1

2

in return for it whatever he happens to want for his living, or money even; in exchange for which he will be able to procure them, and to have on the instant all things in plenty. [6.] Provided, said I, persons existing happen to be in want of his residence, more than of the wisdom of that person; since, if they were such as to value more the wisdom of the man,3 and what results from it, he would have much more to dispose of, if he happened to be in want of any thing, and wished to dispose both of it and the works resulting from it. Surely 5 of the residence the use happens to be much and necessary; and great is the difference to a person in the case of things relating to life, as regards his living in a dwelling of this kind, or in a small and mean tenement; but of wisdom the use costs little, and slight 9 is the difference for a person to be wise or untaught in questions of the greatest moment. 11 And oh! that men should despise the one, and not be buyers of it! but that of cypress for their residence, and Pentelican 12 marble, many should be in want, and willing to purchase! Now would not a person, if he were a clever pilot, or a skilful physician, and able to practise well and creditably his art, 13 or any other of such kind of arts, 13 be of greater value

10

8

1 In lieu of ταῦτα I should prefer τοιαῦτα, “ such things"

* Here again we must read οὐσίαν for οἰκίαν.

3 Since the name of Nestor, who is here alluded to, has not been mentioned recently, I suspect that in ἀνθρώπου lies hid γερηνίου ἱππότουwith reference to the γερήνιος ιππότα Νέστωρ in Homer.

+ I have adopted av exot from Fischer, who correctly saw that av had dropt out after μᾶλλον

5 In lieu of ǹ, which I cannot understand, I have translated, as if the interrogative were written originally.

* Here again one would prefer οὐσίαν to οἰκίαν

'Instead of oikeiv, which is without regimen, the syntax and sense require οἰκοῦντι, as I have translated.

8 Such seems to be here the meaning of ỏλíyov ȧžía, which elsewhere signify "of little value."

• Instead of σμικρά, one would have expected οὐ σμικρά

10 To support the syntax, we must suppose that wore has dropt out before

""The Greek is ǹTOúтov μèv Kaтapρovεiv- I have translated, as if it were Η τὸ τοῦ μὲν καταφρονεῖν— where τοῦ μὲν, referring to τὸ σοφὸν εἶναι, is opposed to τῆς δὲ κυπαρίττου; while on the syntax in τὸ καταφρονεῖν, it will be sufficient to quote Το Δία νομίζειν, in Aristoph. Νεφ. 817.

12 Pentelé was a mountain in Attica famous for its marble.

13_13 The words between the numerals seem strangely introduced here,

1

than any one whatever' of those 2 of the greatest possessions according to substance?2 and would not he, who is able to deliberate well both for himself and another, how he might do the best, be able to dispose (of his skill),3 if he wished to do so?

[7.] (On this) Eryxias, taking up the discourse, and looking with his eyes under, as if he had been injuriously treated,5 observed-And would you, Socrates, if one must speak the truth of you, assert that you are wealthier than Callias,6 the son of Hipponicus? And yet you would acknowledge that you are not less taught (than he is) on matters of the greatest moment, but wiser rather; and still you are not on this account the wealthier. For perhaps you imagine, Eryxias, said I, that these arguments, which we are now discussing, are a sport, since the facts are not really so; but that they are like pebbles in the pebble-game, which if a person cleverly 7 brings forward, he will be able to cause the opposite players to be beaten, so as not to have what they can bring forward against those movements. Perhaps then you imagine, that matters are thus without any reference to the rich; and that there are certain arguments in no respects either true or and so thought Clericus and Horreus. Fischer defends them by quoting the translation of Pirckheimer, "aut alius quispiam simili arte præditus," who evidently wished to read ἤ τις ἄλλος τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων τεχνίτης ὢν in lieu of ἤ τιν ̓ ἄλλην τῶν τοιουτοτρόπων τεχνῶν

9

This is the proper English translation of ovdevòç Öтov oùк in Greek, literally "no one not-"

2-2 Although this may perhaps be understood, yet I should prefer κεκλημένων το κτημάτων, in English, " of those called the greatest as regards their means-"

3 I have added "of his skill," to complete the sense.

44 In lieu of ὑποβλέψας I should prefer the Homeric ὑπόδρα βλέψας, where the Schol. explains υπόδρα by δεινὸν, ὀργίλον.

5 How Eryxias could fancy he had been injuriously treated, I cannot understand. Hence I suspect the author wrote δακνόμενος, not ἀδικούμεvoç. See my note on Soph. Philoct. 377.

