to house-builders for making a dwelling? So it seems at least to me. Whether then shall we say that those things would be useful, which they make use of for house-building, namely, stones and bricks, and wood, and if there be any thing else of this kind? or that there are tools, with which they make the dwelling, and by which they obtain these things, namely, the wood and the stone, and again, the tools for them? To myself at least it seems, said he, that all these (the tools) are useful for those (the materials). Hence, said I, in the case of the rest of operations, not only are those things 2 (useful), which we make use of for each of the works, but those also, by which we obtain them, and without which they would not exist. It is entirely so. Hence, both for those, who possess these (the tools), and if there be any thing further up,3 and for those who possess these (the materials) and what is further up,* so that at last they come to some infinite multitude, it is necessary for all these to appear useful for their operations. There is nothing, said he, to prevent such from being the case. [27.] Well then, if food and drink, and clothing, and the other things which a person is about to make use of for the body, were in his power, would he want in addition gold and silver, or any thing else, by which he could obtain what was in his power? It appears to me he would not. Would it not then appear to us, that sometimes a person does not want any of those things, which relate to the needs of the body? (Yes.) For he does not 'want them. Hence if they appeared to be useless for this operation, they could not, on the other hand, be deemed to appear useful. For it has been laid down, that it is not possible for things to be at one time useful, and at another useless, as regards the same operation. In this way at least, said he, the same reasoning would hold good to both you and me. For if these were at any time useful for this purpose, it never would happen for them to be on the other hand useless. But now to some operations of depraved doings,

1 In lieu of ois avrov, where the genitive has no meaning, I should prefer οἷς αὐτοὶ— similar to οἷς αὐτοὶ in the next clause, and οἷς αὐτὸς in the next section. Opportunely then two MSS. offer aurois

2 I have adopted, what Horreus suggested, avrà for avroïç, which Fischer calls an hyperbaton.

3—3, and 4—4 I confess I hardly understand the words between the numerals, even if avo be translated "further removed."

55 Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. The Latin version has "Nunc vero dixeris aliquas operas esse rerum malarum,

1 Is it not possible

4

but to others of good.5 I should say so. then for a depraved act to be useful for the working out of some good? It does not seem so to myself at least. But good acts we should say are those, which a man does through virtue. I admit it. Is it not possible for a person to learn some of the things, which are taught by conversation, although he were deprived of hearing, or any thing else?2 By Zeus, it does not seem so to me at least. Hence, of the things useful for virtue hearing would appear 3 to be one,3 if at least virtue is to be taught by hearing, and we make use of it for instruction. It appears so. [28.] Hence, if medical art is able to cure a person diseased, even medical art would sometimes appear to be one of the things useful for virtue, if 6 through it be furnished the power of hearing what relates to the thing to be taught. There is nothing to prevent it. If then again we obtain medical science in return for property, even property would appear to be useful for virtue. Yes, said he; for such it is. Hence, again, in like manner, that (would be useful), by which we could obtain property. Yes, all such by all means. Now does it not seem to you that a person could from acts depraved and disgraceful obtain for himself silver, in return for which he might obtain medical science, or be able to hear, after being unable? and to use that very (hearing) for virtue, or any other things of that kind? To me at least it does seem very much so. Would not then the depraved be useful for virtue? It would. It is not necessary then for those things, by which we can obtain what is useful for each, to be themselves useful for the same. For things depraved would sometimes seem to be useful for a thing that is good. And they

aliquas autem bonarum-" as if the translator wished to read, Nuv de y' ἐρεῖς τινας—μοχθηρῶν εἶναι— to answer to the following, "Εγωγ ̓ ἂν φαίην. This was the doctrine of Rochefoucault, who said that "private vices are public benefits; and of the Jesuits, who said that "the end sanctifies the means."

2_2 I hardly understand the words between the numerals.

33 I have translated, as if εἶναι ἓν had dropt out after ἀκούειν

* Although τὸν νοσοῦντα παύειν might perhaps stand, yet τὸν νοσοῦντ ̓ iarpeve, what I have translated, would be far preferable.

