armies which the wealth accumulated by British industry enabled that government to afford, ultimately to humble and extinguish the most powerful sovereign who has appeared in modern times.

But, secondly, even supposing that separate and independent states have, in point of fact, no physical or material superior on earth, it by no means follows that nations are not subject to juridical relations and legal obligations with regard to each other. For this latter proposition is by no means inconsistent with the two fundamental principles of private international law which Dr Fœlix lays down in Chapter III. of his Preliminary Title, under the authority of various jurists, such as Burgundus, Rodenberg, Voet, Cocceii, Huber, Story, Vattel, Meyer, Boullenois.

"The first general principle," he says, "in this matter, results immediately from the fact of the independence of nations every nation possesses and exercises, solely and exclusively, the sovereignty and the jurisdiction within and throughout the whole extent of its territory. From this principle it follows, that the laws of each state affect, bind, and regulate, pleno jure, all the properties, immoveable and moveable, which are found in its territory, as also all the persons who inhabit this territory, whether they are born in it or not; in fine, that these laws affect and regulate, in the same manner, all the contracts concluded, all the acts or deeds consented to or performed, within the boundaries of this same territory. Consequently each state has the power of regulating the conditions under which all things, immoveable and moveable, existing within the limits of its territory, may be possessed, transmitted, or appropriated, as also to determine the

finally, the conditions law may be instituted

state and the capacity of the persons who are found there, as well as the validity of contracts and other deeds which have originated there, and the rights and obligations which result from them; under which actions or suits at and followed out within the limits of this territory, and the mode of administering justice." Now all this seems quite correct, with an exception, perhaps, or modification, relative to the place where contracts are to be implemented or executed, or to be set aside and annulled.

This

In the second principle laid down by Dr Fœlix we also concur: "No state, no nation, can, by its laws, directly affect, bind, or regulate, objects or matters, which are situated out of or beyond its territory; or affect and oblige the persons who do not there reside, whether they be subjected to it by the fact of their birth or not. is a consequence of the first general principle; the contrary system, which would give to each nation the power of regulating the persons and things existing without its territory, would destroy the equality between different nations, and the exclusive sovereignty which belongs to each of them.

"These two principles," continues Dr Fœlix, "lead to an important consequence, and which contains our entire doctrine—namely, that all the effects which foreign laws can produce in the territory of a nation depend absolutely upon the consent, express or tacit, of that nation."

Now this inference, or deduction from the two principles before enumerated, we cannot admit to the unlimited extent here laid down. So far as nations remain in a quiescent and sort of negative state, in relation to each other, and have no intercourse, the deduction may be

correct. For although it seems to have been held, that a nation during a famine, and in a state of starvation, may legally send out ships of war, and seize cargoes of grain on board vessels sailing on the high seas, provided they pay to the owners of the cargoes the market price of the grain, and the freight and other charges due to the owners of the vessels, it must be an extreme necessity indeed which would warrant one nation to invade the territory of its neighbour, for the purpose of seizing part of their stores of grain or other provisions, and we by no means contend for the existence of such a legal compulsory right. But if nations once pass from this negative state of internal quiescence, and, from whatever motive, the individuals of one nation go, and are admitted into the territory of another nation, there then arises a juridical relation, a Rechtsverhältniss, a rapport de droit, involving an obligation on the latter nation and its government to protect the persons of such individuals from assault, and their goods from violent or fraudulent abstraction, to the extent, at least, to which they afford such protection to their own citizens or subjects.

Or, if one nation, or its government, admit the individual subjects of another independent state to purchase its produce, or to sell their goods, which produce cannot, or is not to be delivered for some time, or the price of which goods cannot or is not to be paid for some time, is not the nation or government admitting such intercourse legally bound, through the medium of its judicial establishments or otherwise, to enforce the delivery of such produce, or the payment of the price of such goods, when due ? Or, is such an act on the part of the nation, in its collective or corporate capacity, a mere act of benevolence or

favour, which may be withheld or not at pleasure, or performed merely from courtesy, ex comitate gentium, and with a view to convenance réciproque? Would not such a government, in refusing to give effect to the contracts or conventions which it had allowed to take place between its subjects and those of foreign states, be countenancing and supporting, if not committing, acts of injustice? Would not such a refusal justify measures of retorsion, or, if on a great scale, constitute a just cause of war, a casus belli?

This might be further illustrated by an enumeration of a variety of particular cases; but this seems unnecessary. In short, when in the intercourse of the individuals of whom different nations are composed, juridical relations arise, or the rules of justice, which are distinguished from the other virtues by their susceptibility of enforcement, are involved, and the question is no longer moral or ethical merely, but juridical or legal-what is universally expedient to enforce-private international law, like public international law, will be found to rest, not merely on the comitas gentium, the courtesy of nations, or convenance réciproque, but on the same juridical principles, which we have seen precede the positive laws, established under and in virtue of the social union. The necessity for the individual intercourse of nations may not be so indispensable, for the quiet enjoyment of life and its comforts, and for the advancement of the species in civilisation, as the union of individuals in one society and under one government. But still the advantages of, the necessity for, the intercourse of nations with each other, afford sufficiently grave considerations for the observance and to warrant the enforcement of those rules of justice,

which in civil society protect life, person and property, award reparation of damage, compel the performance of contracts, and secure to the succeeding generation the property of their progenitors under the legal precepts, neminem lædere, suum cuique tribuere, pacta servare, damna resarcire.

What we maintain, then, is, that the sovereignty, dominion, and jurisdiction of independent nations is absolute and exclusive, only within its own territory, or that portion of the earth which it has physically occupied and appropriated; that when an independent state allows its citizens or subjects to have intercourse with the inhabitants of other states, for the purposes of commerce or otherwise, and to enter into connections or transactions similar to those into which its own subjects enter with each other, and which are enforced by the state under the social union, the state itself, as well as its inhabitants, thereby creates juridical relations, and comes under legal obligations, which it is bound, and may be legally compelled, to see or cause to be fulfilled. So far, we appre

hend, private international law does not rest upon the comitas or courtesy, or upon the mere consent of nations, but may be legitimately enforced by such physical means as such states have at their disposal. Nor does it seem necessary, for the true independence and welfare of nations, to push their exclusive right of sovereignty so far as seems to be done by the jurists of the present day, or to make private international law entirely dependent for its existence on the consent of each separate nation. For the true independence and welfare of nations, it seems quite sufficient that the absolute sovereignty of each state should be limited to its own territory, to the