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arms, either the lighter, like mountaineers, or the heavier, like persons living 1 on hilly plains;1 and some would practise cavalry exercise. But in this state he does not lay down by laws that women are to be in common.

Political virtue is therefore contemplative and practical, 2and that which chooses2 to make a state good and happy, and 3of one mind and of one voice;3 (and) it enjoins commands, and has under it the science of war, and generalship, 4and law-judgments. For Political science considers ten thousand other matters, and especially this very one, whether we must engage in war or not.4

[34.] On the Sophist.

It has been stated before what kind of person is the philosopher. From him the Sophist differs, first in manner, in that he is 5 the seeker of pay from young persons,5 and is willing to be considered 6 a person with bodily and mental accomplishments,6 rather than to be so; and (secondly) in matter, in that the philosopher is conversant with things existing for ever and in the same state; while the Sophist busies himself about that which is not, and 'retires to a spot, difficult to be seen on account of its darkness.7 For to that,

11 Such is the literal version of ytwXo^oic—irtSioig. But as such a combination of words is unintelligible, opportunely has Ficinus " littora," which has led me to believe that the author wrote iv aiyiaXoig Ti a</>t\kmvweBioig— where d^eXsow—Jmjioic may be compared with &<pt\iov wtSiwv in Aristoph. 'Ijr7r. 524. Stanley avoids all the difficulty by putting into English the Latin of Ficinus, "et armaturam leviorem, qui montes colant; graviorem, qui littora."

s* Ficinus, " quae eligit atque proponit—"

33 Ficinus, " secum maxime consentientem—" Stanley, " and convenient to itself."

*—* Ficinus omits here Kox StKatrTiKrjv, but adds at the end of his § 31, = 28 here, the Supplement following, which evidently belongs to this place, "Et ut rempublicam gubernat, civilis scientia nuncupatnr; cujus sunt officia duo, leges condere et conditas exsequi; prima vofioOerun), id est legum positive ; secunda iiKaariKri, id est judiciaria nominatur; considerat denique civilis peritia ea, quae ad pacem, et quae ad bellum pertinent, et in eo cum alia plurima, turn hoc preecipue, bellumne ineundum sit an potius renuendum."

*—5 See Sophist, p. 231, D. § 36, v'tav ral vkovmav ifi)w79oQ Or/ptvrig — from whence one would read here t\ip.irfiov 8r\aa\ia in lieu of IttoOapvia

*—" Such is the proper rendering of «caXdc eat aya86g.

'—7 Compare Sophist, p. 254, A. § 84, 'O pip (troipioTi)c) airoltlpaa


which is, that, which is not, is not opposed. For the latter is unsubstantial and unintelligible, nor has it any basis; and which, if a person were compelled to speak of, or to think upon, he would be overthrown,1 through his bringing a battle around himself.2 Now that which is not, as far as it is understood,3 is not a naked negation of what is, *but (it is) with a joint-meaning as regards another thing, which follows upon the primary being ;4 5 so that, unless these too had participated in that, which is not, they would not have been separated from the others.5 But now, as many soever as are the beings that are, so many times is the being, which is not. For that, which is a not-being, is not a being.

So much it suffices to be said for an Introduction to the doctrine-making of Plato; of which a part has been stated in an orderly manner; but a part dispersedly and in no order; 6 so that it is in the power of any one,6 from what has been said, to become contemplative and detective of the rest of his doctrines by following out these.7

ravtnjaat \a\iit6s. From whence I have, with Ficinus, omitted tai between OKoTiivbv and Svahoparov.

1 Ficinus, " oberrabit atque tergiversabitur—" as if his MS. read something else than dvarpairi)otrai. Stanley, "he is deceived, because he putteth together things contrary and repugnant—" which is not even a paraphrase, much less a translation.

2 I have translated, as if the Greek were avriv iv tavrf— not oW iv iavrif— for Ficinus has " secum ipse pugnet atque dissideat—"

1 Ficinus renders HaKoverai, "pronuntiatum auditur—"

4* Such is the literal version of the Greek. Ficinus has " sed cum suspicione quadam et subinsinuatione alterius, quod quidem modo aliquo ipsum, quod est, comitatur;" where " modo aliquo" would lead to rpoir<p rip, in lieu of Tif Tpoirqi, which Heinsius corrected into r<f rpuTif. Stanley, " Yet that, which is not, as far as it is spoken, is not a pure negation of that which is, but implieth a relation to another, which in some measure is joined to Ens."

s—' Stanley, " so that, unless we assume something from that, which is, to that, which is not, it cannot be distinguished from other things."

•—• I have translated, as if the Greek were Ivov rtvac, not /livroi, which could not follow were—

'I have translated, as if Tovtuiv had dropt out before nai T&v \oiriv— And so probably read the MS. of Ficinus, whose version is "uthorum vestigiis reliqua etiam—"





[ 1. ] That 1 for a person about to enter upon2 the Dialogues of Plato, it is fitting that he should know previously what a Dialogue is. For neither without some art and power3 have dialogues been written, nor is it easy for a person, unskilled in contemplation, to know them artistically. It is agreeable then for a philosopher, who is making for himself an insight into every matter of whatever kind, to examine, (first,)4 the essence of the thing, and afterwards, what power it has, and not with reference to what is naturally useful and what is not. Now (Plato) says thus—5 "On every matter, O boy, there is one commencement to those about to consult properly. It is needful to know, about what is the consultation; or else there must needs be an erring in this matter. Now it lies hid from the majority, that they do not know the essence of each thing; (but), as if they did know, they do not, at the commencement

1 From the word "Oh, here and elsewhere, it is evident that the whole of this Introduction is merely an extract from a longer treatise.

