that there was no member of that house, who would not acknowledge, that the representation, as it now stood was incomplete. It was perfectly understood, that there were some boroughs under the influence of the treasury, and others totally possessed by them. It was manifest that such boroughs had no one qua lity of representation in them. They had no share nor concern in the general interests of the country; and they had in fact no stake for which to appoint their guardians in the popular assembly. The influence of the treasury in some boroughs was also contested; not by the electors of those boroughs, but by some one or other powerful man, who assumed or pretended to an hereditary property of what ought only to be the rights and privileges of the electors. The interests of the treasury were considered, as well as the interest of the great man, the lord, or the commoner, who had connections with the borough but the interests of the people, the rights of the electors, were the only things that never were attended to, nor taken into the account. Would any man say, that in this case there was the most distant idea or principle of representation? There were other boroughs, which had now in fact no actual existence, but in the return of members to the house. They had no existence in property, in population, in trade, or in weight of any kind. There were hardly any men in such boroughs who had a right to vote; and they were the slaves and the subjects of persons who claimed the property of the boroughs, and who in fact made the returns. This also was no representation, nor any thing like it. Another set of boroughs and towns claimed to themselves the right of bringing their votes to market. They had no other market, no other property, and no other stake in the country, than the property and price which they procured for their votes. Such boroughs were the most dangerous of all others. So far from consulting the interests of their country in the choice which they made, they held out their borough to the best purchaser; and,

in fact, some of them belonged more to the nabob of Arcot, than they did to the people of Great Britain. They were towns and boroughs more within the jurisdiction of the Carnatic, than the limits of the empire of Great Britain; and it was a fact pretty well known, and generally understood, that the nabob of Arcot had no less than seven or eight members in that house. Such

boroughs were manifestly sources of corruption: they gave rise to an inundation of corrupt wealth, and corrupt members, by which no interest of the people of this country was promoted; and such boroughs ought to be abolished.

Mr. Pitt proceeded to remark, that there was no man in that house who had more reverence for the constitution, and more respect, even for its vestiges, than himself. But he was afraid, that the reverence, and the enthusiasm, which Englishmen entertained for the constitution, would, if not suddenly prevented, be the means of destroying it; for such was their enthusiasm, that they would not even remove its defects, for fear of touching its beauty. He admired the one so much, so great was his reverence for the beauties of that constitution, that he wished to remove those defects, as he clearly perceived that they were defects, which altered the ra dical principles of the constitution; and, therefore, it would not be innovation, but recovery of constitution, to remove them. That a reform of the present parlia mentary representation was indispensably necessary, was the sentiment of some of the first and greatest characters in the kingdom; and he should also take the liberty to observe that he well knew it to be the sentiment of his much honoured father, the late earl of Chatham. His lordship was firmly of opinion, that a reform of the representation was absolutely requisite for the security of the liberties of the people of this country. concluded with moving, "That a committee should be appointed to enquire into the state of the representation in parliament, and to report to the house their observations thereon."

He

On the same.

HE declared that he felt sensations of awe and difficulty, of embarrassment and diffidence, when he rose to take into consideration a topic so weighty as that of the principles of a constitution, which was alike the envy and admiration of the world. He was deeply conscious of the difficulty of the task which he had undertaken. He beheld the constitution of his country with wonder and gratitude. It bestowed upon Englishmen privileges so dear and valuable, so advantageous and dignified, that they were beyond the reach of the subjects of any other nation. There was not on the surface of the globe a form of government which could be compared with it, and which was so nearly allied to the perfection of freedom. He was not presumptuous enough to think of laying violent hands on a constitution so pure and so worthy of veneration. He meant not to display any mark of a mad and visionary zeal, by attempting an innovation on what our ancestors had purchased at so great an expence of blood and treasure, and had delivered to us as the most sacred of all trusts. His wish was infinitely dif ferent. He desired to restore the true spirit to our constitution, and to bring it back to that stability and vigour which time and changes, accident and events, had contributed to enfeeble and diminish.

The state of parliamentary representation was partial and inadequate. The progress of an undue influence was alarming and ominous. The true spirit of liberty had decayed. The powers of check and control in the different branches of the government were debilitated. There were clamours without doors; and in search of a fit remedy to our grievances, an airy speculation went forth, and engendered visions and chimeras. Ideas of reform impracticable and romantic were conceived, and were fortunately destined to die away in the hands of their inventors. In what he was about to propose, he was animated with a sincere passion to promote the pros

perity of this country. He begged, therefore, to be heard with dispassion and without prejudice.

The measure he meant to propose, was not designed to gratify any particular description of men. But he believed it would tend essentially to cure the grievance in view, to calm the minds of the public, and to revive the true spirit of the constitution, without opening too wide a door for experiments and innovation. The constitution of England consisted, of three estates, each of which had its peculiar and separate prerogatives. These different prerogatives, notwithstanding, co-operated together in the preservation of the empire; and, though seemingly discordant, united in matters of high consequence and moment. The equipoise of these estates, was adjusted with great nicety, and while it kept its centre, the constitution would necessarily be productive of liberty. From the advances, however, of corruption, and the progress of exertions of influence, it was universally known and acknowledged that the house of commons had departed from the original spirit and rules of the constitution, and that the people of England complained with reason and justice, that there subsisted not between them and their representatives that strict community of interest and language which ought invariably to have prevailed.

For this disease it was necessary to seek for a remedy. A variety of schemes had been pointed out as adequate and practicable; but they illustrated rather the zeal than the wisdom of those who had formed them. An idea had been entertained by some of an equal and universal representation. This idea appeared to him to be wild, extravagant, and impracticable. It involved an endless multitude of contradictions, and would lead to a system of oppression and tyranny. They must not give way to such vague theories No alteration should be made upon the constitution, but with the most wary jealousy, and the most wakeful suspicion. The measure he had to propose was gentle, moderate, and safe. He would throw

it, for the sake of perspicuity, into the form of resolutions; and he begged that they might not be rejected without a due discussion. The main or chief object of them was an augmentation of the numbers of the house of commons, by the addition of county members, and members for the metropolis. Such members he stated as the least liable to impurity and corruption, and as those whom the people regarded with the greatest confidence. An addition of this sort would, of consequence, establish a greater community and power of interests between that house and the people, and would operate to the extinction of those doubts and jealousies which prevailed without doors of improper influence and corrupt motives. It would at the same time be a means of supporting every honest administration, by checking those fluctuations of government which had abounded so much of late, and which foreign nations deemed so disgraceful to this country.

It was his opinion, that an addition should be made of at least one hundred county members; yet if it should be contended that two additional members for each county was sufficient, he should think that the acquisition of that point, though only a partial application of his proposition, would be a considerable improvement of the constitution. With regard to what were termed the rotten boroughs, he did not wish to destroy their rights. For the arbitrary disfranchising of any electors was a stroke of tyranny and injustice. But he esteemed it right, that where a majority of the voters of such boroughs were convicted of corruption, a ground of disfranchisement should be opened against them. That the innocent, however, might not suffer with the guilty, he accounted it expedient that the virtuous minorities of such boroughs should be entitled to vote for the counties where the disfranchised boroughs were situated. There could be no better method of preserving boroughs from corruption.

He had three resolutions to submit to deliberation. The first he imagined would be assented to with little