before us very much resembles a fulfilment of his father's prophecy 66 Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu Sit melius, causas reddet tibi; mi satis est si SERM. I. IV. 115-17. However the wisdom of such a mode of training may be judged of, it must certainly be admitted that the manner which an Academician would be likely to adopt in enforcing the principles of acts, and the motives of will, would exactly fall in with the practical system pursued in the first instance. TU ME INTER STREPITUS NOCTURNOS ATQUE DIURNOS It is merely intended here to add one to the many guesses that have been offered in explanation of the expression Contracta vestigia vatum.' May not the poet plead ex absurdo thus? I have shown that the steps of street-passengers in a tumultous scene must be narrowly measured (contracta) because of the dangers which beset them: but if you expect that they shall at the same time follow the bent of poets' footmarks—that their steps should have been likewise contracta—you expect what is absurd. "Contracta sequi vestigia vatum?"-There are none such: "scriptorum chorus omnis amat nemus et fugit urbes."— Supr. 77. A figurative inference is also obvious. 217 SECTION IV. TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS ATTRIBUTED TO ROMAN SATIRISTS EXAMINED. FEW modes of verbal expression less aid the discovery of truth, or less influence its diffusion, either in knowledge or practice, than formal enunciation of truisms. Assimilated in outline both to the axiom and the proverb, such propositions possess neither the theoretical applicability of the one, nor the practical conclusiveness of the other. They may certainly assist very weak (as in children), or very slow, perceptions to comprehend inferences or appreciate duties; and are even employed with advantage in exemplification by that Art which systematizes the processes of the thinking mind, as animal mechanics reduce to law the energies of the moving body. In the former case, however, they are properly truisms only relatively to the teacher; and in the latter are not used for the sake of the matter which they communicate, but merely as exhibiting, by insignificant but indisputable examples, certain constructions to which even the most valuable materials must be adjusted; just as very weak and inartificial pieces of matter may exemplify the operation of the highest physical functions. But as exponents of actual thought amongst men they betray barrenness of mind even in common conversation, and should be wholly forbidden to disfigure the philosophic page. At the same time it must be observed that it is by the meaning imputed to a proposition, and not by its actual phraseology, that its character in this respect is to be estimated. A saying translated or understood in one of two admissible views may be purely trifling, which may yet yield an excellent sense when the other is suggested. So independent indeed of the words may the sense be, that even the most apparently trifling class of all conceivable expressions, -namely, the predicating a term of itself-may, by virtue of a peculiar emphasis of meaning, almost reach proverbial rank. For instance, the burden of a very popular ballad of Robert Burns is— "A man's a man, for a' that;" a homely phrase, whose significance, were it duly estimated, would often materially alter the conduct of superiors towards inferiors in worldly condition. If the remarks before made on truisms properly so called be correct, it will be readily conceded that fruitless excrescences of this kind must be regarded as peculiarly unlikely beforehand to cumber the ground which blooms with the animating freshness and charming variety of the mental productions of Horace. Still less, if it were possible, would any weak or futile dictum be supposed compatible with the intense earnestness and undaunted courage of Juvenal. This latter author is properly without the pale of our general treatise. But as he is a joint sufferer with Horace, in the department here alluded to, it is a befitting tribute to the stern and truthful impressiveness of one of virtue's most disinterested friends, to include him in this attempted vindication. And assuredly there is no true admirer of the enduring contributions which these two poet-philosophers have afforded to the knowledge of things and the graces of literature, who would not rejoice to find, even at the eleventh hour, that the few trifling propositions which have been unanimously attributed to them by the commentators are, after all, misconceptions of the true and simple meaning. To assert directly, however, that universal error in such simple cases has in fact prevailed, must appear to be a rather adventurous statement on the part of any modern writer. But the following modification may claim an unprejudiced attention, namely,-That certain passages in the works of Horace and Juvenal, which, as heretofore understood, have yielded a confessedly trifling meaning, are susceptible of translations which not only convey substantive sentiments, but such as contribute, so far as they go, to enforce the authors' doctrines in the context. The instances adducible in proof of this position are happily so few as to have precluded the occurrence of any serious mischief from the misconception here supposed; though they appear to be sufficiently numerous to justify this notice. NAM VITIIS NEMO SINE NASCITUR: OPTIMUS ILLE EST SERM. I. III. 68-9. Or the class of propositions just now alluded to the above extract furnishes a prominent example, in its latter clause. The whole passage is invariably rendered "For no one is born free from faults-he is best who is borne down (or oppressed) by fewest (faults)." The increase to our knowledge which such a sentiment affords may be illustrated by the following: -No one is free from occasional bodily infirmities: he is most healthy who is affected by least.' It requires no Hippocrates to inculcate this fact. Now, by simple conversion of Horace's proposition an entirely new view is given. The logical reader must not feel alarmed on hearing of 'simple conversion' of a universal affirmation, for the given terms are reciprocal. We thus have the optimus' as our subject, and the qui minimis urgetur' as predicate; as 'optimus-est―ille qui minimis (vitiis) urgetur': and the whole sentiment runs thus:-No human being is born into this world exempt from faults of character: and, (to take the extreme conceivable case as proof), the most that can be said for the best man (could he be instanced) is that he is clogged by the least amount of faults; but it would not be true to say that he is afflicted with none:--'The best man-is-he who is depressed by fewest faults.' If this be the author's |