and punishments; in chap. xiv,, of the private promises and contracts of princes; and finally (what truly belongs to the proper law of nations); in chap. xv. and xvi., of public treaties and their interpretation; in chap. xviii., of the law of embassy; and from a strange mingling of subjects, in chap. xix., of the rights of sepulture. After he has, in this manner, gone over all the individual occasions of war, he still treats, in chap. xxii., of unjust causes of war; in chap. xxiii., of doubtful causes; in chap. xxiv., of the grounds for not commencing war at any rate, even for just causes; in chap. XXV., of wars, which are undertaken, for the sake of others; and in chap. xxvi., of the motives of private individuals for allowing themselves to be employed in wars.

In the third and last part, the author treats of the carrying on of war itself, and of the various events and occurrences in the course thereof, agreeably to the principles of the law of nations. And in detail, he treats in chap. i., of what is lawful in war; in chap. ii., of reprisals; in chap. iii., of the declaration of war; in chap. iv. xi., of the right of the enemy to the dead; in chap. v. xii., of booty, or plunder in war; in chap. vi. xiii., of acquisition by war; in chap. xiv., of prisoners of war; in chap. viii. xv., of the conquered; in chap. ix. xvi., of postliminium; in chap. xvii., of neutrality; in chap. xviii., of privateering; in chap. xix., of good faith between enemies, and in the observance of treaties; in chap. xx., of treaties, by which the war is terminated, of appeal to chance, of single combat, of compromise, of voluntary surrender; and of the confirmation of treaties, by hostages and pledges; in chap.

xxi., of treaties during the war itself, as truces, passports, release of prisoners; in chap. xxii., of treaties by military commanders, and consequent responsibility; in chap. xxiii., of the promises of private individuals in war; in chap. xxiv., of tacit obligations in war; and finally, in chap. xxv., he concludes with exhortations to peace.

From this brief review, it sufficiently appears, that the original plan of Grotius was in reality only to treat of the laws of war; but that, in the course of his work, he has not left any object of the law of nations generally untouched; so that the work may be considered, as in a manner, a text-book, or elements of the natural and positive law of nations combined. With regard to the execution of the particular parts of the work, it must also be admitted, in justice to Grotius, that he performed all that could reasonably be expected, in an undertaking so extensive, and so difficult, in the times in which he lived. He arranges the particular subjects in pretty good order; he gives in each clear ideas of what he is to treat; he then expounds, with much acuteness, although frequently with excessive subtilty, the requisite distinctions; he next establishes the necessary fundamental principles; and he finally illustrates each position, with copious, and for the most part, well-chosen examples, from ancient history. At the same time, it can, on the other hand, as little be denied, that in this in itself excellent mode of treating the subject, many defects occur. He often does not sift the matter to the bottom, or exhaust the subject; and creates obstacles, by divisions, subdivisions, and manifold superfluous subtilties, diverting him from his

principal object. He frequently diverges from the law of nations, properly so called, and dwells too much on the general public or constitutional internal law of states, on the private law of states, or jurisprudence, and on other matters, not belonging to international law. Nay, many times he mingles with it, the Roman law. And what is least agreeable in his work, he labours, according to the style and mode of writing of these times, to exhibit his vast learning; for every page is filled with an intolerable number of quotations from Latin, Greek, and even Hebrew writings, which might very well serve as an embellishment, but which are so abundant, that the matters previously treated, are almost hid and buried among them. Notwithstanding, however, all these defects, the excellencies of the work still preponderate; and it will certainly never cease to be duly appreciated, and to continue in deservedly high estimation.*

We may conclude, as formerly proposed, our account of the great work of Grotius, with the following criticism of that acute metaphysician, the Abbè de Condillac,† who, however, seems to have erred in ascribing to Grotius, the intention and design of composing a complete system of the law of nature, as well as of the law of nations. "Quoique Grotius eût pour objet, d' établir les principes du droit naturel, du droit des gens, et du droit public, et de résoudre d'après ces principes, les questions, qui intéressent le bonheur des peuples, il intitula son ouvrage, Le droit de la guerre, et de la

* Von Ompteda Litteratur, § 60.

† Cours d'Etude (Histoire Moderne Tom. V.) Vol. XV. pp. 362-3.

paix. Il parut par-là, se renfermer, dans un plan moins étendu, que celui, qu'il se proposait; mais il usa de cet artifice, parce qu'il écrivait dans un tems ou ce titre devait, plus que tout autre, attirer l'attention des puissances de l' Europe. Il eut la gloire d'avoir pour lecteur le grand Gustave, qui, désirant de s'attacher un écrivain, dont il estimait les talens, etait au moment de l'appeller à son service, lorsqu'il fut tué en 1632, à la battaille de Lutzen. Peu de tems après, le chancelier Oxenstiern, qui ne l'estimait pas moins, se fit un devoir de se conformer aux intentions du Roi son maître, et nomma Grotius ambassadeur de Suède a la cour de France.

"Grotius est en effet un homme de génie, qui commence à répandre la lumiére. Malgré les progres, que fesait l'esprit humain, les puissances de l' Europe, dans la plus grande ignorance des matières qu' il traite, ne songeaient pas même, à s'en instruire; et il semble leur enseigner l'art de defricher des terres, que les barbares avaient jusqu'alors laissées sans culture. Cependant ses principes ne sont pas toujours exacts. Il ne les developpe pas assez ; il manque de méthode. Il raisonne avec profondeur; mais il est difficile de le suivre, parce qu' il n'a pas su saisir cet ordre simple, qui ne se trouve, que dans la plus grande liaison des idées, et qui rejette tout ce qui est superflu. Enfin il embarasse ses raisonnemens, en prodiguant l'érudition pour les éclaircir; et il juge d'après l'autorité, quoiqu'il fût capable de mieux juger par lui-même. Malgré ces défauts, qui sont ceux de son siècle, son ouvrage merite d'être étudié. Il a crée une Science, qui serait la plus utile, si elle etait connue; et il a éclairé

ceux, qui après lui s'y sont appliqués avec plus de succès."

Notwithstanding the great respect and admiration, which the work of Grotius inspired, the peculiar mode, in which he had begun to cultivate the law of nations, made, at the beginning, but a slight impression; and in the course of half a century, it came to be in a great measure, forgotten, or neglected, partly perhaps, from Grotius having in his work mixed up with international law, discussions on the Roman law, or private jurisprudence, and on the constitutional law of states; but chiefly in consequence of the attention paid to the different method of studying the science of the law of nations, which arose out of the mode, in which the learned Pufendorff treated the jus naturæ et gentium. But before proceeding to trace the effect of Pufendorff's writings, we may shortly notice the other writers on international law, who lived in the interval between 1625 and 1673, and these are chiefly English..

In his work entitled, Elementa Philosophica de Cive, published in 1642, Hobbes gives the following idea of the law of nations. He divides the whole of law into divine and human. The former, he says, is "vel naturale vel positivum; the latter is vel naturale hominum, quod solum obtinuit dici lex naturæ; et naturale civitatum, quod dici potest, lex gentium, vulgo autem jus gentium appellatur. Præcepta utriusque eadem sunt; sed quia civitates, semel institutæ, inducunt proprietates hominum personales, lex, quam loquentes de hominum singulorum officio, naturalem dicimus, applicata totis civitatibus, nationibus, sive gentibus, vocatur jus gentium. Et quæ leges, et juris naturalis elementa, hactenus tra