the noble lord (Mornington) he fully understood, that while the Jacobin government existed in France, no propositions for peace could be made or received by us. The chancellor of the exchequer, though he reprobated a Jacobin government, had in the former year declared, that would be no bar to a negotiation, provided the safe ty of Holland and the navigation of the Scheldt were secured. He actually opened a negotiation with persons holding their authority from the Jacobin government of France, with M. Dumouriez and M. Chauvelin. Had peace, in consequence of these negotiations, been then preserved, what would have become of that reasoning? He should be told, perhaps, peace was not the object. they had in view. The truth of this was indeed proved by the haughty conduct of lord Grenville towards M. Chauvelin ministers began a negotiation which they had no design to perfect; they only sought a pretext for reconciling the minds of the people to war, in which they had previously determined to embark. The object was then said to be, to protect an ally; the real object was the subversion of the ruling power in France. Is it then at last decided, that we are to stake the wealth, the commerce, and the constitution of Great Britain, on the chance of compelling France to renounce certain opinions, for which we have already seen they are ready to sacrifice their lives? Mr. Fox contended, that every state had a full right to regulate its internal government; and asserted, that the manifesto of the duke of Brunswick, and the treaty of Pilnitz, had occasioned all the excesses of the French. Upon the subject of acts of aggression previous to the war, this dif ference subsisted. France was always ready to negotiate; the British government invariably refused. The former. expressed the strongest dislike to war, and took every step to avoid it; the latter not only shewed an inclination for war, but endeavoured to inflame and provoke hostilities. Mr. Fox proceeded to consider, whether such a peace with France as might be attainable, was so

desirable as to induce us to treat; and whether a failure in the negotiation would be attended with such dangerous consequences as ought to induce us not to hazard the attempt. He noticed the great difference of our conduct with respect to France and Poland; and called the attention of the house to the nature of every peace that had ever been made. What offence or what pretension had appeared on the part of France at present towards this country, which had not occurred in the reign of Louis XIV? That monarch was a declared enemy to our revolution; he corresponded with the Jacobites of England; he endeavoured to overturn our establishment in church and state; he invaded Holland, and confined not his projects of conquest to the banks of the Rhine. Let us be satisfied with the best security we can procure, taking care by our vigilance and conduct, that the power with whom it is made shall have no temptation to break it. Were France to accede to our wishes, and take Louis XVII. for their king, would ministers in making a peace cede to them the places they have taken ? No the secretary of state says, we must have an indemnification for our expences in the war. What then would be the language of the French nation? They would complain of the deprivation, and seize the first opportunity of again entering upon a war. What secu. rity are we to have for peace, even upon the terms prescribed by ministers? He then pointedly ridiculed the boast of victory in his majesty's speech, and said, if the advantages were such as were represented, we could assume the dignified character of dictating the terms of peace. The right hon. secretary had stated, that our object in the West Indies was to obtain some indemnification for the expences of the war. This, however was a distinct object from giving such a government to France as ministers might think it safe to treat with, and in some respects contradictory. Whatever islands we took for Louis XVII, we must wish to keep; and, as we wished to keep the islands, must wish that Louis XVII. who

would have a right to demand them, should not be restored. Since the close of the last sessions of parliament, the successes of the French against both their internal and external enemies had been such, that Mr. Fox contended, there was no probability of soon, if at all, vanquishing that country. With respect to what had been urged of the ruinous state of their finances, he remembered similar statements had been made during the American war. There was then much talk of a vagrant congress, which was no where to be found, of their miserable resources, and their wretched paper money at 300 per cent. discount, of which, with any few halfpecne you had in your pocket, you might purchase to the amount of 100 dollars. The Americans were repre sented as exercising on each other the most intolerable tyranny, on the royalists the most unheard of cruelty and it was then said, that if such principles were suf fered to exist, if the cause of America was ultimately successful, there was an end of all civilized government; England must be trodden in the dust. "Yet then (said Mr. Fox) I recommended negotiation, and lived to see Great Britain treat with that very congress, so often vilified and abused, and the monarchy remain in sufficient vigour. God grant that I may not see her treat with the present government of France, in circumstances less favourable for making peace than the present!-Mr. Fox then endeavoured to shew, that by a negotiation for peace we might gain much, and could lose little. We should at least gain the point in this country, of having it generally believed, that the war was defensive; we should diminish the enthusiasm of the French, who would be disgusted with the refusal of the Jacobins to treat.