6 On the wealth of Callias see Schol. on Aristoph. Barp., 431, and Hemsterhuis on Lucian Timon, § 24.

7 Instead of pépoiro, which could not be thus used in the middle voice, as shown by the subsequent avripέpwoi, the author wrote, I suspect, pépoι eu, as I have translated.

The description here given of the pebble-game, applies equally well to chess, draughts, and backgammon.

In lieu of Trãσ0αι, which seems somewhat too much here, I should prefer ioráolai, "to be at a stand-still—”

false, by detailing which, a person may get the better of his opponents, how that the wisest are likewise the wealthiest, and by saying these of such a kind of falsehood of persons saying true. And perhaps there is nothing wonderful in this; just as if two persons should be speaking about letters, one asserting that sigma (a) begins the word Socrates, but the other alpha (a), the argument of the party, who says that alpha (a) begins, should be superior to his, who says that sigma (o) does.

4

[8.] And, looking round to the parties present, Eryxias observed, smiling at the same time, and blushing, 2 as if he had not been present2 during what had been said before, I did not imagine, Socrates, that there was any need of arguments of that kind, by which a person would be able to persuade not one of those, who are present,3 nor be benefited by them. For who is there with any intellect, who would be persuaded that the richest are the wisest? but would rather be informed with greater delight, if it is necessary to talk about being wealthy, from whence it is honourable to be wealthy, and from whence disgraceful, and what it is to be wealthy, whether a good or an evil. Be it so, said I. Henceforth then we will be on our guard; and you do right in admonishing me. But why do not you yourself, since you have introduced the subject, endeavour to state whether it seems to you to be a good or an evil to be wealthy? especially since the previous arguments do not appear to have been spoken with reference to this point."

[9.] To myself then for the present 5 it seems that to be

The

Such is the literal version of the unintelligible Greek. author wrote, what might be got at, I think, by a bold conjecture. 2-2 Why Eryxias should blush, in consequence of his being supposed to have been not present at the former part of the discourse, I cannot understand. I could have understood, had the author written, what I suspect he did write, ὥσπερ ἀπορῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λελεγμένοις, as if having been in a difficulty during the preceding conversation-" for that would have been a fair ground for blushing. And similarly one would prefer ἀπορούντων for παροντων just afterwards (3). The error has arisen from § 12.

I have translated, as if the Greek were originally, watoɩ, si deĩ— holov not as at present, éπeidǹ deiv— which I cannot understand. On the loss or confusion of matev, see my note on Legg. ix. p. 127, n. 2, while on ἡδέως, or ἥδιον, οι ἥδιστα, united to verbs of hearing or understanding, see Ast's "Lexicon Platonicum," in 'Hoέwç.

In lieu of Toívvv, the sense requires rà võv, as I have translated.

wealthy is a good. But while he was still desirous to state something, Critias suddenly interrupted him (by saying)Tell me, Eryxias, do you consider it a good to be wealthy? Yes, I do, by Zeus. For I should be mad (if I did not); and I think there is not a single person, who would not say so too. And yet, said the other,2 I think too that there is not a single person, whom I could not cause3 to say with myself that to some men it is an evil to be wealthy. If then it were a good, it would not have appeared to some to be an evil. Hereupon I said to them that-If ye happened to be at variance about this point, which of you two is speaking with the greater truth about horsemanship, how a person would ride the best, and had I myself happened to be skilled in horsemanship, I would have endeavoured to cause you to cease from your differences in opinion; for I should have been ashamed had I not, if present, prevented, as far as I could, your being at variance; or if you had been at variance upon any other matter whatever, and were about to separate not at all, unless you agreed upon this, rather as enemies instead of being friends. But now, since you happen to be at variance upon an affair of this kind, of which there must needs be the use through the whole of life, and a great difference, whether we are to attend to it, as being beneficial or not; and this too as being a part not of trifling questions, but of those that are thought to be the greatest by the Greeks, since fathers recommend this as the first point to their children, as soon as they arrive at the age for reflecting upon 5 what they ought; 5 and 6 they seem

On this sense of vπо крovε see Aristoph. Ach. 38.

