This section had indeed an additional object; for by it all parties who might be guilty of excusable homicide would have been free from any danger of forfeiture of their goods or chattels, or the expenses of suing out a writ of restitution, which, prior to 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, was still the law in theory, though in practice the judges frequently directed a verdict of general acquittal to avoid the forfeiture.

7. Indictment.] The indictment is sufficient if it follows the words of the statute, without averring that the riot was in terrorem populi, (Rex v. James, 5 C. & P. 153,) for whatever the statute meant by the term "riotously and tumultuously," the indictment will mean. But, for the reason above given, (supra, 38,) it must state that they feloniously remained after the proclamation made. There may be principals in the second degree, and they are punishable as principals in the first degree, (Rex v. Royce, 2 Burr. 2073,) and accessaries, who would, it is said, be punishable under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28, s. 8 and s. 9. (1 Russell on Crimes, 38, 276). The Act extends to Scotland (s. 9.)

8. Liability of hundred. Summoning jury.] In a case that occurred in 1824, it was objected to the jury panel that it was summoned by the sheriff, who was an inhabitant of the hundred in which the arson took place, and that, as it had been committed by a riotous assemblage, the hundred would be liable, and the sheriff, therefore, in the technical phrase, not unindifferent. The challenge was overruled, because there was no evidence that the notices required by the Act to make the hundred liable had been given. (Rex v. Savage, 1 M. & R. C. C. 51.)

D 3

9. Limitation to indictment.] By sect. 8, all prosecutions for any offences must be commenced within twelve months after the offence committed.

10. Not triable at sessions.] By 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38, it is enacted, that the offences under this Act shall not be tried at any quarter sessions.

11. Punishment.] By 7 Will. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 91, the punishment is altered to transportation for life, or not less than fifteen years, or imprisonment not exceeding three years, and with or without solitary confinement not exceeding one month at a time, or three months in any one year.

CHAPTER V.

DUTIES OF PRIVATE PERSONS.

1. Difference between felony and misdemeanour.] Although happily the ignorance which Erskine ventured in some degree to put forward as an excuse for Mr. Kennett's conduct in the Gordon riots no longer exists to the same extent, yet since that period the fires of Bristol, and other public outrages, have from time to time shown that the well-disposed part of the community often hang back from the performance of their duties towards the preservation of the public peace, and doubtless in many cases from not possessing a clear notion of those duties. The recent attempts to create disturbances have been happily frustrated, and have called forth a vigorous display of healthy feeling and energy in behalf of order and general security. Yet it will be found useful to present a brief exposition of the subject. In the salient points the law is clear and well defined, and while it imposes duties it also throws round those who perform them the mantle of its protection. Those who fill offices of civil or military authority have additional powers; but they still retain all the rights of citizens. It will therefore be more convenient, in the first place, to state the law as to the powers of private individuals to repress disorder and violence.

If a felony has been committed, any individual is justified in doing what he can and what the occasion demands to apprehend the felon, and so also to prevent

a felony where there can be no reasonable doubt that but for interference it will be perpetrated. Handcock v. Baker, 2 B. & P. 234, is an instance of this, where the defendant was held to be justified in breaking into a house to prevent the plaintiff from committing murder. Other illustrations might readily be given from the books; but it may suffice to give what Lord Loughborough said, for the purpose of correcting the mistaken notion that for the hour after the Riot Act was read no one could interfere :

"If the mob collectively, or a part of it, or any individual within or before the expiration of that hour, attempts, or begins to perpetrate an outrage amounting to felony, to pull down a house, or by any other act to violate the law, it is the duty of all present, of whatever description they may be, to endeavour to stop the mischief, and to apprehend the offender." (21 State Trials, 485.)

This remark need only be made, that private individuals cannot, like police officers, be justified by the mere suspicion of felony, or be protected from the consequences of a mistake, and they will do well not to interfere except on occasions of undoubted necessity. Passing on to the rights more immediately the subject of this work, it would be affectation not to quote at length passages from that most able, accurate, and luminous charge which Lord Chief Justice Tindal delivered to the grand jury at Bristol, in 1832—a charge which will ever remain a record of the rights and privileges of Englishmen, and of those principles of constitutional liberty which can only exist where the individuality of the citizen is recognized and fostered instead of being annihilated or absorbed by govern

ment.

"It has been well said, that the use of the law consists first, in preserving men's persons from death and

violence, next in securing to them the free enjoyment of their property; and although every single act of violence, and each individual breach of the law, tends to counteract and destroy this its primary use and object, yet as general risings and tumultuous meetings of the people in a more especial and particular manner produce this effect, not only removing all security, both from the persons and property of men, but for the time putting down the law itself and daring to usurp its place, the law of England hath accordingly, in proportion to the danger which it attaches to riotous and disorderly meetings of the people, made ample provision for preventing such offences, and for the prompt and effectual suppression of them whenever they arise; and I think it may not be unsuitable to the present occasion if I proceed to call your attention, with some degree of detail, to the various provisions of the law for carrying that purpose into effect. In the first place, by the common law, every private person may lawfully endeavour of his own authority, and without any warrant or sanction of the magistrate, to suppress a riot by every means in his power. He may disperse, or assist in dispersing, those who are assembled; he may stay those who are engaged in it from executing their purpose; he may stop and prevent others whom he shall see coming up from joining the rest; and not only has he the authority, but it is his bounden duty, as a good subject of the king, to perform this to the utmost of his ability. If the riot be general and dangerous, he may arm himself against the evil doers to keep the peace. Such was the opinion of all the judges of England in the time of Queen Elizabeth, in a case called 'The case of arms,' (Popham's Rep. 121,) although the judges add that it would be more discreet for every one in such a case to attend and be assistant to the justices, sheriff, or other ministers of the King in doing this. It would undoubtedly be more advisable so to do, for the presence and authority of the magistrate would restrain the proceeding to such extremities until the danger was sufficiently immediate, or until some felony was either committed or could not be prevented without recourse to arms; and, at all events, the assistance given by men who act in subordination and concert with the civil magistrate, will be more effectual to attain the object proposed than any efforts, however well-intended, of separated and disunited individuals. But if the occasion demands immediate action, and no opportunity is given for procuring the advice or