In 1907 the Second Hague Peace Conference laid down a principle which, although not agreed to by all the States represented there, may be regarded as the present rule of International Law on this subject. The Contracting Powers agreed not to have recourse to armed force for the recovery of contract debts unless in case of a refusal to arbitrate or failure to submit to the arbitral award after arbitration had been agreed upon.2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

*

Responsibility of States. * Anzilotti, in 13 R. D. I. P. (1906), 5-29 and 285-309; * Bar, in 31 R. D. I. (1899), 464 ff.; Baty, Int. Law, chs. 4-5 (for examples of claims by Great Britain); Bluntschli, Arts. 375393; Bonfils (Fauchille), Nos. 324-332, 433-440; Brewer and Butler, in 22 Cyc. of Law and Procedure (1906), 1734 ff. (Art. on Int. Law); * Brusa, in 17 Annuaire de l'Institut (1898), 96 ff.; *3 Calvo, §§ 1261-1298; Clunet, Offenses et faites hostiles commis par particuliers contre un etat etranger (1887); 1 Fiore, Nos. 659-679; Funck-Brentano et Sorel, Précis, ch. 12; Hall (5th ed.), 53, 217–213, 323; 1 Halleck (Baker's 3d ed.), 440-444; Heffter (Geffcken), §§ 101-104; * Hershey, in 1 A. J. (1907), 26-45; Holtzendorff, in 2 Handbuch, 70-74; Liszt (3d ed.), § 24; * Moulin, Le doctrine Drago (1908); * 6 Moore, ch. 21 (for claims by the United States); 2 Nys, 226228; 1 Oppenheim, Pt. I, ch. 3; 1 Piédelièvre, 317-322; Pittard, La protection des nationaux à l'etranger (1896); * 1 and 3 P.-Fodéré, Nos. 196–210, 402 ff., 1363 ff.; 1 and 2 Rivier, 271-273 and 40-44, respectively; * Rougier,

In habitually refraining from diplomatic as well as forcible intervention to secure the payment of public and contract debts, the United States appears to have been influenced by respect for what it believes to be a principle of the Law of Nations as well as by policy or expediency. For the views of American statesmen, see 6 Moore, §§ 916, 995-998. Cf. 2 Wharton, §§ 231-232.

But exceptions have been made in cases where diplomacy furnished the only means of redress, as in case of the non-performance of a government contract, arbitrary confiscation of vested rights, or of annulment of charters or concessions. For examples, see 6 Moore, §§ 918, 996–997, and 2 Wharton, § 232.

"International commissions have frequently allowed claims based on the infraction of rights derived from contracts where the denial of justice was properly established." 6 Moore, p. 718.

In his Message of Dec. 4, 1906, President Roosevelt admitted that "the nonpayment of public debts may be accompanied by such circumstances of fraud and wrongdoing or violation of treaties as to justify the use of force." See Hershey, "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," in 1 A. J. (1908), p. 40, from which article the major portion of this chapter has been drawn.

26 For the text of Art. I of this Convention, see infra, § 313.

The term "contract" debt, as used in the Convention, almost certainly includes public loans. For an admirable discussion of this convention, see Moulin, La Doctrine de Drago, 305-346. See 3 A. J., 772-776 for a review of this excellent work.

Les guerres civiles (1903), 448–478; * Triepel, Völkerrecht u. Landesrecht, 13, 324-381; Tchernoff, Le droit de protection (1898), especially liv. III, ch. 4; Ullmann (2d ed.), § 39; Vattel, liv. II. §§ 63-78; Wiesse, Le droit int. appliqué aux guerres civiles, § 14, pp. 43-55; 1 Westlake, ch. 14; Wheaton, 32; 2 Wharton, Digest, ch. 9, §§ 223 ff.

PART II

THE OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

158. Introductory. — The objects of the Law of Nations are: (1) material goods or things; and (2) individuals or persons (including corporations).

The main things to which the rules of International Law apply are land territory, territorial waters, the open sea, aërial space, public vessels (mainly warships), private vessels (mainly merchantmen), and other public and private property of various sorts.

In the following chapters we shall first consider the various forms of a State's territory, and the modes of acquisition. This will be followed by chapters on aërial space and the open sea (including the non-territorial or property rights of States, more especially the jurisdiction over warships and merchant vessels in times of peace). Finally, we shall consider the rights and duties of individuals as objects of International Law during peace.