Mr. Fox strictly insisted on the misconduct of ministers in the prosecution of the war, and particularly noticed the failure of the expedition against Dunkirk, and the evacuation of Toulon. A plan was projected, said he, for making a descent on the coast of France, under the command of the earl of Moira. When we

ask why that expedition was so long talked of, and never undertaken, the right honourable secretary tells us, that it was delayed for want of troops. What, when we had at last hit upon a plan which was to conduct us to the gates of Paris, were we obliged to abandon it for want of men? Were no Hanoverians, Hessians, or even Austrians, to be found? Miserable indeed must be the alliances contracted by the minister, if neither those whose cause he had undertaken to support, nor those whom he had taken into his pay, would furnish him with men sufficient for an expedition, the success of which might have redeemed so many miscarriages! Did he defer that expedition till winter, because the difficult navigation of the coast of Normandy was peculiarly safe at that season? Or did he choose to delay it, because then the prince of Cobourg would be unable to act, and of consequence the French troops in that quarter would be disengaged? Thus, with a spirit worthy of a British minister, magnanimously displaying his contempt of danger, and his disdain to take the enemy at a disadvantage; defying every obstacle of the season, and braving the collected force of their armies.

Knowing these transactions, Mr. Fox contended that it would be the most contemptible sycophancy to concur in an address to his majesty, in which it was stated that the war had been successful. With respect to the avidity with which different states had put themselves under our protection, the duke of Tuscany had been compeiled by menaces; our conduct to the Genoese had been modelled on the same principles; the Swiss cantons were prohibited from holding any commerce with France. The courts of Sweden and Denmark had the wisdom and firmness to resist every art and menace to induce them to relinquish their system of neutrality. At the time when ministers were inveighing against the French as invaders of the rights of nations, they were themselves daringly infringing the rights of independent states. They issued an order for seizing on American vessels bound to the West Indies, and have only retracted it from a dread

of the power of that country. How infinitely superior must appear the spirit and principles of general Washington, in his late address to congress, compared with the policy of modern European courts! Illustrious man! deriving honour less from the splendour of his situation than from the dignity of his mind; before whom all borrowed greatness sinks into insignificance, and all the princes and potentates of Europe (excepting the members of our own family) become little and contemptible ! He has had no occasion to have recourse to any tricks of policy or arts of alarm; his authority has been sufficiently supported by the same means by which it was acquired, and his conduct has uniformly been characterised by wisdom, moderation, and firmness. H, feeling gratitude to France for the assistance received from her in that great contest which secured the independence. of America, did not choose to give up the system of neutrality in favour of this country. Having once laid down that line of conduct, which both gratitude and policy pointed out as most proper to be pursued, not all the insults or provocation of the French minister Genet could at all put him out of his way, or bend him from his purpose. Entrusted with the care of the welfare of a great people, he did not allow the misconduct of another, with respect to himself, for one moment to interrupt the duty which he owed to them, or withdraw, his attention from their interests. He had no fear of the Jacobins ; he felt no alarm from their principles, and considered no precaution as necessary in order to stop their progress. The people over whom he presided he knew to be acquainted with their rights and their duties. He trusted to their own good sense to defeat the effect of those arts which might be employed to inflame or mislead their minds; and was sensible that a government could be in no danger, while it retained the attachment and confidence of its subjects-attachment, in this instance, not blindly adopted, confidence not implicitly given, but arising from the conviction of its excellence, and the experience of its blessings. I cannot indeed