1 Shame-a fear on the expectation of dishonour.' Vain-gloriousness—a habit of laying claim to a good or good things, not belonging to a person. Sinning-acting contrary to right reason. 2 Envy a pain at the good things of friends, which either are or have been. Shamelessness-a habit of the soul, that endures dishonour for the sake of gain. Rashness-the excess of boldness in the case of dangers, 3 which it ought not.3 A love of honour-a habit of the soul, lavish of every expense without consideration. Natural depravity—a badness by nature, and a sinning in that, which is according to nature; a disease of that, which is according to nature.1 Hope the expectation of a good. Madness- -a habit destructive of a correct perception. Talkativeness-intemperance in speech, devoid of reason. Contrariety-the greatest standing apart of things, that according to a certain difference fall under the same genus. Involuntary-that which is brought to an end contrary to intention. Instruction—a power that has the cure of the soul. Legislation-the science that renders a state firmly fixed (and without suffering.) 5 vii. 112. A similar definition in Aristotle's Rhetor. § 6, and Diogenes L. 2 Although piλwv seems to be defended by Aristotle in Rhetor. ii. 10, yet one would have preferred aλwv, similar to the definition in Diogenes L. vii. 111, φθόνον, λύπην ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς. Proclus, ii. p. 110, φθόνος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς λυπή. Corradus seems to have wished to read ποτε γενησομένοις in lieu of ποτε γεγενημένοις. For his version is, "vel olim futura sint." 33 Such is the literal version of oùç μǹ deĩ, which I cannot understand; nor could Stephens, whose version is "ubi non est opus," as if he wished to read ou-Ficinus has "quæ metuenda sunt," which seems to lead to οἷς ή δεῖμα. ++ Such is the version of νόσος τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, which is equally unintelligible in Greek, and in English, and in the Latin of Ficinus and Stephens, "morbus ejus quod est secundum naturam," and of Corradus, "morbus in natura insitus." ss In lieu of εὐπαγής three MSS. offer ἀπαθὴς, one ἀγαθοῦ, and one ȧyaons. By selecting from all what seems to be the best suited to the Admonition-a speech that finds fault from design; a speech for the sake of turning aside from error. Assistance—the hindering an ill either existing or in the way of existing. Punishment-a curing of the soul for an error committed. 1Power-a superiority in doing or speaking; a habit according to which that, which possesses it, is powerful; a strength according to nature. To preserve-to protect from hurt.1 2(Science is a knowledge without stumbling.) 2 sense, I have elicited, ɛvñaуoûç кaì árabouç, what I have translated. Ficinus has "tumultu vacuam," answering to evalоvç. 11 These two definitions are thus separated in the version of Ficinus, "Potestas, excellentia in agendis seu dicendis; habitus, quo potentes efficimur. Robur, vis unum quidque in natura servans eo, quod detrimenta devitat;" but united in that of Corradus, "Potentia, in actione vel in sermone præstantia; habitus, quem qui habet, potens est; vis hominem naturaliter servans vel tutum efficiens." 22 This last definition, omitted by Bekker, is found in one MS. alone. INTRODUCTION то THE TREATISE OF TIMÆUS. Or this short treatise, relating to a Cosmogony according to the Pythagorean theory, the authorship used to be attributed to Timæus the Locrian, until Meiners adduced arguments to show that the work was the production of a more modern writer. The genuine writings of the Locrian philosopher had so completely disappeared before the time of Aristotle, that he seems to have known nothing about them, as may be inferred from what he says in Metaphysic. i. 6, p. 649, B. In confirmation of this decision, which has been adopted by nearly all subsequent writers on the subject, De Gelder has been led to express his belief that the work was written by some philosopher, who lived in the second century of the Christian era, and amused himself with drawing up an abridgment of the Timæus of Plato, adopting what he conceived to be the Doric dialect, with the view of enabling him to palm it off as a genuine production of the Locrian philosopher. But though we know that similar deceptions have been practised at different times, yet even De Gelder himself confesses his inability to discover the motives that could lead the unknown author to commit the forgery. Hence we may fairly imagine that it was done at an earlier period, when the Ptolemies were collecting the works of older writers to adorn their library at Alexandria. And this deception the writer was enabled to carry on with the greater success, as he has been careful to introduce, doubtless from the work of a Pythagorean, some marked discrepancies, duly noticed by De Gelder in Præf. p. xi., from the Timæus of Plato, of whose treatise his own is in other respects little more than an abridgment. At the present day the treatise is held in so little honour, that De Gelder offered an apology for publishing it at Leyden in 1836. But the time has been, when it was highly esteemed as the genuine production of that very philosopher, whose ideas Plato was thought to have developed in his Timæus; and it was accordingly translated into Latin by Georgius Valla, Simon Passiensis, called likewise Bevilaqua, and Nogarola, whose versions were printed respectively at Venice in 1488, 1498, and 1555, and subsequently by Cornarius, fol. Bas. 1561. Of versions of it in modern languages, a French one appeared at Berlin, 1763, by the Marquis d' Argens, and another at Paris in 1768, by the Abbé Batteux, the former accompanied with an elaborate Preface and Commentary, and the latter with some sensible notes and a few various readings from three Paris MSS. There is likewise a German translation by Schulthes, first published at Zurich in 1779, and again in 1842. It is said by Fabricius to have been translated into English by T. Stanley, in his "History of Philosophy;" but such is not the fact; and equally incorrect is the Bipont editor of Plato, by whom De Gelder has been misled, in attributing a Latin translation of the treatise to Ficinus. THE TREATISE OF TIMEUS THE LOCRIAN ON THE SOUL OF THE WORLD AND NATURE. [1.] TIMEUS the Locrian asserted this-that of all the things in the Universe there are two causes, (one) 1 Mind, (the cause) of things existing according to reason; (the other) Necessity, (the cause) of things (existing) by (some) force, according to the powers of bodies; and that the former of these is of the nature of the good, and is called god, and the principle of things that are the best; but what come after this and are co-causes, are referred to Necessity; but that, as regards the things in the Universe, there are Form, Matter, and the Perceptible, which is, as it were, a production from the two (others); and that the former (namely, Form)2 is unproduced, and unmoved, and stationary,3 and of the nature of the same, and perceptible by the mind, and a pattern of such things produced, as exist by a state of change; for that some such thing as this is Form spoken of and conceived to What the author here, and Plato in Tim. p. 48, A., and 68, E., consider as the two distinct powers of Mind and Necessity, are said by Euripides in Tro. 890, to be singly another name for Zeus. 2 As there are three things mentioned, Valck. wished, to prevent all uncertainty, to read rò μèv eidos in lieu of rò μèv eîuev, referring to Tim. p. 51, A. Had he lived to know that five MSS. offer ràv for rò, and eight add ἀεὶ after εἶμεν, he would perhaps have suggested τὴν μὲν εἶμεν ἰδέαν. 3 Since μένον is the same as ἀκίνατον, Valck. suggested μόνον. But one would prefer μovas, for the "monad" was of the nature of the same; while to avoid the repetition in μονὰς τε καὶ τᾶς ταὐτῶ φύσιος, it is easy to read μονὰς, ἐκ τᾶς ταὐτῶ φύσιος ἰοῦσα—“ proceeding from the nature of the same." |