to take, but also to execute, and actually realize, to a certain extent, a more comprehensive and methodical view and plan of the entire science of international law, as a whole.

In his introductory title, he discusses the general and preliminary principles of the science; and treats first, of the definition, parts, and sources of the law of nations; of the sciences connected with and subservient to it; and in the second place, of the history and bibliography of that law. He then divides his work into two parts. In part first, he treats of states in general, particularly in Europe: first, of the definition, relations, sovereignty, and union of states generally; secondly, of the European states. In the second part, he treats of the rights of the states of Europe in relation to each other; and these rights he divides into absolute and hypothetical. In title first, he treats of what he calls the absolute rights of the European states in relation to each other; of self conservation, of independence, of equality. In title second, he treats of what he calls the hypothetical rights of the states of Europe, in relation to each other; and these he divides into two sections; the rights of states in their pacific relations; and the rights of nations in a state of war. In section first, he treats of the right of property in the state, of the right of treaties, of the right of negotiation, particularly by public ministers. In section second, he treats of the rights of war, of the rights of neutrality, and of the right of peace.

There is here, manifestly, a great improvement in the general arrangement. At the same time, we cannot approve of the division which von Klüber

makes, of the rights and obligations of nations, into those which are absolute, and those which are hypothetical. For no rights and obligations are altogether absolute; but all bear a reference to other men, either individually or collectively, and their actions, prestations, or services; or to external objects, or things, moveable or immovable. And the term hypothetical appears to be exceptionable, in so far as it implies any thing conjectural, or resembling a fiction; because legal right and obligation can only be correctly deduced from actually existing circumstances. Neither do we see why the right of dominion and property of a state in its territory, should be separated from what is termed the absolute right of conservation; or why, being almost an essential attribute, and involved in the idea, of every nation which has made even so little progress in civilization, as to be almost solely agricultural, it should be deemed a merely hypothetical right, and classed along with the rights of negotiation, and of binding other nations by treaty. Nor does there seem to be any good ground for denominating the rights of belligerents and neutrals hypothetical, or why they should not be considered, although not absolute, but correlative, equally actual, as the right of self-preservation.

At the close of our historical inquiry, how international law has been cultivated as a science, we gave a pretty full account of the contents of the work of Dr Julius Schmelzing; and took occasion to remark, that in his Systematischer Grundriss des Practischen Euröpaischen Völkerrechts, or systematic outlines of the practical European law of nations, nearly contemporary with, or a little posterior to, the work of Klüber, the

author has endeavoured to introduce a more methodical arrangement, than those adopted by his predecessors in detail, as well as general. But in this attempt, he has, we think, rather unfortunately employed the division of the Roman law, in matters of private right or jurisprudence, namely, the division into the doctrines of the rights of persons, of the rights of things, and of obligations and actions, as followed by the German jurists in their commentaries on, and illustrations of, that code. And, in arranging them according to this rather inapplicable division, we do not think he has, by any means, succeeded in elucidating or rendering more perspicuous, the doctrines of the law of nations.

The object of the author of the Traité Complet de Diplomatie, is obviously rather to convey instruction in the political art and practice of diplomacy, than to expound juridically the rules of international law. A great part of the work, however, is devoted to the latter subject, in the prosecution of which, he appears pretty much to adopt the views of von Martens, Schmalz, and Klüber. After a short introduction, the author in the first book undertakes to explain the origin and establishment of civil societies, the different forms of government, sovereignty, and the division of powers, the development of the physical and moral means of government, and in general, the internal organization of a state. In the second book, after considering the states of Europe in general, he explains what he calls the absolute rights of states; and under this head, it is rather singular, he treats of the administration of the different branches of government, and shows what in this respect one nation owes to others;

embracing the rights relative to commerce, and the duties and jurisdiction of commercial consuls, as well as separately, the personal relations of sovereigns to each other. He next in the third book, considers the rights which nations can only exercise in given circumstances, and which have a special origin; denominating them conditional rights as Klüber had previously designated them, hypothetical. And under this head, like Klüber, he comprehends the property of the state, the means of acquiring it, the distinction of territory, the ocean and the maritime ceremonial. The fourth book treats of public conventions and treaties, their different kinds, their interpretation and execution; of the written correspondence between states, and of the diplomatic style. In the fifth book, he treats of the right of negotiation and embassies, of the different orders of ministers, their privileges, functions, and jurisdiction, including the ceremonial of embassies. The sixth book contains the law of war, its causes and declaration, the different kinds of hostilities, the rules to be observed in carrying on war, prisoners, military operations, sieges, blockades, privateers, mode of treating with the enemy, and conquests. In the seventh book, on the law of neutrality, there is an analysis of the discussions on the maritime commerce of neutrals, contraband of war, the goods of enemies under a neutral flag, and of neutral goods under the flag of the enemy, visitation and The eighth book con

search, the judgment of prizes.

tains the law of peace, the different modes of negotiating, congresses, preliminary, and definitive treaties of peace.

In this accumulation, or congeries of important

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juridical matters, it is obvious there is scarcely any attempt at a scientific general arrangement; and we cannot approve of the division, which the author, following several previous jurists, makes, of the reciprocal rights and obligations of nations, into those which are absolute, and those which are conditional. For all rights and obligations are conditional, inasmuch as they pre-suppose and proceed upon facts, and actually existing juridical relations.

In his general arrangement of the constituent parts of international law, Dr Wheaton, as already observed, adopts the comparatively improved plan of Klüber. In part first, he treats of the sources of international law, and the subjects of international law, or sovereign states. In part second, he follows the example of Klüber, and of the author of the Traité Complet de Diplomatie, in dividing international rights into absolute and hypothetical or conditional; and treats of absolute international rights, under the heads of selfpreservation, independence, equality and property. But, as we have already remarked, no rights are absolute in the correct sense of that term, or other than relative; and all rights are conditional, inasmuch as they pre-suppose certain states or circumstances, in which they arise, or exist. The better principle of division, therefore, appears to be duration or extent of prevalence, and state or condition. And agreeably to this principle, all international rights may be either permanent and general, such as sovereignty and independence, territorial dominion and property, selfpreservation, and promotion of national welfare, equality and rank; or particular and occasional in