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them to be inferior to no one in the rest of contests, and all the other things that are learnt by art. But did he not wish to make them good men? But perhaps, Socrates, they would have become so, had they not died young. 1 You reasonably come to the aid of your beloved.1 But Pericles would have much rather made them clever in his own wisdom, than in music and contests, had virtue been a thing to be taught, and had he been able to make them good men. [8.] But (I fear) that it is a thing not to be taught; since Thucydides brought up well2 his two sons, Melesias and Stephanus, 3 in behalf of whom you will not have it in your power to say, what you have done in behalf of the sons of Pericles; for one of these you surely know lived to old age, and the other much beyond.3' And yet their father taught them well other pursuits, and they wrestled the best of the Athenians. For he put one under Xanthias, and the other under Eudorus; and these were surely thought to wrestle the best of those of that period. Yes, they were. [9-] Is it not evident then, that he would not have taught his sons these things, where 4 it was requisite to instruct them at an expense to himself, but those where6 without expending any thing it was requisite to make

if it were to be taught? It is likely at least. But perhaps Thucydides was a man of small means, and had not very many friends amongst the Athenians or their allies; and 6 he was of a great family, and of great power in the state, and amongst the rest of the Greeks, so that if this had been a

11 Here again has been preserved another supplement of the Meno. For in § 30, Plato wrote, AN. doxu fiiv, t{3ov\tTO' loiaQ £' av tykvovro, o) EoiKparec," vioi ovrtQ eTtXevrrjaav. 2Q. av [itv ttKOTwg fiorjOetQ rote iraiiucoic- aXXd /ii) oiiie y SiSaKTov. For it seems unreasonable to suppose that the writer of this dialogue was cognizant of facts, which Plato either did not know, or was unwilling to mention.

2 Here again I have substituted ei for ai —and so I would in Meno, § 33.

33 Here too is another supplement of the Meno; for all the words between the numerals ought to be inserted in § 33, after SrkQavov, and rap between Kai and rourouc—

4is I have adopted o5, "where," found in Meno, § 34, in lieu of oZ, "whither;" and similarly in to which oirov in 3 MSS. plainly leads.

6 Although Kai is found both here and in the Meno, in neither place is it what the sense requires, as remarked there by Struve. Opportunely then has Cincius here, "Thucydidem abjectum et obscurum fuisse hominem. At longe secus erat; multitudine enim amicorum et civium et sociorum populi Atheniensis affluebat—"


lit! he not have taught them this,

thing to be taught, he would have discovered a person amongst those of the country, or foreigners, who would have made his son a good man, if he himself had, through his attention to state affairs, no leisure. But (I fear) that virtue is a thing not to be taught. Perhaps not. [10.] But if it is not to be taught, are the good naturally so from their birth? But this perhaps we shall discover by considering the matter in this way. Come then, (say,) do there exist the natures of good horses? They do exist. Are there not men, who possess an art, by which they know the natures of good horses, both as regards their body, with reference to running, and their feelings, which of them are full of spirit or devoid of it. Yes. What is this art, and what its name? Equestrian. Is there not in like manner an art relating to dogs, by which persons discriminate between the good and bad natures of dogs ? There is. What is it? The hunter's art. There are too assayers amongst us of gold and silver, who, by looking, decide upon both the better and the worse (metal). There are. And what do you call them? Silver assayers. [11.] The boy-drillers1 moreover know, by examining the natures of the bodies of men, which of them are useful and which not, for each of their labours, and which of the bodies of persons older and young, are about to be worthy of note, and in which there is much hope of their executing works connected with the body. It is so. [12.] Whether then are good horses and dogs, and other things of such a kind, of more importance in states, or good men? Good men. Well then, do you conceive that, if the natures of men were good for virtue, that mankind would rot have planned in every way to discover those natures? It is likely at least. Can you then mention any art, which has been exhibited and applied to the natures of good men, so as to enable persons to decide upon them? I cannot. And yet the art would be worth much, and so too the parties possessing it. For they would have pointed out the young men, who, when they were still boys, were about to be good; and whom we should have taken and kept in the Acropolis for the public use, as if it were silver, and something more beautiful,2 in order that they might not suffer any mischief, either in a fight or in any other danger, but be

