faculty; another, in the body; another, in an encampment1 and wealth; and another, in doing and suffering.

[98.] Of philanthropy there are three kinds; one exists by being of an easy address,2 as when some persons accost all they happen to meet, and, throwing out the right hand, give them a greeting;3 another kind is, when a person affords assistance to every one in misfortune; another kind 4[of philanthropy] is, when persons are liberal in feastings. Of philanthropy then there is one kind, in addressing; another, in acting kindly; and another, in feasting and being fond of society.

[99.]5 Felicity is divided into five parts. One is in well planning; another, in a sound state of the senses, and in bodily health; the third is in good fortune in one's doings; the fourth in a good repute amongst men; and the fifth in an abundance of means, and of things useful for life. (Of these) well-planning comes from instruction and from being skilled in many matters; a sound state of the senses from the members of the body, as when a person sees with his eyes, and hears with his ears, and perceives with his nose and mouth, what he should perceive. Now a thing of this kind is a sound state of the senses. And good fortune is, when a person proceeds in the right road to what he is aiming at, and accomplishes, what it is meet for a man, who is in earnest, to do. And good repute is, when a person hears himself well spoken of. And abundance of means is, when a person is so situated with respect to the use of things in life, that he can benefit friends and indulge in expense on a large scale and in an easy manner. Now he, in whom all these circumstances meet, is completely happy. Of felicity then, well-planning is

Such is the literal meaning of orрarónedov. But it is sometimes taken in the sense of στράτευμα, 66 an army."

2 I have adopted Casaubon's correction, επрoσnyopías in lieu of προσηγορίας

3-3 Menage quotes from Plautus-" me benignius Omnes salutant— copulantur dexteras-" He might have added Aristoph. Plut. 784, ǹoπάζοντο καὶ Ἐδεξιοῦντο.

The words between the brackets are quite superfluous.

5 This section in Menage's edition begins with ǹ μèv eỷßovλía, a little lower.

66 I have translated, as if the Greek were ὅταν ἐὼν ἐφ ̓ ἃ σκοπεῖ, κατ ̓ ὀρθὸν, πράξη— not ὅταν ἐφ ̓ ἃ σκοπεῖ πράξῃ κατ' ὀρθὸν. But ἐφ ̓ ἂ would require to be united to a verb of motion.

one part; a sound state of the senses and bodily health another; and another, good fortune; another, good repute; and another, an abundance of means.

[100.] Arts are divided into three (kinds), first, second, and third. The first is, that of mining for minerals, and of felling wood; for they are preparative: (the second)1 is that of the smith and carpenter; for they are shape-giving; since from iron the smith forms arms, and from wood the carpenter pipes and lyres: and (the third)2 is that of the party using materials, as the horseman makes use of reins; the warrior of arms; and the musician of pipes and a lyre. there are three kinds; that, which is the first; the second; and that, which is the third.

Of art then that, which is

One of which

[101.] The good is divided into four kinds. we say is in a person possessing virtue, peculiarly a good; another we speak of, as being a good in itself, namely, virtue and justice; (we speak) of the third, as, for example, food, and suitable exercise, and drugs; the fourth good we say is such a thing, as the art of the piper, and of the actor, and such like. Of the good then there are four kinds; one, to possess virtue; another is, virtue itself; a third is, food, and useful exercise; and a fourth good we say is, the art of the piper, and actor, and poet.3

[102.] Of existing things some are bad, some good, and some neither one or the other. Of these we say those are bad, which are able to do ever a mischief, such as intemperance, and thoughtlessness, and injustice, and such like things. But the opposites to these are good. But some things are able at one time to benefit, and at another to do a mischief, as to walk, and to sit down, and to eat; or wholly unable to either benefit or hurt; and these are neither good nor bad. Of existing things then, some are good, some bad, and some neither the one or the other.

[103.] A good state of law is divided into three kinds; one, when the laws are carefully made, we say is a good state of

5

5

1 I have supplied here and in 2 the words that seem necessary for the

sense.

Since the poet is not mentioned by name before, he must be considered as included in the general expression καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Compare Gorgias, p. 467, D. § 52.

55 Such seems to be the meaning of σrovdato, which is not elsewhere, if 1 rightly remember, applied to vóμo.

law; another, when the citizens abide by the laws laid down; and this we say is a good state of law; the third, when, although there are not laws, yet persons conduct themselves correctly as citizens, according to custom and (proper) pursuits; and this we call a good state of law. Of a good state of law then, one kind is, that laws be carefully made; another, that persons abide by existing laws; and a third, when they conduct themselves as citizens according to custom and proper pursuits.

1

A bad state of law is divided into three kinds; one of which is, when the laws are bad, as regards 'strangers and citizens ;1 another, when persons do not obey the existing (laws); and another, when there is no law at all. Of a bad state of law then, one kind is in there being bad laws; another, in persons not obeying those that exist; and a third, in there being no law.

4

[104.]2 Opposites are divided into three kinds-as we say that good things are opposite to bad; and3 justice to injustice, and prudence to imprudence, and such like; and that bad things likewise are opposite to bad, (such as) prodigality to illiberality, and the being unjustly put on the rack to being treated so justly; and such like 5[bad things are the opposite to bad];5 6 and some, as being neither the one nor the other, are opposite to those, that are neither the one nor the other, as for instance, the being poor to the being rich; for each by itself is neither good nor bad; and similarly opposite is light to heavy, and quick to slow. Of opposites then, some things,

The strangers are here strangely mentioned before the citizens. This section begins in Menage's ed. with tεpov dè, ¿àv— a little above.