Here again ev has dropt out, I suspect, after xonoiμwv

6 * The Greek is at present διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς— But ἰατρικῆς could not be thus repeated after iarpun Opportunely then does one MS. offer διδακτής in lieu of διὰ τῆς, which leads at once to δι' αὐτῆς τὰ τῆς διδακτής, without ἰατρικῆς : and so I have translated.

would be still more evident in this case.

For if these are

useful for each (of those), without which they would not exist, unless these had existed previously, come (say), how shall we speak of things of this kind? Is it possible for ignorance to be useful for science, or disease for health, or vice for virtue? I should say, not. [29.] And yet we should agree in this, that it is impossible for science to be produced in him, in whom ignorance had not existed previously; or health, in him in whom disease had not (existed); or virtue, in him in whom vice had not. The fact, said he, is so, as it seems to me. Hence it would not be necessary for those things to be useful, without which a thing is not able to exist. For (otherwise) ignorance would appear to be useful for science; and disease, for health; and vice, for virtue. Of these arguments too he was very hard of belief, 2unless all these things shall be property.2 And I, knowing him thoroughly, that it would be an equally hard task to convince him, as, according to the saying, to boil a stone, said— Let us bid a long 3 farewell to these arguments; since we are unable to agree, whether the same things are useful, and a property, or not. But how shall we say on this question? Whether shall we consider a person happier and better, who is in want of the greatest number of things necessary for his body and living, or him, who (is in want) of the fewest and most trifling? Now this question would perhaps be viewed in the best manner, thus. Should one compare a person himself with himself, and consider which of his states is the better, whether, when he happens to be ill, or in health. But this at least, said he, does not require any great consideration. For perhaps, said I, it is easy for every simpleton to know 5 that the state of the person in health is better than that of the person ill. Well then, at what time do we happen to be in want of things more in number and variety? when we are ill, or in

4

This "otherwise " is due to "alioquin,” in the Latin version. 2-2 The words between the numerals I cannot understand, nor could, I think, the Latin translator, whose words are-" Vix etne vix quidem his sermonibus fidem habebat, quod non omnia hæc utilia essent." But ei un could hardly be rendered " quod non."

3 In lieu of aλà, I have translated, as if the Greek were Tоλλà— Here, as in § 18, I have translated, as if the Greek were кáλora, in lieu of μάλιστα

Here av is not the abbreviation of ȧveρúry, but the word which means "senseless."

health? When we are ill. When therefore we happen to be lying in the worst condition for ourselves, we then are greatly in the desire, and the want of the greatest number of things that relate to the pleasures of the body. It is so. [30.] According to the same rule then, 2 as a person is in the best condition for himself, when he is in want of the fewest of these things, so on the other hand, if there were two persons, one of whom happened to be greatly in the desire and want of many things, and the other of few things and moderately so, as for example things of this kind, such men as are diceplayers, others wine-tipplers, and others of a voracious appetite, for all these happen to be nothing else than desires. Very much so.2 Now all desires are nothing else than the want of some things. (Nothing).3 The persons then, who have suffered the most of these, are in a more depraved state than those, who have suffered things of this kind either not at all, or to the least extent. I consider then persons of this kind to be very depraved; and the more they are of this kind, the more depraved. It seems then to us that it is not possible for these things to be useful for this purpose, unless we happen to be in the want of these things for this purpose. I admit it. It is necessary then, if these are about to be useful to us for the care of the wants of the body, that we too should want them for this purpose. So it seems at least to me. He then, to whom the greatest number of things useful for this purpose belongs, would appear to be in want of the greatest number for this purpose, since it is necessary for him to feel a want of all useful things. To me at least it seems to appear in this way. It is necessary therefore, according to this reasoning, for those, to whom there happens to be much property, to be in much want of the things necessary for the care of the body. For the things useful for this purpose have appeared to be property; so that of necessity they, who should appear to us to be the wealthiest, are in the most depraved state, since they are in want of the greatest number of things of this kind.

1 In lieu of rà the syntax and sense require rõv—as I have translated. 22 As the apodosis is wanting in this long-winded sentence, I doubt not there is some error here, which I could, perhaps, correct; but not without alterations which would be considered too violent. Suffice it to say for the present, that Stobæus omits our πáλiv, in which a portion of the difficulty lies.

3 I have with Boeckh adopted the notion of Cornarius, that Ovdèv has dropt out before Oi ovv