even against a member of the committee who had joined in the calls and paid part of them, nor although a subsequent act recited that the whole sum had been subscribed. 1 M. & P. 151. The Stratford and Moretown Railway Company v. Stratton, 2 B. & Adol. 518.

JURY.

(Costs of view.) The costs of a view were disallowed on the ground that the writ of service did not contain the names of the showers. Taylor v. Thompson, 5 M. & M. 255. LANDLORD AND TENANT.

The premises in question were originally let to N., and precisely one quarter after the expiration of his term he paid a quarter's rent, making a deduction for repairs. He had since been seen upon the premises, but had lived at a different place, and all subsequent payments of rent were made by one L. Held, that this was evidence sufficient to go to a jury that the landlord had accepted L. as his tenant, and the court refused to disturb their finding in the affirmative. 1 Stark. N. R. 455. Woodcock v. Nash, 8 Bing. 170.

A tenant of a house under an agreement for a term, by which he was bound to tenantable repairs, was held entitled to quit during the term, on the ground of the house being uninhabitable for want of a sewer, which the landlord had promised but omitted to construct. N. & M. 268. Collins v. Barrow, 2 M. &

M. 112.

LEASE.

(Words of present demise.) Memorandum of agreement made, &c. A agrees to let, and B agrees to take, a house and premises in the unfinished state they are now in for the term of sixty years or thereabout, being the whole term A has in the same, at a fixed rent, payable quarterly, A to insure the premises. The lease and counterpart to be prepared by A's attorney, and to contain all the clauses, covenants, and agreements that A had entered into and agreed upon in the lease granted unto him of the aforesaid premises: Held, that this was not an executory agreement, but an actual demise. Doe dem. Pearson v. Ries, 8 Bing. 178.

LEGACY.

(Subject to debts.) Action for deposit money on the sale of an annuity. A bequeathed a certain sum, long annuities, subject, in the first instance, to the payment of debts, after which his son was to have a certain portion of the annuities, and the residue was given to the executors in trust for his daughter. The an

nuity in question was the produce of such residue. A suit had been instituted against the surviving executor, and a decree obtained, by which it was ordered that the long annuities should be transferred to the accountant general in trust, and that the annuity in question should be paid to the daughter during life or until the further order of the court. There having been no master's report of debts in the chancery suit, held that the title was not established, and that the purchaser was entitled to recover the deposit. Curtis v. Blow, 2 B. & Adol. 426. LIBEL.

The declaration stated that the plaintiff was a medical practitioner, and that the libel was published of him in that character. There being no proof that the plaintiff had brought himself within any of the regular degrees, held that he might, notwithstanding, be entitled to damages. Long v. Chubb, 5 C. & P. 55. (Pleading.) The action was brought for an alleged accusation of felony contained in a newspaper paragraph, headed horse stealing, and setting forth that the plaintiff had been apprehended for that offence under certain circumstances of suspicion. The inuendo was, then and there including and meaning that the plaintiff had been guilty of feloniously stealing a horse. Plea, justifying the libel with the exception of the word horse stealing: held bad, on the ground that if the words did not. amount to a charge of felony, the defendant would have succeeded on the general issue, but that if they did impute an actual felony, a justification merely alleging circumstances of suspicion, was no answer. Littledale J. considered it bad on the ground that the defendant in such a case could not excuse parts of a libel, Lord Tenterden and Park J. however seemed to think that a part of the libel might be justified separately from the rest. 7 East, 493; 6 Bing. 587. LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

The statute of limitations bars the remedy, not the debt.

An

attorney therefore retains his lien on a judgment for his costs, though his remedy by action be barred. Higgins v. Scott, 2 B. & Adol. 413.

The statute applies to a right of action, accruing in Scotland, and sought to be enforced in England, though the time for enforcing it in Scotland has not elapsed. The law of Scotland in this particular was set out in the declaration, which was adjudged to be wrong, and leave was given to amend; but the point was given up after the first argument.

Delvalle v. The Creditors of York Building Company, Morrison's

Dict. of Decis. 4525, was declared by Lord Tenterden, C. J. to be the only case which created the slightest doubt in his mind. In this case the House of Lords, on appeal from the court of sessions, decided that the Scotch prescription of forty years did not apply to debts contracted in England, by an English company, and due to Englishmen. And see 13 East, 439.

The British Linen Company v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 903. A written promise to pay the balance, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute, though there be no evidence to prove what the balance is, but the plaintiff can only recover nominal damages. Dickinson v. Hatfield, 2 M. & M. 141.

Payment of interest by one of the joint makers of a note takes it out of the statute as against all, under 9 G. 4, c. 14. 8 B. & C. 36; 10 B & C. 122. Wyatt v. Hodson, 8 Bing. 310. LOST DEED. See PRODUCTION OF DEED.

MAGISTRATE.