CHAPTER XI

A STATE'S TERRITORY AND ITS BOUNDARIES

159. The Nature of Territorial Sovereignty. - A State's territory is that definite portion of the earth's surface which is subject to its sovereignty or imperium. According to the old maxim, Quidquid est in territorio, est etiam de territorio.1 This territorial supremacy should be distinguished from the non-territorial or property rights which a State enjoys over its public and private domain.2 Nor should it be confused with the right of eminent domain by virtue of which a State may expropriate private property for public purposes, though it should be noted that this right of eminent domain is essentially an exercise of territorial sovereignty, and may be exercised for international as well as national purposes.

The jurisdiction of a State extends, with certain exceptions to be noted hereafter, over all persons and things found on its territory, and may also be employed for international as well as national purposes. Territorial sovereignty is of the nature of imperium rather than dominium,5 i.e. it is an imperial rather

1 Or in respect to persons, qui in territorio meo est, etiam meus subditus est. 2 See supra, §§ 129-130.

On the right of Eminent Domain, see especially: Beach, Public Corporations in the United States (1893), §§ 653-688; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), 753; 15 Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure, 543-1029; *Elliot, Municipal Corporations (1910, 2nd ed.), ch. 10, §§ 83-98; Encyclopedia of Law (2nd ed.), 10431205; Lewis, The Law of Eminent Domain (3d ed., 1909); Mills, The Law of Eminent Domain (2d ed., 1888); Nichols, The Power of Eminent Domain (1909); Randolph, The Law of Eminent Domain.

▲ See infra, §§ 209, 211, 270 ff., 289–291.

The saying of the great French jurist Portalis is frequently cited in this connection: "Property belongs to the citizen, empire to the sovereign."

Some publicists still speak of territorial sovereignty as a property right. This is doubtless a mediæval survival of the terminology introduced into public law by the feudal confusion of rights based upon the exercise of sovereignty and those derived from the ownership of land.

than a property right. With certain exceptions, this imperium or territorial supremacy is exclusive in character, and cannot be exercised by more than one sovereign State over a given territory.

160. Extent of a State's Territory. The territory of a State consists of land, water, and air. It may be thus classified: (1) The Land Domain. (2) The Maritime and Fluvial Domain or Territorial Waters, using the latter phrase in a general sense. (3) Aërial Space.

161. The Land Domain. The Land Domain consists of all the land (including colonies and dependencies) to which the State has a valid title. Especially important are such means of communication as the public highways, telegraph lines, etc., which are subject to public control.

The Land Domain of a State also includes all islands formed within its territorial waters, and the territorial subsoil beneath its land and water surface. This jurisdiction over the subsoil, which extends to an indefinite depth, arises from the necessity — a need increasingly felt of conserving for future generations the rich treasures found beneath the earth's surface. In certain cases, international regulation may be deemed desirable."

162. Boundaries or Frontiers of a State. The frontiers or boundaries of a State are usually classed as natural or physical, and artificial or conventional. To avoid international conflicts and controversies, it is very important that they be accurately drawn and definitely ascertained.

* See 1 Oppenheim, § 171, for these exceptions.

It does not, strictly speaking, include a Vassal State under Suzerainty or a Protectorate. But inasmuch as the Suzerain or Protector frequently exercises jurisdiction within the Vassal or Protected State, no general rule can be laid down in respect to such territory. It certainly does not include the Back Country (Hinterland), spheres of interest, and the like. It probably includes leased territory.

* In the case of the Anna (1805), 5 C. Rob. 373, Sir Wm. Scott held that a chain of uninhabited mud islands situated at a distance of a mile and a half from the western shore of the principal entrance of the Mississippi River formed natural appendages to the coast, and that the extent of territory or marine league should be measured from these islands. For the case of the Anna in abridged form, see I Moore, Digest, § 82, pp. 269-270, and Scott, Cases, 684-687. For comments, see Lawrence (3d ed.), § 91, p. 142; 1 Oppenheim, § 234, and 1 Westlake, 118. 'On the importance of the subsoil and the different systems of mine exploitation, see 1 Nys, 411-412.