2 Boeckh would read ò έraipoç, "his friend," for he says that ò etεpos is scarcely found thus used elsewhere in Plato or his imitators.

3 The sense and syntax evidently require onσɛia, the Attic aor. 1, optat., or roinoas, in lieu of Toñσai, which is without regimen.

The Greek is tovrì μãλλov—võv dè— But first, there is nothing to which rouri can be referred; and secondly, μãλλov could not be thus repeated after the preceding paλov; and lastly, the propositions, laid down after vuv dè, want their proper conclusion. I have therefore little doubt but that the author wrote, εἰ μὴ ὁμολογοῖτε, ἐχθρὼ ἀντὶ φίλων ἀπαλλαγῆναι· νῦν δὲ τοῦτ ̓ ἔτι μᾶλλον σπεύδειν δεῖ, ἐπειδὴ— for σπεύδειν δεῖ might easily have been lost through ἐπειδὴ—

55 In τοῦ ἤδη φρονεῖν, where ἤδη is perfectly unintelligible, evidently lie hid τοῦ, ἃ δεῖ, φρονεῖν—

• I have translated as if raì, not ws, were written here originally. The two words are constantly confounded. See Markland on Eurip. Iph. A. 173.

you

to consider from whence they shall become wealthy; 'so that should you possess anything you are worth something, but if not, nothing. [10.] If then this object is made so violently a serious pursuit, and you, who agree on other matters, differ upon this one of such great moment, and still in addition are at variance on the question of wealth, not whether it is of a 2 black colour or white,2 nor whether of a light weight or heavy, but whether it is an evil or a good, so as even to be arrayed to the extreme of enmity, should you be at variance about things evil and good, and this too, although you are friends as much as possible, and relations, I will not, as far as rests with myself, neglect you, while at variance with each other; but, if I were able myself, I would tell you how the case stands, and cause you to cease from your difference (in opinion). But now, since I happen to be not able, and each of you thinks himself able to cause the other to agree with him, I am prepared to take a part (in the discussion), as far as I can, in order that it may be agreed upon by you how the matter stands. Do you then, Critias, said I, endeavour to cause us to agree with you, as you have undertaken to do.

[11.] I would, said he, as I have begun, gladly ask Eryxias here, whether there seem to him to be men unjust and just. By Zeus, said he, and very much so. Well then, to act unjustly seems it to you to be an evil or a good? To me at least an evil. Would a man, who commits adultery with his neighbours' wives by means of money, seem to you to act unjustly? and this too when the state and the laws forbid it. To me at least he would seem to act unjustly. Consequently, said he, if the unjust man happens to be wealthy, and 3both able and willing to expend money,3 he would go astray; but if it were not his fortune to be rich, he would not have the means of expending, nor would he be able to accomplish what he wished, so that he would not even go astray. Hence it would be a greater benefit to the party to be not wealthy,

Fischer quotes opportunely Horace Sat. i. 1, 62, "Nil satis est, inquit; quia tanti, quantum habeas, sis.”

Here is an allusion to the dark colour of iron, the coin of Sparta, and the white colour of silver, the coin of Athens.

3_3 I have translated, as if the author had originally written, what is required by the sense, δυνατὸς καὶ βουλόμενος ἀναλῶσαι ὁ ἄδικος ἄνθρωπος, not as at present, δυνατὸς ἀναλῶσαι ὁ ἀδικός τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ Bovλóμevos, which I cannot understand.