(Right of persons to appear as counsel before.) Every Court has the power to regulate its own proceedings, and declare what (or whether any) persons shall act as advocates therein: held, therefore, that the justices were justified in turning an attorney out of a police office on his persisting to take part in the proceedings as an attorney or advocate for the accused, on the hearing of an information. It was admitted that any person, whether a professional man or not, may attend as the friend of either party, take notes, quietly make suggestions, and give advice. Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37. Collier v. Hicks, 2 B. & Adol. 663.

MISNOMER.

The Court refused to discharge a defendant who had been arrested by the name of William Henry M. instead of William Hamilton M., it being sworn that the defendant had told the plaintiff that his name was William Henry M. and signed an agreement by that name. Newton v. Maxwell, 2 C. & J. 215.

Where the writ was against C. Hooper and the notice directed to C. Wood, procedings were set aside with costs. Wright v. Hooper, 2 C. & J. 236.

MARSHAL. See INSOLVENT.
MORTGAGE.

(Effect of payment of interest.) The receipt by a mortgagee of interest due subsequently to the day of the demise laid in the declaration, is no defence to an action of ejectment brought by

him against the mortgagor. 7 Bing. 322. Doe dem. Rogers v. Cadwallader, 2 B. & Adol. 473.

(Lease by Mortgagor and Mortgagee.) The mortgagee demised, and the mortgagor demised and confirmed, and the power of re-entry for breach of covenants was reserved to them or either of them held, that the re-entry enured for the benefit of the person having the legal estate (the mortgagee,) and that an ejectment not containing a demise by him solely, was insufficient. Doe dem. Barney v. Adams, 2 C. & J. 232. NEW TRIAL.

The defendant's attorney knew a week before the cause was called on that it was set down for trial, but had neither delivered a brief nor examined his witnesses; when the cause was called on, no one appeared for the defendant, and a verdict was taken for the plaintiff: the court refused a new trial, though it was sworn that the defendant was taken by surprise, and had a good defence. Gwilt v. Crawley, 8 Bing. 144. OFFICER. See PRACTICE.

PARTNERS.

A, a coach-maker, contracted with B to supply him with a carriage at £75 a year for four years; A was at the time in secret partnership with C, though this was unknown to B. Some time after A retired from the partnership, and C wrote to B to request him to continue the contract; B replied, that he considered the contract as personal, and should return the carriage at the end of the current year, which he did, though there was still two years of the term to run: held, that B was not liable in an action at the suit of A and C for the annual payments for the two last years. Robson v. Drummond, 2 B. & Adol. 303. S. and S. carried on business as brewers, W. advanced them £24,000, and a partnership deed was created between the three, whereby a partnership stock was created, but W., instead of an aliquot portion of the profits, was to receive £ 2000 or £ 200 a year, according to circumstances, out of the clear profits. W's. name did not appear: held, that W. was a partner; and the new firm becoming bankrupts held that the creditors of the old firm of S. and S. as well as the creditors of the new firm were entitled to prove against the property of the new firm, on the ground of S. and S. being the apparent owners of that property within the 72d section of the Bankrupt Act. Exp. Chuck, 8 Bing. 469.

PARENT AND CHILD.

A habeas corpus was issued to remove a female infant from the

custody of the mother to that of the father, though there was no allegation of improper treatment on her part. Exp. McClel lan, D. P. R. 81.

PATENT.

The invention was described in the specification as consisting of a method or process for evaporating liquids and solutions at a low temperature, by forcing air through them, and this,' continued the specification, 'I do by means of pipes, whose extremities reach nearly to the upper area,' &c. &c.: held, that the words this I do must be taken to form one sentence with the preceding words, and amounted to an allegation on the part of the patentee, that his invention consisted in the method or process of forcing the air, and not merely in the principle on which the invention was founded held, that the invention was therefore different from one merely claiming the principle of producing the effect by forcing air through the liquid, &c. without specifying the 1 Stark. 205; 2 Marsh. 211; 3 B. & B. 5. Hallett v. Hague, 2 B. & Adol. 370.

means.

PAYMENT.

(Application of.) A person to whom money is due on separate accounts for spirits supplied in quantities not amounting to 20s. at a time, and for board and lodging, may apply payments made generally to the account for spirits. Cruikshanks v. Rose, 2 M. & M. 100.

PLEA.

(Replevin.) The avowry alleged the rent to be due for a period 'ending at Martinmas, to wit, on the 23d November, 1830:' held, that this must be understood to mean New Martinmas, Gaselee, J. diss. though he agreed that no extrinsic evidence ought to be received to explain the record. The rent being really due at Old Martinmas, the plaintiff recovered. Smith v. Walton, 8 Bing. 235.

See AMENDMENT; TRESPASS.

PLEADING. See INSOLVENT; LIBEL.
PLEDGE. See FACTOR.

PRACTICE.

(Counsel's right to begin.) The plaintiff's counsel has a right to begin, although by a rule of court the defendant is under obligation to admit the plaintiff's case. Thwaites v. Sainsbury. (Amendment.) The power to amend given by 14 E. 3, st. 1 c. 6, and 9 H. 5, st. 1, c. 4, is confined to misprisions of officers of the Court coming within the description of clerk. After error brought, therefore, the Court refused to allow a plaintiff in re