EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY. FACTORY PRICES. The prices at which goods may be bought at factories, as distinguished from the prices of those bought in the market, after they have passed into the hands of third parties or shopkeepers. Whipple v. Levett, 2 Mas. 90, Fed. Cas. No. 17,518. m FACTUM. A deed; a man own act and deed. A culpable or criminal act; an act not founded in law. A deed; a written instrument under seal: called, also, charta. Spelman, Gloss.; 2 Bla. Com. 295. The difference between factum and charta originally would seem to have been that factum denoted the thing done, and charta the evidence thereof; Co. Litt. 9 b. When a man denies by his plea that he made a deed on which he is sued, he pleads non est factum (it is not his deed). In wills, factum seems to retain an active signification and to denote a making. See Weatherhead's Lessee V. Baskerville, 11 How. (U. S.) 358, 13 L. Ed. 717. A fact. Factum probandum (the fact to be proved). 1 Greenl. Ev. § 13. A portion of land granted to a farmer; otherwise called a hide, bovata, etc. Spelm. See FACT. In French Law. A memoir which contains concisely set down the fact on which a contest has happened, the means on which a party founds his pretensions, with the refutation of the means of the adverse party. See Vicat, Voc. Jur. FACULTY. In Canon Law. A license; an authority. For example, the ordinary, having the disposal of all seats in the nave of a church, may grant this power, which when it is delegated is called a faculty, to another. |