the private coercive law of states, or jurisprudence. And in this view many of the rules of private law, or jurisprudence, applicable to individuals considered separately, or as insulated beings, may be applicable to separate or insulated communities or states. But even the jurists who maintain, that international law is founded on, or derived from, the law of nature, are forced to admit, that, in its application to nations, the law of nature, in their sense of these terms, must undergo considerable modifications, to adapt it to the different subjects, to which it is to be applied. Inasmuch, as the nature of political bodies, is different from the nature of actual individual persons, so many changes must the law of nature necessarily undergo, in its applications to independent nations. Even the natural law of nations, the jus inter gentes naturale, deviates sensibly, or rather considerably, from what has been called the law of nature; and the distinction becomes still wider, and more obvious, or rather conspicuous, by the establishment of the additional principles, recognised in the positive or practical law of nations, consuetudinary and conventional.

The following, therefore, seems to be the preferable mode of conducting the inquiry.

First. To give up the idea of transferring the rules applicable to men viewed abstractly, apart from any condition, in which they have ever been found to exist, to nations or communities, formed by the union of men in civil society; and to investigate the principles of the human constitution, as ascertained by observation, experience, and the records of history, and likewise the circumstances, in which men are placed on the

surface of this earth, and particularly the principles and circumstances, by which men have been led, are led, and are likely to continue to be led, to associate themselves into separate communities or states.

Secondly. Either to consider men, although always found living in society, and generally under some kind of government, as separate individuals, with reference to each other, and their families or kindred; in which case we have the internal private law of a state, or jurisprudence; or to consider men, with reference to their civil union, creating a people, state, and government, and to contemplate the individuals so united, not with reference to each other, but with reference to that state or government; in which case we have the internal public, or constitutional law of a state.

Thirdly. To consider the communities, or nations, and governments, created by the social union, not internally, or with reference merely to the individuals, of whom they are composed, but externally, and with reference to each other, as separate states; in which case, we have what has been more correctly denominated, in recent times, not jus gentium, but jus inter gentes, aut civitates, or international law.

In this way, we shall find existing in nature, independently of human legislation, certain legal or juridical relations, leading to certain rules of action, involving certain rights and obligations, capable of being enforced; which, when collected, and arranged into a system, we may with propriety distinguish, by the separate denominations of law, before enumerated, private or civil, public or constitutional, and international.

Adopting this mode of inquiry, and viewing mankind, as they have been, and are, so far as known to us, and observing the particular conformation of the surface of this globe, as divided and intersected by seas and mountains,* we may safely conclude, that as they have not been hitherto, so the human species are not likely ever to be united on this earth, into one great community, or nation, or to be placed under one universal government. Such does not appear to have been the intention of the All-wise Creator; and various obvious reasons present themselves, why such an event would not be desirable. But although they be not united in one universal society, various juridical relations exist between man and his fellow-men simply, as such; various rules exist for the regulation of their conduct; various reciprocal rights and obligations, capable of being enforced by such power, as the Creator has delegated to them. And in the same way, although mankind are likely to continue in future as hitherto, to be divided into separate communities, tribes, and nations, comparatively unconnected with each other, there exist among these separate communities, tribes, and nations-certain juridical relations-certain rules for the regulation of their reciprocal conduct and intercourse-certain rights and obligations, likewise capable of being enforced, and which it is just, and generally, or rather, universally expedient, should be enforced, by such means, as are placed at the disposal of such

Rivers are not found in experience to be the natural, or ordinary boundaries of nations; the opposite banks even of great rivers, are generally found inhabited by the same people.-History of India, by the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, Vol. I. p. 1.

nations. For we decidedly differ from the juridical philosopher Kant, and the philosophic lawyer Hugo, so far, as they hold that legal rights and obligations are dependent for their existence upon the possibility of legislation (Gesetz-gebung) by the supreme power of communities or states; however desirable an approximation to such legislation may be, by positive international laws, established by means of consuetude, and conventional treaties. Such legal or juridical relations, and consequent or concomitant rights and obligations, have an actual and real existence, whether enforced by human power, or not, among individuals, and also among nations. They are antecedent to, independent of, and not created by, human legislation. Among individual men, united or living together in communities or states, these legal relations, rights and obligations, are, to a certain extent, perceived and felt, almost intuitively; and are gradually unfolded in the progress of civilization, through imitation, or education in a general sense, through tradition, through the accumulated wisdom and feeling of one age, transmitted to the next, from generation to generation; and thus come to be recognised in usage, and enforced by the legislative and judicial powers of states. Among nations, no such controlling coercive power exists, as is exercised by a community, or state, over its members or subjects. But there exist among nations, legal relations, rights and obligations, similar or at least analogous to those, which are recognised among individuals in the private law of a state, or jurisprudence, and which are declared and enforced by the legislative and judicial powers. And these legal relations, rights, and

obligations, although by no means declared and enforced, in such a distinct and efficient manner, as is done by the internal legislation and jurisprudence of states, come in time to be recognised in usage, especially among the more civilized nations, or by special conventions or treaties; and to be, to a certain extent, enforced by the union of a number of nations, against an aggressive nation, or by what has been called among modern European nations, the maintenance of the balance of power.

Agreeably to these views, nations are collections of men, occupying particular portions of the surface of this globe, or territories, living in civil society, under separate governments, considered in their collective character, and in their mutual relations, as legal persons, or independent states. And the collection of the rules which result from these mutual relations, for the regulation of their reciprocal intercourse, as independent states, in other words, the reciprocal rights and obligations of these collections or assemblages of men, as independent of each other, which may be, and which it is just, and generally expedient, should be enforced, constitute the law of nations, the jus gentium in the proper sense of these terms, or jus civitatum inter se, or as more recently denominated, international law.

Some recent jurists, such as M. Schmalz, and the anonymous author of the Traité Complet de Diplomatie, 1833, have even held, that such legal and compulsory regulations are the only relations and rules of reciprocal conduct, which exist among nations, and that the rules of morality, or præcepta virtutum, are not applicable to, and cannot be predicated of, nations,