1 I have translated, here and elsewhere, ivTvxx"vtlvi "t0 enter upon," or " to meet with," as being a meaning more nearly allied to the derivation of the word than " to read," the sense given by others.

• Perhaps " meaning" would be the proper rendering.

* I have translated, as if fire had dropt out after rrpi, to answer to tmira

1 In Phfedr. p. 237, C. § 29, from whence Fischer reads here moi Tovto instead of Trapd rouro—

of the inquiry, agree (amongst themselves),1 but as they proceed, sthey pay the reasonable (penalty);2 for they agree neither with themselves nor with others." In order then that we may not suffer this,3 while entering upon the Dialogues of Plato, let us consider this very thing, which I have spoken of, what is a dialogue. 4 [For neither without some art and power have dialogues been written.]4 5It is then nothing else than a discourse composed of question and answer upon some political or philosophical matter, combined with a becoming delineation of the manners of the characters introduced, and the arrangement as regards their diction.6

[2.] Now a dialogue is called a discourse, as a man (is called) an animal. But since of a discourse there is one kind arranged (in the mind)6 and another pronounced (by the mouth),7 let us hear about the one pronounced (by the mouth). And since of the latter there is one kind spoken, as a continued narration, and another by question and answer, questions and answers are the peculiar mark of a dialogue; 8 from whence it is said to be a discourse8 by interrogation; and moreover9 it is applied to some political and philosophical matter; because it is meet for the subject matter to be related to the dialogue.10 Now the matter is that relating to politics and philosophy.11 For as the matter of fables is laid down as adapted to tragedy and poetry in general, so is to dialogue philosophy, that is (to say), what relates to philosophy. But as regards that, which is combined with a becoming deline

1 So Heindorf explains o'lo/joXoyoCvrai, which Fischer has restored here, in lieu of out o/ioXoyovirec, from the passage referred to. For the active tytoXoyoivrtc would require iavroic, as shown by Alcibiad. I. p. Ill, E., quoted by Heindorf, ol jroXXoi Sokovoi aoi b/ioXoyitv avroi iavroii.

72 So Heindorf understands ro ei'icoc diroStSoam. 'One would prefer ro avrb, " in the same way." '—4 The words between the brackets are evidently a needless repetition.

55 The same definition of a dialogue is found in Diogen. L. iii. 48. * 1 I have added the words between the lunes for the sake of perspicuity.

s8 I have translated, as if the Greek were '68tv Xoyoc, not '69tv b M. yoe— where the article is improperly introduced.

8 I have translated, as if the Greek were In Si, not rb St—■ One would expect here here, " the discourse," not SiaXoytj).

"To complete the definition, one would have expected to find something added to this effect, "which is discussed the best during a dialogue." ation of the manners of the characters introduced, (and) their being different in their discourses through life, some as philosophers, and others as sophists, it is requisite to assign to each their peculiar manners; to the philosopher that, which is noble, and simple, and truth-loving; but to the sophist that, which is of many hues, and tricky, and reputationloving; but to an individual what is peculiar to him. Added to this, '(the definition) speaks likewise of the arrangement,1 as regards their diction; and reasonably so. For as 2the measure ought to be2 adapted to tragedy and comedy, and the fiction (of the subject) to the bruited story, so ought the diction and composition, adapted to the dialogue, possess what belongs 3to the grace of an Attic style,3 and is neither superfluous nor deficient.

[3.] But if a so-called discourse, not being made in the form, as I have laid down, but deficient on these points, is said to be a dialogue, it will not be said so correctly. 4 Thus that, which is said in the case of Thucydides to belong to the power to represent the peculiarity of dialogues, but rather two public speeches composed on set purpose against each other.4—Since then we have ascertained what is a dialogue, let us look into the different kinds of the Platonic dialogue, that is, into their characteristics, how many are the topmost,8 and how many of them 6 exist subdivided into the uncut.6

[4.] As regards their characteristics, which are two, one explanatory and the other exploratory, the explanatory is suited to the teaching and practice of truth, but the explora

11 I have translated, as if o opof had dropt out before <pr)tri— and irepi after caTaaKevijg— Fabricius too perceived that 7repi was wanting here.

*—* Here too I have translated, as if the Greek were olxtiov tlvai To fitrpov— not To oUtiov fikrpov

*—' The Greek is ro 'attikov, To tvxapi— as if two things were mentioned; whereas, since T6 'attikov is To tvxapi, the author probably wrote, what I have translated, Tov 'attikov To e«x«P'—

4—' Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where it is to be hoped that some of the MSS., not hitherto collated, either exhibit what the author wrote, or furnish a clue to it.

4 On the uncertainty in the meaning of oi dvwrdru, see in the Life of Plato by Diogenes, § 49.

*—4 I confess I cannot understand the words between the numerals, and especially how the middle aor., iarqaavTo, could be found here.

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