all cases, contain the allegation, "with divers other persons," which will suffice if evidence be given of three having been engaged; just as in conspiracy, (see Rex v. Nicholls, 13 East. 412, n,) only one may be on his trial, but may be found guilty, if others are named or the general averment inserted, and the jury satisfied of the participation of some one besides the prisoner. 4. Joint purpose.] Although some of the ancient authorities (see Reg. v. Soley, 11 Mod. 115; 2 Salk. 594) seem to imply that the purpose must be illegal, yet the better opinion is that the legality of the purpose is wholly immaterial, provided the other ingredients of the offence exist. There is little doubt it would be so held at the present day; for the obvious policy of the law is to prevent all interuption to the pursuits of the community at large by violence and tumult, under whatever pretence, and to restrain individuals from taking the law into their own hands to redress their private grievances, to the great risk of dangerous consequences. (See 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 65, s. 7; Anon. 12 Mod. 648; and Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91; Reg. v. Neale, 9 C. & P. 431.) Thus, for a number of persons to abate a common nuisance, e. g. destroy an unlawful inclosure, is legal; but it must be done in a peaceable manner, so that there is no breach of the peace. (Dalt. c. 137.) On this principle, it was recently decided (Perry v. Fitzhowe, 15 L. J. 239. Q. B.) that a man has no right to attempt to remove a house which is an incroachment upon a public common while there are persons actually in it, on account of the manifest danger to the public peace. General evidence of the joint purpose will be all that is necessary; and that will be more usually proved by what is subsequently done, or by the natural inference from their proceedings. In this sense it is that the definition above cited uses the words, "with an intent mutually to assist one another against any who shall oppose them." The intent of this nature will be inferred from the display of force and general conduct calculated to overawe resistance. In the great majority of instances no question will arise as to the purpose of those charged with rioting. No specific purpose is stated in the indictment, so as to give rise to variance; and, moreover, the conduct of the parties charged is seldom open to two constructions, as large bodies do not long allow their intentions to be matter of inference or vague guess-work. The proof of a joint purpose is of more importance where the meeting is in its origin lawful. Thus, if at a fair or market or place of amusement a sudden quarrel occurs, and a public disturbance, to the terror of her Majesty's subjects, this would be an affray and not a riot, because there would be no joint purpose. So if a jury, says Dalton, (c. 137,) fall out and fight, this is no riot, because they were lawfully assembled. But if after the quarrel parties are formed and a joint purpose of mutual assistance entertained, and put into execution, then the offence of riot will arise; or if, in pursuance of any new purpose, a meeting lawfully assembled should proceed to execute that purpose with violence, the offence would be no less a riot because they met at first for another purpose. They are assembled together for the joint purpose from the moment that that purpose is entertained. It is said, indeed, in an old case (Reg. v. Ellis, 2 Salk. 595), that if three or more, being lawfully assembled, quarrel, and attack one of their own party, it is no riot; but if they attack a stranger the very moment the quarrel begins, there would be an unlawful assembly, and the act would be a riot. But if there was equal evidence of a joint purpose in each case, it is not possi ble to assign a distinction in the nature of the two acts; and each or neither would be a riot, according to the other circumstances. An 5. Actual execution with violence, to the terror of the people.] A conspiracy may exist, whether it be to effect an illegal object, or a lawful object by illegal means, without any act being done by the conspirators. (Opinions of the judges in O'Connell's case, 11 Cl. & Fin. 233.) So an unlawful assembly is where three or more persons meet together, under such circumstances of terror and alarm as, according to the opinion of firm and rational men, will produce danger to the peace and tranquillity of the neighbourhood, without any aggressive acts. (See Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91, 109; Reg. v. Neale, 9 C. & P. 435.) (a) But to constitute a riot the parties must be in the actual execution of the purpose, and so as to cause terror to the people. unlawful assembly has sometimes been distinguished from a riot, that it is a meeting for a purpose, the execution of which would be a riot, but at which meeting nothing is done. (Rex v. Birt, 5 C. & P. 154, per Patteson, J.) In such an unlawful assembly acts of violence, in pursuance of the common object, by any of the party there assembled, would no doubt constitute a riot. But both as to the degree of terror necessary, and as to what is the violent execution of the purpose, much latitude seems to be left to the discretion of the jury in each case. It is just on occasions like these, that the tribunal of the jury is of such essential assistance to the correct administration of justice. As men of sense and experience, and accustomed to the exercise of the rights and duties of citizens, they alone can weigh all the circumstances, with a due regard to the invalu (a) See infra, pp. 85-89. able right of free expression of public opinion on the one hand, and, on the other, to the preservation of freedom of action to every member of the community. Some remarks and deductions may, however, be presented on these two points. It may in the first place be safely laid down, that much stronger evidence of the means to inspire terror, and of the actual execution of the purpose, will be required, where the meeting and purpose are in themselves lawful, (Arch. C. Law. 603; Dalt. c. 137,) than when they are unlawful, and directly causing a breach of the peace. Very slight evidence indeed seems to be necessary in such case, as for instance, where parties meet with the intention of aiding, encouraging, and abetting a prize fight, which is clearly illegal, and a breach of the peace by all concerned in it, and if, whilst they are so intending the fight takes place, they may be indicted for a riot. (Rex v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 537. Sce also 6 C. & P. 103.) Indeed, they may be indicted for an assault also, as they were in the case just referred to, although the jury there found them guilty of the riot only. This case would almost seem to show that where there is a deliberate breach of the peace by a number of persons assembled in a tumultuous manner, the in terrorem populi was an inference in law. It is, however, right to state, that Mr. Baron Alderson is reported to have held, that neither the principals nor the seconds in a prize fight could be indicted for a riot or an affray, where the fight took place at a distance from the public road, and was over before the constables arrived, and the assemblage dispersed, and the prisoners gave themselves up as soon as they did arrive. (Reg. v. Hunt and others, 1 Cox's Crim. Cas. 177.) This is perhaps distinguishable from the former case, because here the jury could not infer any intention to resist or effect their purpose by violence, when the facts plainly negatived the intention. In any case of the kind, however, it would be far safer to have some evidence of terror caused by the assemblage. In the Where a number of persons cut down the fences of the inclosures of the forest of Dean, all that is stated in the report as to the proof of terror is, that the surveyor-general and his woodmen did not think themselves sufficiently strong to resist. (Rex v. Birt, 5 C. & P. 154.) But the most remarkable case is one that occurred under the statute as to a riotous and felonious demolition of houses (7 & 8 G. 4, c. 30). That statute gives no definition of what shall be a riot within the meaning of the enactment, and, therefore, the common law definition must be resorted to; and upon a case reserved, all the judges held that it was a sufficient terror and alarm if any one of the Queen's subjects being present was terrified, and upon that decision the prisoners were sentenced, although only one old man was shown to have been terrified. particular case the proceedings had been violent; but still the case establishes that more than one need not be affected by terror consequent on the violence. The averment, however, as to terror is essential to the validity of the indictment. Thus in a similar case for cutting down inclosures, the indictment omitted the allegation in terrorem populi, and Mr. Justice Patteson held that the defendants could not be convicted of a riot, although they might for an unlawful assembly. (Rex v. Cox, 4 C. & P. 538.) In a previous case, (Rex v. Hughes, 4 C. & P. 373,) twelve defendants were indicted for a riot and riotously assaulting one J. W., but the indictment omitted the averment, in terrorem populi. Some of the defendants were convicted of the assault at a prior assizes, others had traversed over and were tried at a subsequent assizes. Owing to the absence of the prosecutor, no evidence was given |