3 In lieu of g, the sense requires kai- On the confusion in those words, see Markland on Iph. A. 173.

4 The flow of ideas evidently leads to τῇ ἀνελευθερίᾳ, instead of καὶ τὴν ἀνελευθερίαν

5-5 The words between the numerals, κaкà kakoïç έvavría ori, are clearly superfluous after the preceding κακὰ δὲ κακοῖς ἐναντία εἶναι.

The words between the numerals are made out of two readings; one found in ed. Steph., τὰ δὲ, ὡς οὐδετέρως οὐδέτερα, οἷον τὸ πένεσθαι τῷ πλουτεῖν· ἑκάτερον γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ οὔτ ̓ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· ἐναντία δὲ öμws Tò dè Baρù— and the other in ed. Menag., where all those words are omitted, while the following period is closed with ὡς οὐδέτερα οὐδε τέρως ἐναντία ἐστι— and hence it is easy to see that the author wrote τὰ

as being good, are opposite to bad; and some, as being bad, (are opposite) to bad; and some, as being neither one nor the other, (are opposite) to those that are neither one nor the

other.

[105.] Of good things there are three kinds; some are to be had, some to be shared in, some (meet) to be in existence. Those to be had are, as many as it is possible to have, such as justice and health; those to be shared are, as many as it is not possible to have, but of which it is possible to have a share; for instance, it is not possible to have the good itself, but it is possible to have a share of it; and those (meet) to be in existence are as many as it is not possible either to have a share of them or to have, but as many as are meet to be in existence; for example, to be earnest in a matter and just: now these things it is possible neither to have nor to share in them, but they are meet to be in existence 2[to be earnest in a matter and just.]2 Of good things then some are to be had, some to be shared in, and some (meet) to be in existence.

[106.] Counselling is divided into three (kinds). One is taken from the past, one from the future, and one from the present. Things (taken) from the past are examples, as— "What did the Lacedæmonians suffer by trusting?" Things

δὲ ὡς οὐδέτερα οὐδετέροις ἐναντία ἐστι, οἷον τὸ πένεσθαι τῷ πλουτεῖν· οὐδέτερον γὰρ κατ' αὐτὸ οὔτ ̓ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακόν· ἐναντία δ ̓ ὁμοίως τό τε Bapu The reading of ed. Steph. has been followed by E. Smith in his version" Thirdly, where there is a contrariety between things neither good nor bad, as poverty and riches; for neither are good in themselves, yet contrary one to another. In like manner ponderosity and levity,

swift and slow," &c., p. 59.

1 This section begins in Menage's ed. with ruv ivavríwv äpa—in the preceding period.

22 The words between the numerals are evidently superfluous. 3 This section begins in Menage's ed. with τwv åya¤~v äpa—in the preceding period.

I confess I do not know to what circumstance the author is alluding, unless it be the one mentioned by Thucydides in v. 45, relating to the trick played upon the Spartan ambassadors by Alcibiades, in whose words they placed too implicit confidence. Still less do I know how the following words crept into the Latin translation before ri ëπalov—“ quid prudenter egerit (gens) ut caveamus;" from which came the version of E. Smith, "The time past affords us examples, when we consider what the Lacedæmonians suffered through their over-confidence; what they bravely acted for our imitation."

266

from the present; as for instance, 1" to show that the walls are weak, the people cowards, (and) bread-corn1 scarce." Things from the future, as for instance, "Not to do wrong through suspicion to an embassy, lest Greece should be in bad repute."2 In counselling then there are matters (taken) from the past, the present, and the future.

[107.] Voice is divided into two (kinds); one is with life, and one without life; that with life is of living beings, that without life is sounds and noises. Of voice with life one kind is expressed by letters, and one not expressed by letters. That expressed by letters is of men; that not expressed by letters is of animals. Of voice then there is one with life, and one without life.3

3

[108.] Of existing things, some are divisible and some indivisible. And of the divisible, some are with similar parts, some with dissimilar parts. Now the indivisible are as many as have no division, or are not composed of something; as for instance, unity, a point, and a sound; but the divisible are as many as are composed of something; as for instance, syllables, and concords, and animals, and water,5 and gold. Now those with similar parts are as many as are composed of similar things, and where the whole differs in nothing from the part, except in multitude; as for instance, water, and gold, and every thing that is fusible, and such like; but those with dissimilar parts are as many as are composed of dissimilar parts; as for instance, a dwelling and such like things. Of existing things then some are divisible and some indivisible; and of the divisible some are with similar parts and some with dissimilar parts.

Here I am quite at a loss as to the event alluded to.

6

Here again I must leave for others to discover what the author is alluding to.

33 To complete the summary one would have expected to find ἐγγράμματος after ἔμψυχος, and ἀγράμματος after ἄψυχος.

This section begins in Menage's ed. with kai opoloμεon-somewhat

further on.

This introduction of water seems very strange here amongst the things that are composed of something. One would have expected rather δένδρα in lieu of ὕδωρ

I have adopted Huebner's correction, xuròv for Tuxòv—

Instead of auɛon one would have preferred àμépiora, given as a var. lect. by Stephens, as better opposed to μepioτá.