'On the ircu$OTpif3ai, see my remarks on Crito, § 7, n. 5. 'As in Meno. § 25, the expression in a similar passage ist0uXoVrof«v iv arpordXci—itoKi paWov ri To \pvaiov— I have translated here, as laid up as the saviors and benefactors of the state, since 1 they should have arrived at a proper age. But it seems almost that virtue does not exist to mankind either by nature or instruction. [13.] How then, Socrates, would persons seem to become (good),2 if they do not become so by nature or instruction? By what other means could the good exist? This, I think, could not be shown easily; but I conjecture that the property (of goodness) is something especially divine, and that good men exist, as prophets do and oracle chaunters. For these exist neither by nature nor by art, but become such by the inspiration of the gods. And so too good men point out to states what is about on each occasion to happen, and what is about to be, from the inspiration 3 of a god, much more, and more clearly, than oracle chaunters do: and even women 4 somehow say that such a person is a divine man; and the Lacedaemonians too, when they praise in a very handsome manner, say that a man is divine,5 and often does Homer make use of the same expression, and the rest of poets likewise. When therefore a god wishes a state to do well, he causes some men in it to be good; but when a state is about to do ill, the god takes away the good men from it. Thus then it is likely that virtue is a thing not to be taught nor (derived) from nature, but exists by a divine allotment to those who possess it.

if the Greek were KaWwv, not /iaXXov— The two words are constantly confounded. Cincius however has, "mnlto quoque hercle magis—"

1 Instead of truth, which is unintelligible, Cincius seems to have found in his MS. sue Irj—for his version is "quousque—"

2 I have translated, as if dyaBol, absolutely requisite for the sense, had dropt out after yiyvtvQai.

3 Cincius, here and just below, renders tiriirvoia by "providentia."

4 Cincius exhibits here a remarkable supplement in his version— "Atqui mulieres etiam, qua maxime linguam antiquum observant"—not found in Meno, § 41.

5 On the Laconian fltloc, or rather (rtToc &v>]f>, see Meno, § 41, n. 95.



[1.] Can you tell us what is justice? or does it seem to you not worth entering into a discourse about it? To me at least (it seems) very much so. What is it then? What else than the things considered just. Do not (speak)1 to me in this way; but, as if you had asked me—What is the eye? I should have said to you—It is that, by which we see; and if you should bid me to prove it, I would prove it. And if you should ask—To what is given the name of soul? I would say —To that, by which we know (something).2 And if again— What is the voice? I would answer—That, by which we converse. In this way then do you tell me that justice is that, which we use for something, as are the things, of which I was just now asking. I have it not in my power to reply in this way at all. But, since such is the case, perhaps we shall discover it more easily in this way. Come then, (say,) by what do we, on consideration, distinguish the greater and the less? Is it not by a measure? Yes. And together with a measure by what art? Is it not by that of measurement? Yes. And how things light and heavy? Is it not by weight? Yes. And together with a weight by what art ?' Is it not that of weighing? Certainly.3 Well then, by what instrument do

'On the ellipse of Mrs after fit) ftoi, see my note on jEsch. Suppl. 2S4. I have translated, as if ri had dropt out before yiyvuoico)iiv, which c»n hardly dispense with its object.

After irdvv yt, Boeckh proposes to insert, 2Q. ri Si rd jroXXd icai we, on consideration, distinguish what is just and unjust? and together with the instrument, by what art previously? Is it not somehow manifest to you thus? No. [2.] But'(let us consider it)1 again in this way. When we are disputing about things greater and less, who decides between us? Is it not the measurers? Yes. And when about things many and few, who are the persons to decide? Is it not the numberers? But what, when we are disputing with each other about things just and unjust, to whom do we come? and who are the persons to decide on each occasion between us? Say. Do you not, Socrates, mean the judges? You have correctly made the discovery. Come then and try to tell this likewise. By doing what do the measurers decide respecting things large and small? Is it not by measuring? Yes. And respecting things heavy and light? Is it not by weighing? Yes. And respecting things many and few? Is it not by numbering? Yes. But how, respecting things just and unjust? Answer me. I cannot say. Say, by speaking. Yes. By speaking then do judges decide between us, when they are forming a judgment respecting things just and unjust. , Yes. And by measuring, those skilled in measuring things small and great? for a measure is that, by which these things are judged. It is so. And by weighing, those skilled in weighing things heavy and light? for a weight is that, by which these things are judged. Yes, it is. And again by numbering, those skilled in numbering things many and few? for number is that by which these things are judged. It is so. But by speaking, as we just now agreed, the judges decide respecting things just and unjust. You speak correctly, Socrates. [3.] It is true then; and speech is that, it seems, by which things just and unjust are judged. What then are things just and unjust? As if a person had asked us—Since a measure, and the measuring art, and the person skilled in measuring, decide which is the greater and the less, what is the greater and the less? Shall we say to him that the greater exceeds, and the

6\iya; dp' Ovk dpiOfitji; 'ET. Nat. m. fitra Sk Tov dpiOpovTivi Ti\vy\ oil ry apiB)iririKy; 'ET. iravv ye. For not only might these words have been lost through ri ApoioTtXevTOV, but they are requisite likewise for the train of thought; since the subject of number is touched upon in § 2, just as all the others are.

11 I have introduced what is requisite for the sense.

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